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Case No. 20160500-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
JAMES CHRISTOPHER MCCALLIE, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Brief of Petitioner 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court 
of Appeals in State v. McCallie, 2016 UT App 4,369 P.3d 103 (Addendum A). 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3) 
(West Supp. 2016). 
INTRODUCTION 
Fifty years ago, Miranda v. Arizona required police to warn a person 
they are about to question that (1) the person has the right not to talk to 
them, and (2) if he does talk to the1n, anything he says can and will be used 
against him in court. Since then, Miranda warnings have "become so 
embedded in routine police practice [that they] have become part of our 
national culture." Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000). But 
despite the universal understanding that anything a person says to police 
will be used against him in court, the court of appeals has now held that 
many things a person says to police actually cannot be used against him in 
court. And this is true, the court of appeals concluded, even when the 
statements conflict with the defendant's trial testiinony. 
Under Doyle v. Ohio, a person who chooses to exercise his right not to 
talk to police cannot have his silence used to impeach his testiinony at trial. 
According to the court of appeals, silence includes statements about the 
interrogation rather than about the crime. 
Here, Defendant did not choose to exercise his right not to talk to 
police when they tried to question him about a shooting that had happened 
only moments before they arrested him. Instead, he demanded to know 
why police were questioning him, claimed that the police had awakened 
him, and professed to be unaware that the shooting had happened. Then at 
trial, he admitted that he knew about the shooting, but claimed the victim 
was shot accidentally after he pulled his gun in self-defense. The State used 
his post-Miranda protestations of ignorance of any shooting at all to impeach 
his trial admission to a shooting done while he was acting in self-defense. 
The court of appeals held this was error, reasoning that the statements were 
the same as silence because, in its estimation, they were statements about 
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the interrogation, rather than indisputably admissible statements about the 
crime itself. This holding depends on a distinction-actual statements and 
silence-equivalent statements - that Doyle itself does not draw. And even 
though the court of appeals affirmed on harmlessness grounds, its 
reasoning denies the State access to impeachment evidence that no 
constitutional rule prohibits using-post-Miranda denials to police that 
cannot be squared with an explanation offered at trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
This Court granted review on the following question: 
"Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding the prosecutor 
improperly com1nented on Respondent[']s failure to assert self-defense 
during an interview with police." 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews the court of appeals' decision 
for correctness. See Salt Lake City v. Carrera, 2015 UT 73, if 6,358 P.3d 1067. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum C: 
e U.S. Const. amend. V 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 1 
After a long night of drinking, Defendant shot his friend John. See 
R.297:28-29, 132; R.298:7, 36, State's Ex. 1. John had been visiting his Aunt 
Jody and Uncle Tim at their home, where Defendant also rented a room. See 
R.297:14-16, 64-65; R.298:31, 36. 
Jolm had arrived at their home late one morning for an extended visit. 
See R.297:16. When Defendant arrived home later that evening, John and 
Tim were playing cribbage. See R.297:18-19, 74. They all "exchanged some 
pleasantries" and Defendant sat down with them. R.297:17-19; R.298:40. 
Defendant drank beer and John drank whiskey while they visited. See id. 
"[A]ll of a sudden," Defendant got "an attitude" and called Jody a 
"cunt." R.297:19-20, 76, 82, 88. John was "shocked" and told Defendant to 
apologize. R.297:20, 82, 89. Thn told Defendant he could not speak that 
way to Jody. See R.297:20, 82. But things soon "calmed down" and John 
and Tim finished their cribbage game. R.297:21, 83. Afterwards, Tim and 
Jody went to bed. R.297:21. John and Defendant stayed up, playing poker 
and "taking shots" of whiskey. R.297:21, 78-79. 
1 Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are stated in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict and conflicting evidence is presented 
only as needed to understand the issues raised on appeal. See State v. 
Kruger, 2000 UT 60, if2,· 6 P.3d 1116. 
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At one point, John and Defendant "got in a little argument over what 
[Defendant] had called" Jody. R.297:22. John told Defendant that he had 
"disrespect[ed]" his family, but Defendant answered that "it was just how 
he felt . . . and he was not going to apologize." R.297:22, 76-77. The 
argument woke Tim, who came out of his bedroom and told them to be 
quiet. See R.297:23. John and Defendant '' quieted down" and continued to 
play poker. Id. 
Defendant later invited John into his bedroom for a "shot of brandy." 
R.297:22. They talked about golf as John followed Defendant to his room. 
See id. As they reached the foot of Defendant's bed, John asked if they were 
going golfing in the morning. See R.297:23-24. Defendant turned around 
and answered, "How about I just fuckin' kill you?" Id. Defendant had a 
gun in his hand. See R.297:24. With his finger on the trigger, Defendant 
"[p]ulled back the hammer, raised it up and pointed it in Uohn's] face." 
R.297:24. Not wanting "to get shot," John grabbed Defendant's wrist with 
one hand and "the barrel of the gun" with the other and "tried to pull it 
away." R.297:24, 27. The gun, however, "went off." R.297:27. The bullet 
hit John below his ribcage and exited out his back. See R.297:27-29; State's 
Ex. 1. Fearing that Defendant would shoot him again, John held onto the 
gun and Defendant's wrist while trying to pull the gun free from 
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Defendant's hands. See R.297:29. Defendant fell back onto his bed. See id. 
John put one knee on Defendant's wrist and "screamed for help." Id. 
Awakened by the gunshot, Tim and Jody ran to Defendant's 
bedroom. See R.297:68-69, 80, 90. Tim saw Defendant lying on his bed, 
holding a gun with his finger on the trigger. See R.297:69-70. John stood 
over Defendant with one foot on the floor and his other knee on 
Defendant's wrist. See R.297:69-70, 80. John was holding the barrel of the 
gun with one hand and Defendant's wrist with the other. See R.297:69-70. 
John told his aunt and uncle that he had been shot. See R.297:70, 81, 
91. Tim "rushed" Jody "out of the room" and called 911. R.297:71. Soon 
after, Tim informed John and Defendant-who were still struggling over 
the gun- that the police had arrived and were outside. See R.297:30; 
R.298:50-51. To persuade Defendant to let go of the gun, John told 
Defendant that he would go outside and tell the police that the shooting 
was an accident. See R.297:30; R.298:51. Defendant surrendered the gun 
and John carried it outside to the waiting police. See R.297:30, 49. An 
ambulance took John to the hospital where he was treated and later 
released. See R.297:31, 42. 
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At the hospital, John told the investigating officer, Detective Arnn, 
that Defendant had pointed a gun at him and said something like "I'm just 
going to kill you" or "I should kill you now." R.297:46-47, 117. 
Defendant's police interview: "You woke me up" 2 
After John walked outside to the waiting police, Defendant changed 
his clothes. See R.298:51. He then walked outside. See R.298:51-52. The 
police immediately arrested Defendant and took him to the police station 
for questioning. R.298:54. Once in an interview room, the interviewing 
officer, Detective Arnn, observed that Defendant smelled "very strong[ly]" 
of alcohol. R.297:131. He offered Defendant a Coke. See R.297:131; R.298:64. 
Defendant responded that he wanted "a rum and Coke," then a "six pack 
and a cigarette." R.298:64. And Defendant asked the police officers 
whether they thought they could "all handle" him. R.298:54, 63-64. 
Defendant told Detective Arnn, "Still don't understand why I'm here. 
What happened?" R.298:64. When Detective Arnn explained that 
Defendant was under arrest, Defendant asked, "for what?" and then asked 
repeatedly why he was there. R.298:64-65. In response, Detective Arnn read 
Defendant his Miranda rights, but Defendant replied that he did not 
2 A transcript of Defendant's police interview is not in the record on 
appeal. This account is taken from Defendant's testimony at trial. See 
R.298:56, 63-66, 70. 
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understand his rights. See R.298:65. Detective Arnn asked him what part of 
his rights he did not understand and Defendant retorted, "The part where 
you're fucking jerking me off. What the fuck am I doing here to begin with? 
You people woke me up." Id. He continued, "I want to know what the fuck 
I am doing here .... " Id. Detective Arnn told Defendant that he was under 
arrest for attempted murder and Defendant asked, "To who?" R.298:70. In 
answer, Detective Arnn explained that someone had been shot. See 
R.298:65, 70. Defendant responded, "Whose [sic] got a gunshot wound?" 
Id. Defendant continued, "I want to know what the fuck is going on .... 
You woke me up. I want to know what is going on." R.298:65. Detective 
Arnn eventually stopped the interview. See R.297:1. 
Defendant's phone calls from jail: 
Changing the "game plan" to self-defense 
While in jail awaiting trial, Defendant made several phone calls. He 
first called Tim, asking him to tell him "what happened" because Defendant 
did not "remember anything" and the police had told him he shot Tim. 
R.298:24, 55-56. Later, Defendant called his mother. R.298:58. He told her 
that he needed John "to say this was an accident." Id. A day later, he 
assured his mother that John would be a "team player" and "say this was an 
accident." R.298:58:25, 58. 
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Defendant later called a friend, Christy. R.298:59, 66-67. When Christy 
told Defendant that John was "unwilling to say this was an accident," 
Defendant asked her to "[t]alk to him again," "be pushy," and tell him that 
they would "take care of him" and make it "well worth his while" if he told 
police that the shooting was an accident. Id. 
But Defendant later told his mother in another call that he would 
"have to change the game plan" and was "[g]oing a different direction with 
the story, [it's] self-defense now since John ... doesn't want to play ball." 
R.298:25, 59-60. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
Defendant was charged with felony discharge of a firearm with 
injury, a second degree felony, and aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony. See R.46-47. 
Defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of his police interview 
The morning of trial, defense counsel orally moved to exclude 
"anything in regard to" Defendant's police interview. R.297:8, 1. Defense 
counsel argued that Defendant had not cooperated in the interview and 
"stated numerous times that he didn't understand his Miranda rights and 
finally the State gave up and did not question any further." R.297:1. 
The State represented that it would not "go into the content" of 
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Defendant's interview, but wanted the detective to testify about 
Defendant's behavior so that the jury could "understand that the defendant 
was inebriated" like John. R.297:2, 9. When the trial court stated that 
"behavioral descriptions" "should be acceptable," defense counsel further 
objected that Defendant's "belligerent" attitude was not relevant. R.298:2, 9. 
The State clarified that it would ask the officer only "[v]ery general" 
questions about Defendant's intoxication and not "paint the defendant as a 
jerk." See R.297:10. The court stated, "I think that addresses [ defense 
counsel]'s concerns. Is that correct?" R.297:11. Defense counsel answered, 
"it will." Id. 
The State's case 
The State called John, Tim, Jody, and Detective Arnn to testify at trial. 
See R.297. The State also played excerpts of the jail house phone calls. 
R.298:21-26.3 The jury heard that Defendant called Tim, asking him to tell 
him "what happened" because Defendant did not "remember anything" 
and the police had told him he shot Tim. R.298:55-56. They also heard 
Defendant telling his mother that he believed John would be a "team 
3 The phone calls were not transcribed and the recordings were not 
transported with the rest of the record on appeal. See supplemental index; 
R.135. The prosecutor, however, su1nmarized some portions of the phone 
calls on the record and Defendant also testified to what he said in the calls. 
See R.298:21-26, 55-60, 66-67. 
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player" and "say this was an accident." R.298:58:25, 58. They then heard 
Defendant's ask Christy to talk with John, "be pushy," and tell him that 
they would "take care of him" and make it "well worth his while" if he told 
police that the shooting was an accident. R.298:59, 66-67. And finally, they 
head Defendant telling his mother that they would "have to change the 
game plan" and go "a different direction with the story, [it's] self-defense 
now since John ... doesn't want to play ball." R.298:25, 59-60. 
Detective Arnn testified about his interviews with Defendant and 
John. See R.297:104-152. True to his word, the prosecutor did not ask 
Detective Arnn about the content of Defendant's interview or about 
Defendant's attitude; he asked only about Defendant's drunken demeanor. 
See R.297:130-132. And Detective Arnn testified only that Defendant 
appeared drunk and that Defendant acted "more inebriated" than John. 
R.297:132. 
When defense counsel cross-examined Detective Arnn, he asked 
whether Defendant was "a little mad," "[b]elligerent," and not "very 
cooperative" in the interview. R.297:138-139. Detective Arnn answered yes 
to each question. Id. 
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Defendant's defense: Self-defense 
Defendant testified. See R.298:31-70. He claimed that he had pulled 
out his gun in self-defense and that John had pulled the trigger himself 
when he grabbed the gun and fell on top of him. See id. 
According to Defendant, after he called Jody a "fat fucking cunt," 
John told him to apologize. R.298:43-44. Defendant refused and went to his 
room. R.298:44. He claimed that he was sitting on his bed when John came 
in uninvited, stepped "on top" of Defendant's feet, put both of his fists 
"up," and stood "over the top" of Defendant. R.298:44-45. John told 
Defendant, "you're going to apologize to my aunt." R.298:45. Feeling 
"threatened," Defendant grabbed his loaded gun from under his pillow, 
pointed it at John, and told him, "you need to get out of my room." 
R.298:45-46. 
Defendant testified that John, however, grabbed the gun, pinning 
Defendant's finger against the gun frame. See R.298:46. John then lost his 
balance, fell on top of Defendant, and John's finger "pushed the trigger and 
fired the weapon." Id. 
After John was shot, Defendant did not let go of the gun for fear that 
John would "turn around and use it" on him. R.298:50. But Defendant 
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relinquished the weapon when John told him that he would go outside and 
tell the waiting police that the shooting was an accident. See R.298:51. 
Defendant also gave an explanation for his phone calls from jail. He 
asserted that he had lied to Tim about not remembering the shooting simply 
because he wanted to "find out what's going on on his end." R.298:56. And 
he explained that he talked to Christy about compensating John because 
Christy had told him that John did not want to "press charges" and "just 
wanted to [be] compensated for the days off that he missed from work." 
R.298:59-60. 
While explaining his phone call with Tim on direct examination, 
Defendant testified that the police had h·ied to read him his Miranda rights 
and ask him what happened, but he told them, "I'm not telling you 
anything." R.298:56. His counsel also asked him whether he was 
"belligerent" and "uncooperative" at his police interview. R.298:54, 64. 
Defendant agreed that he had been. See id. 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor stated that he wanted to "round 
off" Defendant's testimony about being "belligerent" during his police 
interview. R.298:63. The prosecutor asked Defendant about his requests for 
rum and Coke, a six pack, and cigarettes. R.298:64. He asked Defendant 
about his taunting officers with whether they could "all handle" him. 
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R.298:54, 63-64. And he asked Defendant whether he demanded to know 
why police were questioning him, claimed that the police had awakened 
hhn, and professed to be unaware that the shooting happened. R.298:65, 70. 
Defendant admitted that he had made all those statements, including "I 
want to know what's going on," "You people woke me up," "Whose [sic] 
got a gunshot wound?" and "To who?" in response to being informed that 
he was under arrest for attempted murder. See R.298:54, 63-65, 70. Defense 
counsel did not object to any of the questions. See id. 
Defendant called other witnesses to testify on his behalf. His mother 
testified that John had told her the shooting was an accident. See R.298:75, 
77, 79. Defendant's 1nother's friend testified that she overheard John say the 
shooting was an accident over the phone. R.298:76, 80-81. And a physician 
testified as an expert that John's blood alcohol level was high enough to 
impair one's ability "[t]o think, to understand, to remember" and "walk in a 
straight line." R.298:8. 
Closing argum.ents 
In closing, the prosecutor explained how the evidence met the 
elements of the crimes of discharge of a firearm with injury and aggravated 
assault. He also argued that Defendant had not acted in self-defense: "He 
brought the gun to what had been a word fight." R.298:96-97. 
-14-
In Defendant's closing, defense counsel argued that Defendant had 
pulled his gun in self-defense and that John" discharged" the gun when he 
tried to take it. R.298:107-113. He further argued that the jail house phone 
calls were consistent with the defense theory and that Defendant merely 
had been willing to compensate John for his lost wages. R.298:112. 
Defense counsel also argued that Defendant was "belligerent" and 
"uncooperative" at his police interview because he was "an innocent man," 
and that his behavior "cause[d] [Detective Arnn] to be not very pleasant 
when he comes to testify." R.298:111. 
On rebuttal, the prosecutor responded that Defendant's self-defense 
theory was not believable because his story had evolved: first, he claimed to 
the police and to John's uncle that he did not know what happened; then he 
asked his friend to push John into saying that it was an accident; and when 
that did not work, he finally claimed that he acted in self-defense. 
R.298:119-120. The prosecutor explained that Defendant told the police in 
his interview not that he acted in self-defense, or even that it was an 
accident, but that he did not know that anything had happened: 
The evolution of his story from the very beginning when they 
questioned him, what does he say? Why am I here? Why are 
you jerking me off? Nothing happened. You woke me up. 
You woke me up. He didn't say it was an accident. He doesn't 
say this was self-defense. 
-15-
R.298:120. 
Defendant iinmediately objected and moved for a mistrial: "That is a 
c01nment on my client's right to remain silent and I move for a mistrial." 
R.298:121. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that it was not a 
comment on Defendant's right to remain silent, and even if it were, it did 
not influence the jury to Defendant's prejudice. R.298:123-124, R.178. 
The jury ultimately convicted Defendant of aggravated assault, but 
found him not guilty of discharge of a firearm with injury. See R.135, 138; 
R.298:128. 
Defendant ti1nely appealed. R.264. 
The court of appeals' decision 
On appeal, Defendant argued in part that the prosecutor's closing 
argument impermissibly used his silence as evidence of guilt, violating his 
right against self-incrimination. State v. McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, if 13, 369 
P.3d 103. The court of appeals agreed, holding that the prosecutor 
impermissibly commented on Defendant's exercise of his right to remain 
silent when he pointed out in closing argument that Defendant had not told 
the police that he acted in self-defense, as he had testified at trial. See id. at 
,126. 
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Although the court of appeals recognized that Defendant "did not 
remain silent in the usual sense" -for Defendant "in fact made statements 
to police" - it nonetheless treated Defendant's statements as "the equivalent 
of silence." Id. at ,I,I13 n.3, 21-22, 29. This was because the court of appeals 
believed that "controlling case law treats commenting on the suspect's 
statements about the interrogation-as opposed to statements about the 
crime-as tantamount to commenting on the suspect's silence." Id. at ,I13 
n.3. 
The court of appeals relied on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and 
Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980) (per curiam). It noted that although 
the Doyle decision prohibited the use of a defendant's post-Miranda 
"silence," two footnotes in the opinion revealed that one of the two 
defendants in the case made two statements to police after arrest: either "I 
don't know what you are talking about" or "What's this all about?" and 
"you got to be crazy." McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ifl7 (quoting Doyle, 426 
U.S. at 614-615 n.5 & 622 n.4 (Stevens, J. dissenting)). 
And in Charles, the United States Supreme Court recognized- again 
in a footnote- that Doyle '" analyzed the due process question as if both 
defendants had remained silent."' McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ,I20 (quoting 
Charles, 447 U.S. at 407 n.2). 
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Relying on these two footnotes, the court of appeals declined to take 
Doyle at its word- that it prohibits using a defendant's post-Miranda 
silence-and concluded that "[w]hat matters," is not whether the defendant 
is silent, but whether his post-Miranda statements are "'about [a 
defendant's] involvement in the crime."' Id. (quoting Charles, 447 U.S. at 
407) (second alteration in original). The court read Charles to hold that post-
arrest statements about the suspect' s involvement in the interrogation 
itself-such as 'What's this all about?' 'You got to be crazy,' and 'I don't 
know what you are talking about' - are for Doyle purposes, the equivalent 
of silence." Id. at ,121. 
Applying this principle, the court of appeals determined that 
Defendant's statements-namely '"Why are you jerking me [around]?"' 
"'Nothing happened,"' and '"You woke me up"' -although "more 
bellicose," were similar to those in Doyle and accordingly were statements 
about his interrogation, not about the crime. Id. at ~22 (addition in 
original). The court of appeals thus proceeded "as if [Defendant] had 
remained silent" and held that the prosecutor violated the Doyle 
proscription when he referred to Defendant's statements in his closing 
argument. Id. at i1i122, 26, 29. 
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Although the court of appeals found constitutional error, it 
nonetheless affirmed Defendant's conviction because the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where evidence of Defendant's 
evolving story- independent of his statements to police- was 
overwhelming, Defendant's own testimony supported his aggravated 
assault conviction, and the prosecutor's comment was an "isolated 
reference" -roughly four lines of transcript. Id. at ,I33-36, 38. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals erred when it held that the prosecutor 
unconstitutionally commented on Defendant's exercise of his right to 
remain silent because Defendant's post-Miranda statements "about his 
involvement in the interrogation" were equivalent to silence under Doyle v. 
Ohio and Anderson v. Charles. Neither Doyle nor Charles supports treating 
Defendant's statements as the equivalent of silence. First, Doyle and Charles 
did not distinguish between a defendant's statements about the 
interrogation and a defendant's statements about the crime. Rather, the 
controlling distinction between what Doyle permits and what it prohibits is 
whether the prosecutor's questions were "designed to draw meaning from 
silence," or "to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement." 
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Where the prosecutor elicits an explanation for a pnor inconsistent 
statement, there is no Doyle violation. That is what the prosecutor did here. 
When police questioned Defendant about the shooting, he protested 
his factual innocence by pretending to know nothing about it. By the time 
of trial, he protested his legal innocence by admitting to the shooting he told 
police he knew nothing about, but giving the jury a legally exonerating 
explanation for it. The two stories cannot be squared with each other, and 
the prosecutor properly informed the jury of the conflict. 
But even if Doyle or Charles arguably created a distinction between 
statements about the interrogation or statements about the crime, the court 
of appeals still erred because Defendant's statements here were not about 
the interrogation. They were instead statements about the crime that 
conflicted with the version he gave at trial. Defendant's statements told an 
exculpatory story that he was not involved in the crime: he had been 
asleep, he was awakened by the police, and he did not know that anyone 
had been shot. By prohibiting the State from inquiring into statements like 
Defendant's, the court of appeals has denied the jury access to information 
important to assessing whether a defendant's testimony is true. This Court 
should reverse. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONESOULY HELD THAT 
DEFENDANT'S INCONSISTENT, POST-MIRANDA 
STATEMENTS WERE EQUIVALENT TO SILENCE UNDER 
DOYLE V. OHIO AND ANDERSON V. CHARLES 
The court of appeals erred when it held that the prosecutor 
unconstitutionally commented on Defendant's exercise of his right to 
remain silent under Doyle v. Ohio. 
When a defendant exercises his right not to talk to police, then 
testifies to an exculpatory version of events at trial, Doyle v. Ohio and 
Anderson v. Charles prohibit the State from arguing that the jury should not 
believe the defendant's testimony on the basis that he withheld that version 
from police when he refused to talk to them. 
But Defendant did not remain silent after Miranda warnings. Instead, 
he told police that he had been asleep at the time of the shooting and did 
not know that anyone had been shot. See R.298:63-65, 70. These statements 
conflicted with his trial testimony that he was awake and knew that John 
had been shot in a struggle that resulted when Defendant merely tried to 
def end himself. 
Even though the prosecutor did not rely on Defendant's post-
Miranda silence, the court of appeals held that the prosecutor 
unconstitutionally commented on Defendant's exercise of his right to 
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remain silent. To get there, the court of appeals recognized a different kind 
of post-Miranda "silence" -post-Miranda silence-equivalent statements. It 
concluded that post-Miranda statements about the interrogation are the 
sa1ne as silence and Doyle and Charles prohibited using those statements to 
impeach Defendant's inconsistent trial testimony. 
Neither Doyle v. Ohio nor Anderson v. Charles support treating 
Defendant's statements as the equivalent of silence. First, Doyle and Charles 
did not distinguish between a defendant's statements about the 
interrogation and a defendant's statements about the crime, or otherwise 
characterize statements about the interrogation as the equivalent of silence 
that the State may not use. Second, even if Doyle or Charles arguably did so, 
the court of appeals still erred because Defendant's statements here were 
not about the interrogation; they were instead statements about the crime 
that conflicted with the version he gave at trial. By prohibiting the State 
from inquiring into statements like Defendant's, the court of appeals has 
denied the jury access to information hnportant to assessing whether a 
defendant's testimony is true. 
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A. Doyle v. Ohio and Anderson v. Charles did not create a 
category of silence-equivalent statements that the State 
cannot use at trial. 
Neither Doyle v. Ohio nor Anderson v. Charles support the proposition 
that a defendant's statements are to be treated as silence when they concern 
the interrogation and not the crime. Rather, both cases support the long-
standing understanding that a prosecutor may impeach a defendant with 
his post-Miranda statements that conflict with his trial testimony. 
The Fifth Amendment to the Utah States Constitution provides that 
"No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself .... " U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda v. Arizona, the 
United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment requires "a 
person taken into custody be advised immediately that he has the right to 
be silent, that anything he says may be used against him, and that he has the 
right to retained or appointed counsel before submitting to interrogation." 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976). Implicit in Miranda's warning is the 
assurance that if a person invokes his right to remain silent, his "silence will 
carry no penalty." Id. at 618. Thus, in Doyle v. Ohio, the United States 
Supreme Court held that "the use for impeachment purposes of [a 
defendant's] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda 
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warnings, violate[s] the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Id. at 619. <iJ 
Doyle based its holding on two grounds. First, as stated, it was 
"fundamentally unfair" to use a defendant's post-Miranda silence when the 
warning implicitly assured him that "silence will carry no penalty." Id. at 
618. Second, silence is not necessarily inconsistent with later trial testimony. 
Id. at 617. Indeed, post-Miranda silence is "insolubly ambiguous" because it 
"may be nothing more than ... [an] exercise of these Miranda rights." Id. 
The petitioners in Doyle, Doyle and Wood, had been charged with 
selling marijuana to an informant. Id. at 611. They were arrested near the 
scene of the transaction and given Miranda warnings by the arresting officer. 
Id. at 612. They were tried separately and each testified at both trials that 
they were actually attempting to buy marijuana and that the informant had 
framed them. Id. at 612-613. 
During cross-examination of each petitioner, the prosecutor 
repeatedly asked why they had not told the frame-up story to the arresting 
officer: if "you are innocent ... why didn't you tell hiln?" Id. at 613-614. 
And in closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the petitioners' post-
arrest silence showed they were guilty: "if you are innocent ... You tell the 
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truth. You tell them what happened .... " Id. at 633-634 n.12 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
The Doyle opinion characterized petitioners Doy le and Wood as 
remaining silent after arrest. Id. at 613, 616 (framing issue as "use of a 
defendant's post-arrest silence" and quoting cross-examination of Wood 
who testified that he did not tell arresting officer anything). But a footnote 
in the majority's opinion shows that one of the petitioners, Doyle, made one 
statement at arrest. Id. at 614 n.5. At his trial, Doyle testified that he said 
only "'What's this all about?"' when arrested. Id. He denied making the 
statement, '"I don't know what you are talking about."' Id. A footnote in 
the dissenting opinion also shows that at Wood's trial, Doyle testified that 
he made two statements at arrest, "What the hell is all this about" and "you 
got to be crazy." Id. at 622 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Wood remained 
silent. See id.; Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407 n.2 (1980) (per curiam). 
But the Doyle Court never directly acknowledged that Doyle made 
one or two statements at arrest. See generally, Doyle, 426 U.S. 610. It did not 
consider whether Doyle's statement(s) were "the equivalent of silence." 
McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, 'if 21. And it did not distinguish between 
statements made about an interrogation and state1nents made about the 
facts of the crime. See generally, Doyle, 426 U.S. 610. 
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In Anderson v. Charles, the United States Supreme Court made clear 
that Doyle does not prohibit a prosecutor from impeaching a defendant with 
his post-Miranda statements when they are inconsistent with his trial 
testimony. 447 U.S. 404 (1980) (per curiam). This is true even if the 
prosecutor's questioning "concerned the respondent's failure to tell the 
police the story he recounted at trial." Id. at 408. 
Charles was arrested while driving a stolen car that belonged to a 
murder victim. Id. at 404. After receiving Miranda warnings, Charles told 
police that he stole the car from a certain street. Id. at 405, 408-409. But at 
h·ial he testified that he stole the car from a parking lot at a location two 
miles distant fr01n this street. Id. The prosecutor cross-examined Charles 
about this inconsistency, asking hhn, "Don't you think it's rather odd that if 
it were the truth that you didn't come forward and tell anybody at the time 
you were arrested, where you got that car?" Id. at 406. 
The Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's questioning was not a 
Doyle violation. "Doyle does not apply to cross-examination that merely 
inquires into prior inconsistent statements." Id. at 408. And although the 
"two inconsistent descriptions of events 1nay be said to involve 'silence' 
insofar as it omits facts included in the other version . . . Doyle does not 
require any such formulistic understanding of 'silence."' Id. at 409. 
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The Charles court explained that the underpinnings of the Doyle 
decision did not apply in that situation. First, "[s]uch questioning makes no 
unfair use of silence because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after 
receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent. As to 
the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent 
at all." Id. at 408 (citing with approval United States v. Agee, 597 F.2d 350, 
354-356 (3rd Cir. 1979) (en bane) (explaining "Doyle can have no application 
to a case in which the defendant did not exercise his right to remain silent"; 
for "to hold that a prosecutor may not question or refer to a defendant's 
statements and conduct which were designed to deceive the police 
regarding the commission of a crime, we would be extending the holding of 
Doyle far beyond its rationale"). Compare Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618 (explaining 
it is "fundamentally unfair" to use a defendant's post-Miranda silence when 
the warning implicitly assured him that "silence will carry no penalty"). 
Second, the questions "were not designed to draw meaning from 
silence, but to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement." 
Charles, 447 U.S. at 409. Compare Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617 (explaining post-
Miranda silence is not necessarily inconsistent with trial testimony because it 
"may be nothing more than ... [an] exercise of these Miranda rights"). See 
also People v. McReavy, 462 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Mich. 1990) (explaining that if 
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defendant is silent "there is an irrebuttable presumption of irrelevancy, and 
such silence may not be used substantively or for impeachment purposes 
since there is no way to know after the fact whether it was due to the 
exercise of constitutional rights or to guilty knowledge ... [but w]here the 
defendant has not maintained 'silence,' but has· chosen to speak, the Court 
has refused to endorse a formalistic view of silence"). 
In its discussion of Doyle, Charles described the case as one that 
"involved two defendants who made no postarrest statements about their 
involvement in the crime." Charles, 447 U.S. at 407. In a footnote, Charles 
recognized that Doyle actually made two statements at arrest, but that both 
the Doyle majority and dissent "analyzed the due process question as if both 
defendants had remained silent. The issue was said to involve cross-
examination of a person who 'does remain silent."' Id. at 407 n.2 ( quoting 
Doyle, 426 U.S. at 620) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Charles did not otherwise 
examine or address why Doyle characterized the petitioners as remaining 
silent, but observed that "[i]n any event, neither" of Doyle's statements 
"contradicted the defendant's later trial testhnony." Id. 
Like Doyle, Charles did not consider whether Charles's statements 
could be "the equivalent of silence." McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, if 21. It also 
did not distinguish between state1nents made about an interrogation and 
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statements made about the facts of the crime. See generally, Charles, 447 U.S. 
404. And while Charles noted that Doyle did not make any statements about 
his "involvement in the crime," it also observed that Doyle's statements did 
not contradict his trial testimony in any way. Charles, 447 U.S. at 407 & n.2. 
In other words, Doyle's post-Miranda statements were not prior inconsistent 
statements that could be used to impeach his trial testimony. See Grunewald 
v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 418 (1957) ("It is, of course, an ele1nentary rule 
of evidence that prior statements may be used to impeach the credibility of 
a criminal defendant ... [b]ut this can be done only if the judge is satisfied 
that the prior statements are in fact inconsistent."); United States v. Hale, 422 
U.S. 171, 176 (1975) (" A basic rule of evidence provides that pnor 
inconsistent statements may be used to impeach the credibility of a 
witness."). See also Reynolds v. State, 114 So.3d 61, 134 (Ala. App. 2010) 
(hypothesizing that Doyle's statements were "construed to be silence for the 
purposes of analysis, presumably because it did not actually contradict 
Doyle's trial testimqny") (citing Charles, 447 U.S. at 408 n. 2). 
Thus, the controlling distinction between what Doyle permits and 
what it prohibits is not whether a defendant's statements are about his 
involvement in the crime or about the interrogations itself, as the court of 
appeals declared, McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ,I20. Rather, the controlling 
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distinction is whether the prosecutor's questions were "designed to draw 
meaning from silence," or "to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent 
statement." Charles, 447 U.S. at 409. See also State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 315 
(Utah 1985), abandoned on other grounds as stated in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1986), (explaining that to constitute an impermissible comment on a 
defendant's silence, the remark must be '"manifestly intended or ... of such 
character that a jury would naturally and necessarily construe it to amount 
to a comment on defendant's silence"'); United States v. Cantebun;, 985 F .2d 
483, 486 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining Doyle violation "turns on whether the 
cross-examination was designed to impeach the defendant's trial testimony 
by calling attention to prior inconsistent state1nents or, instead, was 
designed to suggest an inference of guilt from the defendant's post-arrest 
silence."); Greico v. Hall, 641 F.2d 1029, 1034 (1st Cir. 1981) ("[O]nce a 
defendant makes post-arrest statements that may arguably be inconsistent 
with the trial story, inquiry into what was not said at arrest may be 
designed not 'to draw meaning from silence, but to elicit an explanation for 
a prior inconsistent statement."') (quoting Charles, 447 U.S. at 409); United 
States v. Caruto, 532 F.3d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that there is no 
Doyle violation where "differences between the post-arrest staten1ent and 
the trial testimony [are] 'arguably inconsistent"'). And where the 
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prosecutor elicits an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement, there is 
no Doyle violation. Charles, 447 U.S. at 408-409. See also State v. Velarde, 675 
P.2d 1194, 1195 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) ("The inconsistency of that 
testimony with what defendant had told the officer is a legitimate basis for a 
prosecutor's testing the credibility of a witness by way of impeachment."). 
Here, there can be no doubt that the prosecutor did only what Doyle 
permits: confront Defendant with his prior inconsistent statements. When 
police questioned Defendant about the shooting, he protested his factual 
innocence by pretending to know nothing about it. See R.298:63-35, 70. As 
time showed him that that strategy would likely fail, he changed course. By 
the time of trial, he protested his legal innocence by admitting to the 
shooting he told police he knew nothing about, but giving the jury a legally 
exonerating explanation for it. See R.298:44-46. The two stories cannot be 
squared with each other, and the prosecutor properly informed the jury of 
the conflict: 
The evolution of his story from the very beginning when they 
questioned him, what does he say? Why a1n I here? Why are 
you jerking me off? Nothing happened. You woke me up. 
You woke 1ne up. He didn't say it was an accident. He doesn't 
say this was self-defense [like he did at trial]. 
R.298:120. 
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The prosecutor's cross-examination and closing argument were thus 
not designed to suggest that Defendant was guilty because he was silent at 
arrest Rather, the prosecutor's argument was designed, like in Charles, "to 
elicit an explanation" for his inconsistent stories. Charles, 447 U.S. at 409. By 
pointing out that Defendant's story had II evolved," the prosecutor made no 
use of Defendant's silence. R.298:120. 
Likewise, the two bases of the Doyle decision do not apply here. First, 
the prosecutor's argument made "no unfair use of silence because a 
defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not 
been induced to remain silent." Charles, 447 U.S. at 408. 11 As to the subject 
matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all." Id. 
Second, Defendant's statements were not "insolubly ambiguous"; they were 
patently inconsistent with his trial version of events. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617. 
See also State v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1097-98, 1100 (Conn. 2010) (explaining 
that "Once an arrestee has waived his right to remain silent, the Doyle 
rationale is not operative because the arrestee has not remained silent and 
an explanatory statement assuredly is no longer 'insolubly a1nbiguous.' By 
speaking, the defendant has chosen unambiguously not to assert his right to 
remain silent. He knows that anything he says can and will be used against 
h . ") lffi , 
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Thus, contrary to the court of appeals' reading, neither Doyle nor 
Charles understood · that the silence that the State cannot inquire into 
includes statements about the interrogation. They only prohibit drawing an 
unfair inference from the defendant's exercise of a right he has just been 
informed he has the right to exercise. See State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 787-
788 (Utah App. 1991) (holding no Doyle violation where prosecutor pointed 
out that Harrison did not tell police that murder victim was armed like he 
did at trial when claiming self-defense); Velarde, 675 P.2d at 1195-1196 
(holding that prosecutor properly impeached Velarde's trial testimony that 
he remembered how he arrived in Morgan with statement to police that he 
did not know he was in Morgan); United States v. Ochoa-Sanchez, 676 F.2d 
1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that prosecutor's questions about details 
defendant omitted in interrogation not Doyle violation because prosecutor 
was not "attempting to draw meaning from the defendant's silence"); 
United States v. May, 52 F.3d 885, 887, 890 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding no Doyle 
violation where prosecutor argued in closing that "[n]ever once did" May 
tell the story that he told at trial because "focus of the prosecutor's 
comments was not on May's failure to present his exculpatory story at the 
time of arrest, but on prior inconsistent stories as in Anderson v. Charles"); 
Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1230 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that cross-
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examination "was within permissible limits because [defendant] presented 
a new story at h·ial that was materially different from the information he 
provided police"). 
The court of appeals' classification of statements about the 
interrogation as opposed to statements about the crime is problematic for 
other reasons as well. In most cases, a defendant's statements about his 
interrogation would likely not be admissible at trial simply because they 
would not be relevant. But there may be cases where a defendant's 
statements-although not about the crime-would be relevant and 
necessary at trial. For example, where a defendant raised an insanity 
defense, but he coherently speaks during the interrogation, his statements 
could be used at trial to rebut his defense. See Commonwealth v. Hunsberger, 
565 A.2d 152, 153-155 (Penn. 1989) (finding no Doyle violation where State 
introduced defendant's questions," Are public defenders as good as money 
lawyers?" and "How can I get to see the public defender on the sixth floor 
of the courthouse if I am in jail?" to rebut insanity defense). And where a 
defendant is charged with DUI, his statements about the interrogation could 
be relevant to show his intoxication. See State v. Lee, 967 A.2d 1161, 1164-
1166 (Vt. 2008) (holding no Doyle violation where prosecutor showed Lee's 
police interview of him drunkenly yelling obscenities while officer read 
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Miranda rights, then was silent; "The State did not offer the tape to show 
defendant was guilty because he refused to speak with the officer."). 
Likewise, where a defendant raises an intoxication defense, his statements 
about the interrogation would be relevant to rebut his defense. See Shaw v. 
State, 2014 WL 3559389, **24, 26 (Ala. App. 2014), petition for certiorari 
docketed by Aubrey Shaw v. Alabama, U.S. Aug. 26, 2016 (holding that there 
was no Doyle violation where prosecutor introduced Shaw's post-Mirqnda 
statements that "turn[ed] around all of the questions on the officers" like 
"No need to waste y'all' s time," "What's age got to do with it anyway?" and 
"We're talking" because they rebutted his intoxication defense). 
But under the court of appeals' decision, in each of these cases, the 
State would be constitutionally prohibited from presenting the defendant's 
statements simply because the statements were about the interrogation and 
not about the facts of the case. This is not what Doyle intended. See State v. 
Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 634 (Utah App. 1997) (explaining defendant has "'no 
right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without 
laying himself open to cross-examination upon those facts"'). 
Indeed, the State is aware of no other jurisdiction that has treated a 
defendant's statements about his interrogation as the equivalent of silence 
under Doyle or Charles, and the court of appeals cited none. Rather, many 
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courts have found no Doyle violation where the prosecutor impeached a 
defendant with statements that were not about his involvement in the 
crime. See Hunsberger, 565 A.2d at 153-155 (Penn. 1989) (finding no Doyle 
violation where State introduced defendant's questions, "Are public 
defenders as good as money lawyers?" and "How can I get to see the public 
defender on the sixth floor of the courthouse if I am in jail?''); Lee, 967 A.2d 
at 1164-1166 (holding that there was no Doyle violation where prosecutor 
showed Lee's police interview of him drunkenly yelling obscenities); Shaw, 
2014 WL 3559389, *24, 26 (holding that there was no Doyle violation where 
prosecutor introduced Shaw's post-Miranda statements like "No need to 
waste y'all' s time," "What's age got to do with it anyway?" and "We' re 
talking"); Boyd, 992 A.2d at 1100 (finding no Doyle violation where Boyd 
told police that he "he was not yet ready to tell the police everything that he 
knew about the murder and that he was not willing to discuss the crime 
scene"); Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1412-1413 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding 
no Doyle violation where prosecutor impeached defendant's trial version 
with his statements to police that he was not guilty, he wanted protective 
custody, and wanted to take a polygraph test). 
The court of appeals thus erred when it treated Defendant's 
statements as the "equivalent of silence." McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, if 20. 
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"Because the impeachment evidence here concerned Defendant's statement 
... Doyle's rule does not apply." United States v. Gomez, 725 F.3d 1121, 1127 
(9th Cir. 2013) ( emphasis in original). "A contrary rule 'would pervert the 
constitutional right into a right to falsify free from the embarrassment of 
impeachment evidence from the defendant's own mouth."' Id. at 1128 
(quoting Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975)). This Court should 
reverse. 
B. Defendant's statements were not about his interrogation; they 
were about the crime because they amounted to a denial of 
his involvement. 
Even if the court of appeals' disparate treatment of statements about 
interrogations versus statements about crimes were supportable, the court 
of appeals also erred when it held that Defendant's statements were not 
about the crime. And that error sets precedent for cases where defendants 
make state1nents similar to Defendant's. 
While some of Defendant's statements bare superficial similarities to 
Doyle's, Defendant did not merely inquire into what was happening, like 
Doyle did. Defendant's statements instead told an exculpatory story that he 
was not involved in the crime: he had been asleep, he was awakened by the 
police, and he did not know that anyone had been shot. 
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Context matters. True, if a defendant had been awakened by police 
days or months after a shooting, such a statement might not be about the 
facts of the crime. But that is not what happened here. Police arrived 
almost immediately after Defendant shot John- indeed, Defendant and 
John were still struggling over the gun. See R.297:30; R.298:50-51. They 
immediately arrested Defendant and took him to the police station for 
questioning. See R.298:51-54. Thus, Defendant's statements that the police 
had just awakened him and that he wanted to know what was going on 
were necessarily statements about the crime, not the interrogation. And by 
equating Defendant's statements to the ones Doyle gave without accounting 
for this context, the court of appeals' decision will allow defendants to give 
conflicting accounts of their involvement in a crime without letting the jury 
know about the conflict so long as the statements to police bare some 
superficial similarity to Doyle's. 
But Doyle and Charles do not give defendants the right to hide post-
Miranda stories to police that contradict the stories they tell at trial. Quite 
the opposite. And to separate the permitted from the prohibited, the "court 
1nust look at the particular use to which the disclosure is put, and the 
context of the disclosure." State v. Maas, 1999 UT App 325, ,I21, 991 P.2d 
1108. Indeed, it is "the prosecution's duty to clear up discrepancies 
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manufactured by the defendant. ... " State v. Sorrels, 642 P.2d 373, 376 (Utah 
1982) (per curiam) (holding no Doyle violation where prosecutor asked 
defendant whether he told police the story he told at trial after defendant 
testified that he had not had an opportunity to give his version of events). 
"There is nothing irregular about trying to straighten out something out on 
the record, if a prosecutor is confronted with a voluntary statement of an 
accused who has taken the witness stand ... by asking questions to test the 
credibility of the witness." Id. at 375. Because McCallie allows defendants to 
give conflicting accounts without being answerable to explain the 
discrepancies-and improperly skews the truth-finding process by doing 
so-this Court should reverse and make clear that alleged Doyle violations 
must be considered in the context of each case and not a rule that looks only 
to superficial similarities between statements made by different defendants 
in different contexts. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
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<Jll After an evening of drinking and card-playing, James 
Christopher McCallie and an acquaintance had an altercation 
involving a handgun. The acquaintance (Victim) got the worst of 
it, suffering a non-fatal gunshot wound to his abdomen. 
McCallie claimed self-defense, but the jury convicted him of 
aggravated assault, a third-degree felony. On appeal, McCallie 
contends that his right to remain silent was infringed when the 
prosecutor questioned why McCallie had not claimed self-
defense in his police interview. We agree with McCallie that 
constitutional error occurred, but we agree with the State that 
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore 
affirm the conviction. 
State v. McCallie 
B.ACKGROUND1 
12 Around 10:00 a.m. on March 30, 2013, Victim visited his 
aunt and uncle at their home. He brought a half gallon of 
whiskey for a day of drinking and cribbage. Sometime later, 
McCallie, who rented a room from Victim's aunt and uncle, 
returned home with an 18-pack of beer after completing a long-
haul route as a truck driver. 
13 McCallie and Victim drank, played cards, argued, and 
talked about guns. Victim asked to see McCaHie's gun, and 
McCallie obliged. McCallie retired to his bedroom multiple 
times; each time, Victim followed and asked McCallie to come 
o_ut and drink with him; each time McCallie joined him. At some 
point McCallie and Victim's aunt got into a verbal 
confrontation. McCallie called her a derogatory name, and 
Victim demanded that McCallie apologize. McCallie refused; he 
"went to [his] room and ... was going to go to bed ... when 
[Victim] came in for the last time." 
14 McCallie testified that as he sat on his bed, Victim stood 
over him with one foot on top of McCallie' s feet and "both of his 
fists up." McCallie grabbed his gun from under his pillow. 
McCallie testified that he did not have his finger on the trigger 
but rather that he placed it "across the frame of the weapon.11 
Then, according to McCallie, Victim grabbed the gun, McCallie 
pulled back on the gun, Victim fell on top of him, and when 
Victim fell, Victim "pushed the trigger and fired the weapon 
himself." 
<j{5 Victim gave a different version of events. He testified that 
McCallie invited him to his room for some brandy. Victim 
1. "On appeal, we review the record facts in a light most 
favorable to the jmy's verdict and recite the facts accordingly. 
We present conflicting evidence only as necessary to understand 
issues raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, Cjl 2, 10 P.3d 
346 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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followed McCallie down the hall to his room when, suddenly, 
McCallie turned around "and he's got a gun." Then, according 
to Victim, McCallie "[p lulled back the hammer, raised it up and 
pointed it in [Victim's] face." Victim testified that McCallie said 
"How about I just fuckin' kill you?" Victim grabbed McCallie's 
wrist with one hand and the barrel of the gun with the other 
hand. As Victim tried to pull the gun away, it came down near 
his side, "and then the gun went off." Victim suffered a non-fatal 
gunshot wound to his abdomen.2 
~16 After his arrest, McCallie acted- to use his word-
"belligerent" with police. He testified that they "were trying to 
read [me] my rights and do the interrogation ... they were 
asking me what happened and it's like, 'I'm not telling you 
anything' and they read my rights and said I'm-'no, I don't 
understand my rights, I'm not telling you anything."' On cross-
examination, McCallie described the attempted interrogation: 
[Prosecutor:] [T]hen they offered you a Coke? 
[McCallie:] Yes. 
[Prosecutor:] And your answer was, yes, I'll have a 
rum and Coke. 
[McCallie:] Sure. I was being belligerent. 
[Prosecutor:] ... And they came back and [said] 
we'll go get you a Coke and then you said not a 
problem, how about a six pack and a cigarette? 
[McCallie:] Yes. 
[Prosecutor:] And then you asked them, "Still don't 
understand why I'm here. What happened?" 
[McCallie:] Exactly. 
2. The jury acquitted McCallie of the count of discharge of a 
firearm. Accordingly, his version of the shooting is most 
consistent with the jury's verdict. 
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[Prosecutor:] They said you're under arrest and 
you said for what? Yes? 
[McCallie]: Yes. 
[Prosecutor:] And then [they] tried to explain and 
again you said, "For what? 'Why am I here?" And 
then they explained your rights. 
[Mccallie:] Yes. 
[Prosecutor:] And then at one point [the detective] 
says what part of your rights do you not 
· understand and your answer was "The part where 
you're fucking jerking me [around]. What the fuck 
am I doing here to begin with? You people woke 
me up." 
[McCallie:] Yes. 
[Prosecutor:] [The detective] tries to explain-this 
could be a real short thing. And you said, "No, I 
want to know what the fuck I am doing here in the 
first place .... " 
Before trial, McCallie' s h·ial counsel moved to exclude 
McCallie's police interview because he "stated numerous times 
that he didn't understand his Miranda rights and finally the State 
gave up and did not question [him] any further." The prosecutor 
responded that he would not elicit any testimony from the 
detective about the content of his interview with McCallie, 
because "that can be cast as us commenting on his right to 
remain silent." Accordingly, the detective testified about 
McCallie's demeanor, attitude, and general belligerence during 
the attempted interrogation but not about any of McCallie's 
statements. 
'Il8 However, in closing arguments, the prosecutor described 
the evolution of McCallie' s story over time as proof that 
McCallie had fabricated it: 
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[T]he facts that I've offered react together, show an 
evolution, a progression of what? Of the 
defendant's fabrication. 
The evolution of his story from the very beginning 
when they question him, what does he say? Why 
am I here? Why are you jerking me [around]? 
Nothing happened. You woke me up. You woke 
me up. He didn't say it was an accident. He doesn't 
say this was self-defense. 
McCallie' s trial counsel objected and moved for a mistrial on the 
ground that the prosecutor had "comment[ed] on [McCallie's] 
right to remain silent." The court denied the motion. 
«jI:9 Ultimately, the jury acquitted McCallie of felony 
discharge of a firearm but convicted him of third-degree-felony 
aggravated assault. After the verdict, McCallie moved for a new 
trial, which the court denied. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
<J[lO McCallie raises two challenges on appeal. First, he 
contends that the trial court committed constitutional error by 
denying his mistrial and new trial motions, because the 
prosecutor impermissibly commented on McCallie's exercise of 
his right to remain silent. Second, he contends that the trial court 
erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict based on the 
insufficiency of the evidence. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Constitutional Error 
1(11 McCallie contends that the trial court erred "in denying 
[his] motion for mistrial and motion for a new trial, given the 
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State's comments regarding [his] exercise of his right to remaih 
silent." The State contends that the prosecutor's closing 
argument "was not that Defendant had remained silent when 
given an opportunity to offer an innocent explanation for his 
conduct, but rather that his statements to the police and others 
were inconsistent with his trial testimony." Accordingly, the 
State maintains that "[t]his type of argument is proper." 
':[12 "We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for a new 
trial under an abuse of discretion standard. At the same time, 
however, we review the legal standards applied by the trial 
court ... for correch1ess .... " State v. Billingsley, 2013 UT 17, 'lI 9, 
311 P.3d 995 (first omission in original) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). If we determine the trial court erred, 
and "the error results in the deprivation of a constitutional right, 
we apply a higher standard of scrutiny, reversing the conviction 
unless we find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 
State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, c_[ 45, 55 P.3d 573; see also Chapman 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). "The State bears the burden of 
proving that an error passes muster under this standard." Brecht 
v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993). 
A. The Prosecutor Impermissibly Commented on McCallie's 
Silence. 
<J{13 McCallie argues that "[t]he State's use of Mr. McCallie's 
silence as evidence of guilt violates his right against self-
incrimination and was a critical error requiring reversal." He 
asserts that the prosecutor's statement during closing amounted 
to an argument that "McCallie made up the story later, 
otherwise he would have shared it at the time of interrogation."3 
3. McCallie did not remain silent in the usual sense. But, as we 
explain below, for Fifth Amendment purposes controlling case 
law treats commenting on the suspect's statements about the 
interrogation-as opposed to statements about the crime-as 
tantamount to commenting on the suspect's silence. 
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<J{14 The State, on the other hand, argues that the prosecutor 
"described how Defendant told the police not that he acted in 
self-defense or that it was an accident-as he did at trial-but 
that he did not know what happened because the police had just 
awakened him." Thus, the State argues that the prosecutor "did 
not raise the inference that silence equals guilt; in fact the 
f prosecutor] did not mention Defendant's silence at all. Instead, 
the [prosecutor] properly argued that Defendant's trial 
testimony was inconsistent with his prior statements to the 
police" and others. 
<J{lS The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
commands, ''No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself ... . 11 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
And the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966), requires "that a person taken into custody be ad vised 
immediately that he has the right to remain silent, that anything 
he says may be used against him, and that he has a right to 
retained or appointed counsel before submitting to 
interrogation." Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976). Implicit in 
the Miranda warning is the "assurance that silence will carry no 
penalty." Id. at 618. Consequently, where a defendant remains 
silent after hearing Miranda warnings, "it would be 
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow 
the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an 
explanation subsequently offered at trial." Id. (footnote omitted); 
see also State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1981). 
<J{16 In Doyle, the Supreme Court examined "whether a state 
prosecutor may seek to impeach a defendant's exculpatory story, 
told for the first time at trial, by cross-examining the defendant 
about his failure to have told the story after receiving Miranda 
warnings at the time of his arrest." Doyle, 426 U.S. at 611. The 
case involved two defendants, Doyle and Wood, who were 
arrested together, charged with a single sale of marijuana, and 
tried in separate trials about one week apart. Id. J/The evidence at 
their trials was identical in all material respects." Id. 
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<jfl 7 .~t those trials, the prosecufion argued that "the 
discrepancy between an exculpatory story at trial and silence at 
time of arrest gives rise to an inference that the story was 
fabrkated somewhere along the way." Id. at 616. To support this 
theory at Doyle's trial, the prosecutor elicited the following 
testimony from Doyle: 
Q. (By the prosecutor.) ... You are innocent? 
A. (By Doyle.) I am innocent. Yes Sir. 
Q. That's why you told the police department and 
[the officer] when they arrived ... about your 
innocence? 
A .... I didn't tell them about my innocence. No. 
Q. You said nothing at all about how you had been 
set up? 
A. Not that I recalt Sir. 
Q. As a matter of fact, if I recall your testimony 
correctly, you said instead of protesting your 
im1ocence, as you do today, you said in response to 
a question of [the officer], "I don't know what you 
are talking about." 
A. I believe what I said [is] "What's this all about?" 
If I remember, that's the only thing I said .... 
Q. All right. But you didn't protest your innocence 
at that time? 
A. Not until I knew what was going on. 
Id. at 614-15 n.5 (first and third omission in original). And at 
Wood's trial, the prosecutor asked Doy]e why he didn't te11 
police that he had been framed; Doyle responded that he said to 
the detective "what the hell is all this about and he said you are 
under arrest for the suspicion of selling marijuana and I said you 
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got to be crazy. I was pretty upset." Id. at 622 n.4 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
<J[18 The Supreme Court held that this "use for impeachment 
purposes of [the defendants'] silence, at the time of arrest and 
after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 619. And because 
"[t]he State has not claimed that such use in the circumstances of 
this case might have been harmless error," the Supreme Court 
reversed the convictions. Id. at 619-20. 
119 Four years after issuing Doyle, the Supreme Court applied 
that precedent in Anderson v. Cha1'les, 447 U.S. 404 (1980) (per 
curiam). Anderson involved a murder. The defendant was found 
with the victim's car. The defendant testified at trial, and his 
testimony about the car differed crucially from his statement to 
police at the time of his arrest. Id. at 404-06. The Supreme Court 
held that Doyle did not forbid impeaching a defendant's trial 
testimony about the crime with his police statement about the 
crime; the prosecutor's questions in that case "were not designed 
to draw meaning from silence, but to elicit an explanation for a 
prior inconsistent statement." Id. at 409. 
'f(20 The Anderson Court distinguished Doyle on the ground 
that Doyle "involved two defendants who made no postarrest 
statements about their involvement in the crime." Id. at 407. 
However, as the Court acknowledged, that assertion was not 
literally true, at least as to Doyle. Doyle asked arresting officers, 
"What's this all about?" and "e...-xclaimed 'you got to be crazy,' or 
'I don't know what you are talking about."' Id. at 407 n.2 
(citations omitted). But the Court noted that both the majority 
and dissenting opinions in Doyle II analyzed the due process 
question as if both defendants had remained silent." Id. What 
matters, the Court explained, are post-arrest statements "about 
[a defendant's] involvement in the crime." Id. at 407. 
~l21 Consequently, under Anderson, post-arrest statements 
about the suspect's involvement in the interrogation itself-such 
as "What's this all about?" "You got to be crazy," and "I don't 
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know what you are talking about" -are, for Doyle purposes, the 
equivalent of silence. Accordingly, the prosecutor may not use 
such statements to impeach a defendant's trial testimony. We 
thus must decide whether McCallie' s post-arrest statements fall 
into this category of comments about his involvement in the 
interrogation or, on the contrary, whether they can be fairly 
described as comments about his involvement in the crime. 
<]{22 Discussing Mccallie' s police interview in closing 
argument, the prosecutor asked rhetorically, "[W]hat does he 
say? Why am I here? Why are you jerking me [around]? Nothing 
happened. You woke me up. You woke me up." Though more 
bellicose, these statements by McCallie are similar to statements 
by Doyle in his police interview: "What's this all about?" "You 
got to be crazy," and "I don't know what you are talking about." 
Both men were addressing the interrogation itself, not the crime 
for which they were being interrogated. And because the 
Supreme Court "analyzed the due process question as if [Doyle] 
had remained silent," Anderson, 447 U.S. at 407 n.2, we do the 
same, proceeding here as if McCallie had remained silent. 4 
1123 The State also argues that because McCallie made 
statements to the police, his claim that he '"remained silent' at 
the police interview is incorrect." The State relies on the 
Supreme Court's decision in Bergltuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 
(2010), to argue that McCallie did not remain silent and made 
substantive statements to the police. The State argues that under 
Berghuis, no Doyle violation exists absent an affirmative 
invocation of the right to remain silent. In Berghuis, the Court 
held that a suspect who wishes to invoke his right to remain 
silent "must do so 'unambiguously."' Id. at 381. The Court 
4. We of course realize that suspects' statements feigning 
ignorance during a police interrogation may turn out to be 
"graphically inconsistent with their trial testimony." Doyle v. 
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 621 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But again, 
McCallie's statements and Doyle's statements are in this regard 
ind is tingu isha b le. 
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clarified that the defendant II did not say that he wanted to 
remain silent or that he did not want to talk to police. Had he 
made either of these simple unambiguous statements, he would 
have invoked his right to cut off questioning." Id. at 382 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
'1124 Berghuis does not control the present case. The Supreme 
Court has distinguished Fifth Amendment right-to-remain-silent 
cases from due process comment-on-silence cases. Thus, Berghuis 
holds that the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, like the 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel, must be invoked 
unambiguously. Id. at 375-76, 381. And a plurality of the 
Supreme Court has held in the Fifth Amendment context that 
"[a] suspect who stands mute has not done enough to put police 
on notice that he is relying on his Fifth Amendment privilege." 
Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 (2013) (plurality opinion).5 
1{25 But the plurality also stated that "due process prohibits 
prosecutors from pointing to the fact that a defendant was silent 
after he heard Miranda warnings. 11 Id. at 2182 n.3 (emphasis in 
original) (citing Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617-18 (1976)). The plurality's 
formulation of Doyle's holding emphasizes the suspect's having 
heard- not necessarily invoked- his Miranda rights. And there 
is no dispute here that McCallie heard his Miranda rights. Nor do 
we discern any intent by the Salinas plurality to abandon or 
narrow Doyle. And in Doyle, neither defendant "claimed the 
privilege and ... Doyle did not even remain silent." Doyle, 426 
U.S. at 627-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, we cannot agree 
that in the post-Miranda context, a suspect must unambiguously 
invoke his right to remain silent to trigger Doyle's "assurance 
that silence will carry no penalty." Id. at 618 (majority opinion). 
5. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the 
judgment of the Court on the ground that a prosecutor's 
comments on a defendant's precustodial silence do not violate 
the Fifth Amendment. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 
(2013) (Thomas, L concurring). 
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CJ{26 In sum, we conclude that the prosecutor committed a 
Doyle violation when he commented on McCallie's exercise of 
his right to remain silent. Having concluded a constitutional 
error occurred, we will reverse "unless we find the error 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 
86, c_r[ 45, 55 P.3d 573; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1967). 
B. The Constitutional Error Was Harmless Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt. 
c_r[27 Most constitutional errors do not automatically result in 
reversal. Barring structural error, "an otherwise valid conviction 
should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently 
say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Delawate v. Van Arsdall, 
475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). Doyle errors are not structural. See Brecht 
v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993) (citing Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307 (1991)). Thus, we address whether 
we may confidently say, on the whole record, that the Doyle 
error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
<J[28 In determining whether a Doyle error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, we may consider four factors: 
(1) whether the jury would naturally and 
necessarily construe the comment as referring to 
defendant's silence; (2) whether there was 
overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt; 
(3) whether the reference was isolated; and 
( 4) whether the trial court instructed _the jury not to 
draw any adverse presumption from defendant's 
[silence]. 
State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (alteration in 
original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
~f29 First, we do not believe that the jury would have 
"naturally and necessarily" construed the prosecutor's comment 
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as a comment on McCallie's silence. See id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). As explained above, Doyle and 
Anderson require us to "analyze[] the due process question as if 
[McCallie] had remained silent." Andetson v. Chatles, 447 U.S. 
404, 407 n.2 (1980) (per curiam). But McCallie in fact made 
statements to police, and the prosecutor's improper comments 
referred to these statements. Given this factual context, we 
cannot say that a lay jury would naturally and necessarily have 
understood the prosecutor's reference as a comment on. 
McCallie' s silence in the Fifth Amendment sense. We therefore 
conclude that the first Byrd factor weighs in favor of 
harmlessness. 
'Il:30 Second, we consider whether the evidence of McCallie's 
guilt was overwhelming. See Byrd, 937 P.2d at 535. Because the 
jury acquitted McCallie of discharge of a firearm and convicted 
him only of aggravated assault, we consider only the latter 
offense. 
~[31 As this court explained in Byi-d, "Courts have generally 
refused ... to conclude that evidence was overwhelming in cases 
that ultimately rested on the jury's resolution of conflicting 
evidence, particularly where the defendant's credibility is 
involved." Id. at 536. However, on the point in question-
whether McCallie's story had evolved over time-the evidence 
did not conflict and was overwhelming. 
1132 The prosecutor demonstrated the evolution of McCallie's 
story through a series of jailhouse phone calls. Portions of these 
recorded phone calls were played for the jury. In a call to his 
mother, McCallie stated that he needed Victim "to say this was 
an accident." A day later McCallie assured his mother that 
Victim would be a "team player" and would "say this was an 
accident." But a friend later told McCallie that Victim "was 
unwilling to say this was an accident," to which McCallie 
replied, "I told [Victim] we'd take care of him. Talk to him again. 
This will be well worth his while." He also asked the friend if 
she could "be pushy" with Victim "about saying this was an 
accident.'' Finally, McCallie told his mother, "I'm going a 
20140148-CA 13 2016 UT App4 
State v. McCallie 
different direction with the story now, it's self-defense now since 
[Victim] ... doesn't want to play ball." 
. ~[33 These phone calls, far more clearly than Mccallie' s 
belligerent statements to police., demonstrate that McCallie's 
story had indeed evolved over time. Thus, in closing argument, 
after summarizing these phone calls-but before mentioning 
McCallie' s police interview- the prosecutor stated, "That's the 
evolution of the story." He continued, "At first it's got to be an 
accident. ... All of a sudden it's self-defense because [Victim's] 
not playing ball .. . 11 
c_J(34 Furthermore, McCallie' s own version of events at trial 
supported the charge of aggravated assault. McCallie testified 
that after Victim barged into his room "for the umpteenth time," 
McCallie felt threatened and so grabbed his loaded handgun 
from under his pillow, "c[a]me up with it/' placed his finger 
"across the frame of the weapon," and ordered Victim out of his 
room. Under the law then in effect, "a threat, accompanied by a 
show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another" constituted an assault. Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-102(1)(b) 
(LexisNexis 2012). Use of a dangerous weapon elevated the 
offense to aggravated assault. Id. § 76-5-103(1)(a).6 Therefore, 
barring his recently evolved theory of self-defense, McCallie's 
testimony alone provided evidence on which the jury could 
reasonably have found the elements of aggravated assault. 
<jf35 Accordingly, we conclude that the second Byrd factor 
weighs in favor of harn1lessness. 
136 Third, the prosecutor's comment on McCallie' s silence 
constituted an isolated reference. See State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 
535 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Although the comment occurred at a 
crucial junction of the trial-the prosecutor's rebuttal in closing 
6. The same conduct meets the current defh~ition of aggravated 
assault. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 
2015). 
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argument-it occupied at most four lines of the transcript.7 We 
therefore conclude that it constituted an isolated statement. 
Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of harmlessness. 
<j{37 Finally, the trial court did not instruct the jury not to draw 
any adverse inference based on the prosecutor's improper 
comment. See id. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of 
harm. 
<J{38 In sum, the Byrd factors weigh in favor of harmlessness. 
Because the prosecutor's isolated comment did not clearly refer 
to McCallie' s silence, because the evidence that McCallie' s story 
had evolved over time was overwhelming, and because 
McCallie's own version of events supported his conviction for 
aggravated assault, we conclude that we "may confidently say, 
on the whole record," that the Doyle error here "was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt." See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 
673, 681 (1986). 
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
~[39 McCallie also contends that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for a directed verdict based on the 
sufficiency of the evidence. On appeal from a denial of a motion 
for a directed verdict based on the sufficiency 0£ the evidence, 
"[t]he applicable standard of review is ... highly deferential." 
State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, c_[ 30, 326 P.3d 645. "The evidence is 
to be viewed in the light most favorable to the [S]tate." State v. 
Montoya, 2004 UT 5, c_[ 29, 84 P.3d 1183. And "[w]e will uphold 
the trial court's decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all 
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, we conclude 
that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could 
find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Id. (alteration in original) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). When reviewing a directed 
7. By comparison, the prosecutor's discussion of the jailhouse 
phone calls occupied thirty-four lines of transcript. 
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verdict, "the court is not free to weigh the evidence and thus 
invade the provh1ce of the jury, whose prerogative it is to judge 
the facts." Id. ~[ 32 ( citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
A. We Review the Entire Record on Appeal. 
<J{40 The parties disagree on wl~ether we may canvas the entire 
record for evidence supporting McCallie' s conviction or are 
limited to evidence presented in the State's case-in-chief-that is, 
the evidence actually before the court at the time McCallie 
moved for a directed verdict. 
<jf 41 In a criminal case, a defendant may move for a directed 
verdict of dismissal at the close of the State's case-in-chief or 
after the close of all the evidence. See Utah R. Crim. P. 17(p). If 
the defendant moves for a directed verdict at the close of the 
State's case, and if, as often happens, the court denies the 
motion, the defendant may call defense witnesses, after which 
the State may call rebuttal witnesses. The question is whether the 
appellate court may consider this post-motion evidence in 
reviewing the trial court's denial of the motion. 
Cjl42 The State asks us to explicitly adopt the "waiver doctrine" 
or "waiver rule." Under this rule, "if the defendant elects to 
introduce evidence following the denial of a motion for a 
judgment of acquittal, appellate review of the defendant's 
conviction encompasses all of the evidence presented to the jury, 
irrespective of the sufficiency of evidence presented during the 
state's case-in-chief." State v. Perkins, 856 A.2d 917, 929 n.16 
(Conn. 2004). The State argues that Utah "seems to implicitly 
follow" the waiver rule.8 
8. The State describes the waiver rule as the prevailing view as 
well as the federal rule. See 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Crimin.al 
Procedure § 24.6(b) (3d ed. 2007). Our research bears out the 
State's characterization. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d 
(continued ... ) 
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143 McCallie contests this characterization. Further, he 
observes that, in any event, the State bases its sufficiency 
argument entirely on evidence presented in its case-in-chief; 
consequently, he argues, this court "ought to postpone ruling on 
this issue until a case comes before it with relevant facts from the 
entire case.'' 
'Il44 Our own research suggests that the Utah Supreme Court 
adopted the waiver rule some years ago. In State v. Stockton, 310 
P.2d 398 (Utah 1957), the court held that presenting evidence 
after denial of a motion for directed verdict constih1tes "waiver 
of the motion to direct": 
In jurisdictions where it is held to be the duty of 
the court, in a proper case, to direct an acquittal, it 
is the general rule that, if the entire evidence is 
sufficient to sustain a conviction, the introduction 
of evidence by the defense, after the court has 
refused to direct a verdict of acquittal at the close 
of the prosecution's case, amounts to a waiver of 
the motion to direct. 
Id. at 400. The court added that a defendant "cannot complain of 
the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, though 
( ... continued) 
1082, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ( All eleven numbered circuits and 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals are now on record ... 
as adhering to the waiver rule"); State v. Kinsella, 2011 ND 88, 
~l 11, 796 N.W.2d 678 ("Further, our adherence to the waiver rule 
is consistent with the position taken by the federal circuit courts 
of appeals and the majority of state courts.") The waiver rule 
"eliminates the bizarre result that could occur in its absence, 
namely, that a conviction could be reversed for evidentiary 
insufficiency, despite evidence in the record sufficiently 
establishing guilt." State v. Perkins, 856 A.2d 917, 932-33 (Conn. 
2004). 
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the State. failed to make a case, if he himself proved one for it." 
Id, (quoting Slate ·o. Potello, 119 P. 1.023, 1029 (Utah 1911)). But see 
State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, <JI 9, 988 P.2d 949 (stating, in 
reviewing a denied motion to dismiss, that "this court's review 
of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to the evidence 
adduced by the prosecution in its case-in-chief''). 
<J[45 In any event, in the present case, McCallie himself has 
placed the entire record before us, In arguing that the trial court 
erred in denying his motion for directed verdict, McCallie relies 
not only on evidence presented in the State's case-in-chief, but 
also on the testimony of four defense witnesses, including his 
own. Accordingly, as concerns this case, the parties apparently 
agree that we may assess the sufficiency of the evidence in light 
of the entire record. 
B. The Evidence Supports McCallie's Conviction. 
~f46 McCallie's argument that sufficient evidence failed to 
support his conviction rests on the severe intoxication of Victim, 
the State's key witness. Specifically, McCallie argt1es that the 
State "failed to make out its prima fade case because the 
evidence, which depended entirely on [Victim's] testimony, was 
based on a non-existent memory from extreme intoxication, and 
was so contradictory to the physical evidence, as to be utterly 
non-persuasive." Distilled to its essence, McCallie's argument 
goes to Victim's credibility. He maintains that, given Victim's 
extreme intoxication, "he would have had no or little ability to 
form a memory [of the events] at all. What this reflects is that 
[Victim] likely created [his} memories subsequently, when he 
was no longer so highly intoxicated." 
1147 No party disputes that Victim had a blood alcohol content 
(BAC) of .31. And at trial, an expert wih1.ess testified on behalf of 
the defense, explaining that someone who did not regularly 
drink and who had a BAC of ,31 "would be non-functional," 
"they'd be out cold on this level, almost certainly." He 
anticipated that "[s]omeone who drank alcohol on a regular 
basis ... would be significantly impaired." The expert explained 
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that at this level of intoxication, the ability "[t]o think, to 
understand, to remember, . . . and that sort of thing and to 
reason" would be significantly impaired. But on cross-
examination the expert also explained that a seasoned drinker 
could tolerate higher levels of alcohol: 
Well, his brain is used to seeing blood alcohols that 
are more substantial and so he'll have, you know, 
adapted to that and, you know, be able-he'll be 
able to function more normally, not completely 
normal, he'll be able to function more normally on 
higher blood alcohols than, you know, a non-
drinker or a rare drinker. 
All relevant evidence was before the jury to consider, and we 
will not invade the province of the jury by reweighing it. See 
State z,. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, <Jl 32, 84 P.3d 1183. "[I]t was the 
jury's prerogative to weigh [Victim's] testimony in light of the 
[expert testimony], and [Victim1 s] testimony, if believed, was 
sufficient to support a conviction" for aggravated assault. See 
State v. Peterson, 2015 UT App 129, i 8, 351 P.3d 812.9 
~[48 Moreover, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State, as we must, see Montoya, 2004 UT 5, i 29, 
we conclude sufficient evidence supports McCallie' s aggravated 
assault conviction. "A person commits aggravated assault if the 
person commits assault ... and uses a dangerous weapon .... " 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2012). Assault is, 
among other things, "a threat, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another." Id. 
§ 76-5~102(1)(b). Taking Victim's testimony at face value-as it 
constitutes the evidence most favorable to the State-Victim 
testified that McCallie had a gun; that he "[p ]ulled back the 
9. We also note that it appears the jury apparently disregarded at 
least some of Victim's testimony, because it acquitted McCallie 
of one qmnt of discharge of a firearm with injury. 
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hammer, raised it up and pointed it in [Victim's] face"; and that 
he uttered, "How about I just fuckin' kill you?" This alone 
constitutes sufficient evidence to uphold McCallie's aggravated 
assault conviction. Moreover, even if the jury found Victim's 
testimony wholly incredible, we conclude, as explained above, 
that McCallie' s own testimony provided some evidence of every 
element of the crime of which he was convicted. See supra '1[ 34. 
~[49 Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
denying McCallie's motion for a directed verdict, because the 
State and the defense presented sufficient evidence to support 
McCallie' s conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
'1[.50 In sum, we conclude that the prosecutor improperly 
commented on McCallie's right to remain silent, but that this 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We also 
conclude that sufficient evidence exists to support McCallie' s 
conviction. We therefore affirm. 
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Doyle v. Ohio1 426 U.S. 610 (1976) 
96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, 54 USLW 2230 
96 S.Ct. 2240 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Jefferson DOYLE, Petitioner, 
v. 
State of OHIO. 
Richard WOOD, Petitioner, 
v. 
State of OHIO. 
Nos. 75-5014, 75-5015. 
I 
Argued Feb. 23, 1976. 
I 
Decided June 17, 1976. 
Defendants were convicted before the Common Pleas 
Court of Tuscarawas County, Ohio, of selling marihuana, 
and they appealed. The Court of Appeals of Tuscarawas 
County, affirmed, and certiorari was granted. The 
Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Powell, held that although 
the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that 
silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit 
to any person who receives the warnings, that where 
defendants, who were given the Miranda warnings on 
arrest, did not complain to arresting officer that they had 
been framed but gave their exculpatory story for first time 
at trial, prosecutor's cross-examining defendants as to why 
they had not told the frame-up story on arrest violated 
due process and that cross-examination as to defendants' 
postarrest silence was not justified on grounds of necessity, 
i. e., that discrepancy gave rise to inference that story was 
fabricated and that such cross-examination was necessary 
in order to present to the jury all information relevant to 
the truth of such story. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Mr. Justice Stevens filed dissenting opinion in which Mr. 
Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined. 
**2241 *610 Syllabus * 
During the course of their state criminal trials petitioners, 
who after arrest were given warnings in line with Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-473, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 
1624-1627. 16 L.Ed.2d 694, took the stand and gave an 
exculpatory story that they had not previously told to the 
police or the prosecutor. Over their counsel's objection, 
they were cross-examined as to why they had not 
given the arresting officer the exculpatory explanations. 
Petitioners were convicted, and their convictions were 
upheld on appeal. Held : The use for impeachment 
purposes of petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and 
after they received Miranda warnings, violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Post-arrest 
silence following such warnings is insolubly ambiguous; 
moreover, it would be fundamentally unfair to allow an 
arrestee's silence to be used to impeach an explanation 
subsequently given at trial after he had been impliedly 
assured, by the Miranda warnings, that silence would 
carry no penalty. Pp. 2244-2246. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
James R. Willis, Cleveland, Ohio, for petitioners. 
Ronald L. Collins, New Philadelphia, Ohio, for the 
respondent, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court. 
Opinion 
*611 Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
(1) The question in these consolidated cases is whether 
a state prosecutor may seek to impeach a defendant's 
exculpatory story, told for the first time at trial, by cross-
examining the defendant about his failure to have told the 
story after re~eiving Miranda warnings 1 at the time of his 
arrest. We conclude that use of the defendant's post-arrest 
silence in this manner violates due process, and therefore 
reverse the convictions of both petitioners. 
I 
Petitioners Doyle and Wood were arrested together and 
charged with selling 10 pounds of marihuana to a local 
narcotics bureau informant. They were convicted in the 
Common Pleas Court of Tuscarawas **2242 County, 
Ohio, in separate trials held about one week apart. 
The evidence at their trials was identical in all material 
respects. 
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The State's witnesses sketched a picture of a routine 
marihuana transaction. William Bonnell, a well-known 
"street person., with a long criminal record, offered to 
assist the local narcotics investigation unit in setting up 
drug "pushers" in return for support in his efforts to 
receive lenient treatment in his latest legal problems. 
The narcotics agents agreed. A short time later, Bonnell 
advised the unit that he had arranged a "buy" of IO 
pounds of marihuana and needed $1,750 to pay for it. 
Since the banks were closed and time was short, the 
agents were able to collect only $1,320. Bonnell took this 
money and left for the rendezvous, under surveillance 
by four narcotics agents in two cars. As planned, he 
met petitioners in a bar in Dover, Ohio. From there, he 
and petitioner Wood drove in Bonnell's *612 pickup 
truck to the nearby town of New Philadelphia, Ohio, 
while petitioner Doyle drove off to obtain the marihuana 
and then meet them at a prearranged location in New 
Philadelphia. The narcotics agents followed the Bonnell 
truck. When Doyle arrived at Bonnell's waiting truck in 
New Philadelphia, the two vehicles pro(?eeded to a parking 
lot where the transaction took place. Bonnell left in his 
truck, and Doyle and Wood departed in Doyle's car. 
They quickly discovered that they had been paid $430 
less than the agreed-upon price, and began circling the 
neighborhood looking for Bonnell. They were stopped 
within minutes by New Philadelphia police acting on 
radioed instructions from the narcotics agents. One of 
those agents, Kenneth Beamer, arrived on the scene 
promptly, arrested petitioners, and gave them Miranda 
warnings. A search of the car, authorized by warrant, 
uncovered the $1,320. 
At both trials, defense counsel's cross-examination of 
the participating narcotics agents was aimed primarily 
at establishing that due to a limited view of the parking 
lot, none of them had seen the actual transaction but 
had seen only Bonnell standing next to Doyle's car 
with a package under his arm, presumably after the 
transaction. 2 Each petitioner took the stand at his trial 
and admitted practically everything about the State's case 
except the most crucial point: who was *613 selling 
marihuana to whom. According to petitioners, Bonnell 
had framed them. The arrangement had been for Bonnell 
to sell Doyle 10 pounds of marihuana. Doyle had left the 
Dover bar for the purpose 9f borrowing the necessary 
mo~ey, but while driving by himself had decided that he 
only wanted one or two pounds instead of the agreed-upon 
1 O pounds. When Bonnell reached Doyle's car in the New 
Philadelphia parking lot, with the marihuana under his 
arm, Doyle tried to explain his change of mind. Bonnell 
grew angry, threw the $1,320 into Doyle's car, and took all 
IO pounds of the marihuana back to his truck. The ensuing 
chase was the effort of Wood and Doyle to catch Bonnell 
to find out what the $1,320 was all about. 
Petitioners' explanation of the events presented some 
difficulty for the prosecution, as it was not entirely 
implausible and there was little if any direct evidence 
to contradict it. 3 As part of a wide-ranging cross-
examination for impeachment purposes, and in an effort 
to undercut the explanation, the prosecutor asked each 
petitioner at his respective trial why he had not told 
the frameup story to Agent Beamer when he arrested 
petitioners. In the first **2243 trial, that of petitioner 
Wood, the following colloquy occurred: 4 
"Q. (By the prosecutor.) Mr. Beamer did arrive on the 
scene? 
"A. (by Wood.) Yes, he did. 
"Q. And I assume you told him all about what happened 
to you? 
"A.No. 
*614 '. You didn't tell Mr. Beamer? 
"A.No. 
"Q. You didn't tell Mr. Beamer this guy put $1,300 in your 
car? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. And we can't understand any reason why anyone 
would put money in your car and you were chasing him 
around town and trying to give it back? 
"A. I didn't understand that. 
"Q. You mean you didn't tell I~im that? 
"A. Tell him what? 
"Q. Mr. Wood, if that is all you had to do with this and 
you are innocent, when Mr. Beamer arrived on the scene 
why didn't you tell him? 
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0 Q. But in any event you didn't bother to tell Mr. Beamer 
anything about this? 
"A. No, sir." 
Defense counsel's timely objections to the above questions 
of the prosecutor were overruled. The cross-examination 
of petitioner Doyle at his trial contained a similar 
exchange, and again defense counsel's timely objections 
were overruled. 5 
*615 Each petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, 
Fifth District, Tuscarawas County, alleging, Inter alia, 
that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor 
to cross-examine the petitioner at his trial about his 
post-arrest silence. The Court of Appeals affim1ed the 
convictions, stating as to the contentions about the post-
arrest silence: 
"This was not evidence offered by the state in its case in 
chief as confession by silence or as substantive evidence of 
guilt but rather cross examination *616 of a witness as 
to why he had not told the same story earlier at his first 
opportunity. 
**2244 "We find no error in this. It goes to credibility of 
the witness." 
The Supreme Court of Ohio denied further review. We 
granted certiorari to decide whether impeachment use of 
a defendant's post-arrest silence violates any provision 
of the Constitution, 6 a question left open last Term in 
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 
L.Ed.2d 99 (1975), and on which the Federal Courts of 
Appeals are in conflict. See Id., at 173 n. 2, 95 S.Ct., at 
2135. 
II 
The State pleads necessity as justification for the 
prosecutor's action in these cases. It argues that the 
discrepancy between an exculpatory story at trial and 
silence at time of arrest gives rise to an inference that the 
story was fabricated somewhere along the way, perhaps to 
fit within the seams of the State's case as it was developed 
at pretrial hearings. Noting that the prosecution usually 
has little else with which to counter such an exculpatory 
story, the State seeks only the right to cross-examine a 
defendant as to post-arrest silence for the limited purpose 
of impeachment. In support of its position the State 
emphasizes the importance ofcross-examination *617 in 
general, see Brown l'. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-155, 
78 S.Ct. 622, 626-627, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958), and relies 
upon those cases in which this Court has permitted use for 
impeachment purposes of post-arrest statements that were 
inadmissible as evidence of guilt because of an officer's 
failure to follow Miranda's dictates. Harris v. New York, 
401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); Oregon 
v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 
( 1975); see also Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 
74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954). Thus, although the 
State does not suggest petitioners' silence could be used as 
evidence of guilt, it contends that the need to present to 
the jury all information relevant to the truth of petitioners' 
exculpatory story fully justifies the cross-examination that 
is at issue. 
{21 131 (4] (5] (6) Despite the importance of cross-
examination, 7 we have concluded that the Miranda 
decision compels rejection of the State's position. The 
warnings mandated by that case, as a prophylactic means 
of safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights, see Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-444, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2363-2364, 
41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974), require that a person taken into 
custody be advised immediately that he has the right to 
remain silent, that anything he says may be used against 
him, and that he has a right to retained or appointed 
counsel before submitting to interrogation. Silence in the 
wake of these warnings may be nothing more than the 
arrestee's exercise of these Miranda rights. Thus, every 
post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what 
the State is required to advise the person arrested. 8 
See **2245 *618 United States v. Hale, supra, 422 
U.S., at 177, 95 Ct., at 2137. Moreover, while it is true 
that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance 
that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is 
implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such 
circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a 
deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's 
silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently 
offered at trial. 9 *619 Mr. Justice White, concurring in 
the judgment in United States v. Hale, supra, at 182-183, 
95 S.Ct., at 2139, put it very well: 
"(W)hen a person under arrest is informed, as Miranda 
requires, that he may remain silent, that anything he 
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says may be used against him, and that he may have 
an attorney if he wishes, it seems to me that it does 
not comport with due process to permit the prosecution 
during the trial to call attention to his silence at the time of 
arrest and to insist that because he did not speak about the 
facts of the case at that time, as he was told he need not do, 
an unfavorable inference might be drawn as to the truth 
of his trial testimony .... Surely Hale was not informed 
here that his silence. as well as his words, could be used 
against him at trial. Indeed, anyone would reasonably 
conclude from Miranda warnings that this would not be 
the case." 10 
(7) We hold that the use for impe.achment purposes of 
petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving 
Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 11 The State has not *620 
claimed that such use in the circumstances of this case 
might have been harmless error. Accordingly, petitioners' 
**2246 convictions are reversed and their causes 
remanded to the state courts for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
Mr. Justice STEVENS, with whom Mr. Justice 
BLACKMUN and Mr. Justice REHNQUIST join, 
dissenting. 
Petitioners assert that the prosecutor's cross-examination 
about their failure to mention the purported "frame" 
until they testified at trial violated their constitutional 
right to due process and also their constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination. I am not persuaded by the 
first argument; though there is merit in a portion of the 
second, I do not believe it warrants reversal of these state 
convictions, 
I 
The Court's due process rationale has some of the 
characteristics of an estoppel theory. If (a) the defendant 
is advised that he may remain silent, and (b) he does 
remain silent, then we (c) presume that his decision was 
made in reliance on the advice, and (d) conclude that 
it is unfair in certain cases, though not others, 1 to use 
his silence to impeach his trial testimony. The key to the 
Court's analysis is apparently a concern that the Miranda 
warning, which is intended to increase the probability 
*621 that a person's response to police questioning will 
be intelligent and voluntary, will actually be deceptive 
unless we require the State to honor an unstated promise 
not to use the accused's silence against him. 
In my judgment there is nothing deceptive or prejudicial to 
the defendant in the Miranda warning. 2 Nor do I believe 
that the fact that such advice was given to the defendant 
lessens the probative value of his silence, or makes the 
prosecutor's cross-examination about his silence any more 
unfair than if he had received no such warning. 
This is a case in which the defendants' silence at the 
time of their arrest was graphically inconsistent with their 
trial testimony that they were the unwitting victims of 
a "frameup" in which the police did not participate. If 
defendants had been framed, their failure to mention that 
fact at the time of their arrest is almost *622 inexplicable; 
for that reason, under accepted rules of evidence, their 
silence is tantamount to a prior inconsistent statement and 
admissible for purposes of impeachment. 3 
Indeed, there is irony in the fact that the Miranda warning 
provides the only plausible explanation for their silence. If 
it were the true explanation, I should think that they would 
have responded to the questions on cross-examination 
about why they had remained silent by stating that they 
relied on their understanding of the advice given by the 
arresting officers. Instead, however, **2247 they gave 
quite a different jumble of responses. 4 Those *623 
response negate the Court's presumption that their silence 
was induced by reliance on deceptive advice. 
**2248 Since the record requires us to put to one side 
the *624 Court's presumption that the defendants' silence 
was the product of reliance on the Miranda warning, 
the Court's entire due process rationale collapses. For 
without reliance *625 on the waiver, the case is no 
different than if no warning had been given, and nothing 
in the Court's opinion suggests that there would be any 
unfairness in *626 using petitioners' prior inconsistent 
silence for impeachment purposes in such a case. 
Indeed, as a genera] proposition, if we assume the 
defendant's silence would be admissible for impeachment 
purposes if no Miranda warning had been given, I should 
think that the warning would have a tendency to salvage 
the defendant's credibility as a witness. If the defendant 
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is a truthful witness, and if his silence is the consequence 
of his understanding of the Miranda warning, he may 
explain that fact when he is on the stand. Even if he is 
untruthful, the availability of that explanation puts him 
in a better position than if he had received no warning. 
In my judgment; the risk that a truthful defendant will be 
deceived by the Miranda warning and also will be unable 
to explain his honest misunderstanding is so much less 
than the risk that exclusion of the evidence will merely 
provide a shield for perjury that I cannot accept the 
Court's due process rationale. 
Accordingly, if we assume that the use of a defendant's 
silence for impeachment purposes would be otherwise 
unobjectionable, I find no merit in the notion that he is 
denied due process of law because he received a Miranda 
warning. 
II 
Petitioners argue that the State violated their Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by asking 
the jury to draw an inference of guilt from their 
constitutionally protected silence. They challenge both the 
prosecutor's cross-examination and his closing argument. 
A 
Petitioners claim that the cross-examination was improper 
because it referred to their silence at the time of *627 
their arrest, to their failure to testify at the preliminary 
hearing, and to their failure to reveal the "frame" prior 
to trial. Their claim applies to the testimony of each 
defendant at his own trial, and also to the testimony 
each gave as a witness at the trial of the other. Since I 
think it quite clear that a defendant may not object to the 
violation of another **2249 person's privilege, 5 I shall 
only discuss the argument that a defendant may not be 
cross-examined about his own prior inconsistent silence. 
In support of their objections to the cross-examination 
about their silence at the time of arrest, petitioners 
primarily rely on the statement in Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, that 
the prosecution may not use at trial the fact that the 
defendant stood mute or claimed the privilege in the 
face of accusations during custodial interrogation. 6 There 
are two reasons why that statement does not adequately 
support petitioners' argument. 
First, it is not accurate to say that the petitioners 
"stood mute or claimed the privilege in the face of 
accusations. 11 Neither petitioner claimed the privilege and 
*628 petitioner Doyle did not even remain silent. 7 The 
case is not one in which a description of the actual 
conversation between the defendants and the police would 
give rise to any inference of guilt if it were not so flagrantly 
inconsistent with their trial testimony. Rather than a claim 
of privilege, we simply have a failure to advise the police of 
a "frame" at a time when it most surely would have been 
mentioned if petitioners' trial testimony were true. That 
failure gave rise to an inference of guilt only because it 
belied their trial testimony. 
Second, the dictum in the footnote in Miranda relies 
primarily upon Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 
85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, which held that the 
Fifth Amendment, as incorporated in the Fourteenth, 
prohibited the prosecution's use of the defendant's silence 
in its case in chief. But as long ago as Raffel v. 
United States, 271 U.S. 494, 46 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed. 
1054, this Court recognized the distinction between the 
prosecution's affirmative use of the defendant's prior 
silence and the use of prior silence for impeachment 
purposes. Raffel expressly held that the defendant's 
silence at a prior trial was admissible for purposes 
of impeachment despite the application in federal 
prosecutions of the prohibition that Griffin found in the 
Fifth Amendment. Raffel, supra, at 496-497, 46 S.Ct., at 
567-568. 
Moreover, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, the author of 
the Court's opinion in Miranda, joined the opinion in 
Walder v. United States. 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 
L.Ed. 503. which squarely held that a valid constitutional 
objection to the admissibility of evidence as part of the 
Government's case in chief did not bar the use of that 
evidence to impeach the defendant's trial testimony. The 
availability of an objection to the affirmative use of 
improper evidence does not provide the defendant "with 
a shield against contradiction of his untruths." Id., at 65, 
74 S.Ct., at 356. The need to ensure the integrity *629 
of the truth-determining function of the adversary trial 
process has provided the predicate for an unbroken line of 
decisions so holding. 8 
*630 Although I have no doubt concerning the propriety 
of the cross-examination about petitioners1 failure to 
mention the purported **2250 "frame" at the time of 
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their arrest, a more difficult question is presented by their 
objection to the questioning about their failure to testify 
at the preliminary hearing and their failure generally to 
mention the "frame" before trial. 9 Un1ik~ the failure 
*631 to **2251 make the kind of spontaneous comment 
that discovery of a "frame" would be expected to prompt, 
there is no significant inconsistency between petitioners' 
trial testimony *632 and their adherence to counsel's 
advice not to take the stand at the preliminary hearing; 
moreover, the decision not to divulge their defense prior 
to trial is probably attributable to counsel rather than to 
petitioners. 10 Nevertheless, unless and until this Court 
overrules Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 46 S.Ct. 
566, 70 L.Ed. 1054, 11 I think a state court is *633 free to 
regard the defendant's decision to take the **2252 stand 
as a waiver of his objection to the use of his failure to 
testify at an earlier proceeding or his failure to off er his 
version of the events prior to trial. 
B 
In my judgment portions of the prosecutor's argument 
to the jury overstepped permissible bounds. In each trial, 
he commented upon the defendant's silence not only as 
Footnotes 
inconsistent with his testimony that he had been "framed," 
*634 but also as inconsistent with the defendant's 
innocence. 12 Comment on the lack of credibility of the 
defendant is plainly proper; it is not proper, however, for 
the prosecutor *635 to ask the **2253 jury to draw a 
direct inference of guilt from silence-to argue, in effect, 
that silence is inconsistent with innocence. But since the 
two inferences perjury *636 and guilt are inextricably 
intertwined because they have a common source, it would 
be unrealistic to permit comment on the former but to 
find reversible error in the slightest reference to the latter. 
In the context of the entire argument and the entire 
trial, I am not persuaded that the rather sophisticated 
distinction between permissible comment on credibility 
and impermissible comment on an inference of guilt 
justifies a reversal of these state convictions. 13 
Accordingly, although I have some doubt concerning the 
propriety of the cross-examination about the preliminary 
hearing and consider a portion of the closing argument 
improper, I would affirm these convictions. 
All Citations 
426 U.S. 610, 96S.Ct. 2240,49 L.Ed.2d 91, 54 USLW 2230 
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the 
convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 
50 L.Ed. 499. 
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-473, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624-1627, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 {1966). 
Defense counsel's efforts were not totally successful. One of the four narcotics agents testified at both trials that he had 
seen the package passed through the window of Doyle's car to Bonnell. In an effort to impeach that testimony, defense 
counsel played a tape of the preliminary hearing at which the same agent had testified only to seeing the package under 
Bonnell's arm. The agent did not retract his trial testimony, and both he and the prosecutor explained the apparent 
inconsistency by noting that the examination at the preliminary hearing had not focused upon whether anyone had seen 
the package pass to Bonnell. 
Seen. 2, Supra. 
Trial transcript in Ohio v. Wood, No. 10657, Common Pleas Court, Tuscarawas County, Ohio (hereafter Wood Tr.), 
465-470. 
5 Trial transcript in Ohio v. Doyle, No. 10656, Common Pleas Court, Tuscarawas County, Ohio (hereafter Doyle Tr.), 
504-507: 
"Q. (By the prosecutor.) ... You are innocent? 
"A. (By Doyle.) I am innocent. Yes Sir. 
"Q. That's why you told the police department and Kenneth Beamer when they arrived 
"(Continuing.) about your innocence? 
"A. ... I didn't tell them about my innocence. No. 
"Q. You said nothing at all about how you had been set up? 
"Q. Did Mr. Wood? 
"A. Not that I recall, Sir. 
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"Q, As a matter of fact, if I recall your testimony correctly, you said instead of protesting your innocence, as you do today, 
you said in response to a question of Mr. Beamer, 'I don't know what you are talking about.' 
"A. I believe what I said, 'What's this all about?' If I remember, that's the only thing I said. 
"A. I was questioning, you know, what it was about. That's what I didn't know. I knew that I was trying to buy, which was 
wrong, but I didn't know what was going on. I didn't know that Bill Bonnell was trying to frame me, or what-have-you. 
"Q. All right, But you didn't protest your innocence at that time? 
"A. Not until I knew what was going on." 
In addition, the court in both trials permitted the prosecutor, over more objections, to argue petitioners' post-arrest silence 
to the jury. Closing Argument of Prosecutor 13-14, supplementing Wood Tr.; Doyle Tr. 515, 526. 
Petitioners also claim constitutional error because each of them was cross-examined by the prosecutor as to why he 
had not told the exculpatory story at the preliminary hearing or any other time prior to the trials. In addition, error of 
constitutional dimension is asserted because each petitioner was cross-examined as to post-arrest, preliminary hearing, 
and general pretrial silence when he testified as a Defense witness at the other petitioner's trial. These averments of error 
present different considerations from those implicated by cross-examining petitioners as defendants as to their silence 
after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of arrest. In view of our disposition of this case we find it unnecessary to 
reach these additional issues. 
7 We recognize, of course, that unless prosecutors are allowed wide leeway in the scope of impeachment cross-
examination some defendants would be able to frustrate the truth-seeking function of a trial by presenting tailored 
defenses insulated from effective challenge. See generally Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304,315, 20 S.Ct. 944, 
948, 44 L.Ed. 1078 (1900). 
8 The dissent by Mr. Justice STEVENS expresses the view that the giving of Miranda warnings does not lessen the 
"probative value of (a defendant's) silence .... " Post, at 2246. But in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 177, 95 
S.Ct. 2133, 2137, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975), we noted that silence at the time of arrest may be inherently ambiguous even 
apart from the effect of Miranda warnings, for in a given case there may be several explanations for the silence that are 
consistent with the existence of an exculpatory explanation. In Hale we exercised our supervisory powers over federal 
courts. The instant cases, unlike Hale, come to us from a state court and thus provide no occasion for the exercise of our 
supervisory powers. Nor is it necessary, in view of our holding above, to express an opinion on the probative value for 
impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence. We note only that the Hale court considered silence at the time of arrest 
likely to be ambiguous and thus of dubious probative value. 
9 A somewhat analogous situation was presented in Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. 704 
{1943). A defendant who testified at his trial was permitted by the trial judge to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination in response to certain questions on cross-examination. This Court assumed that it would not 
have been error for the trial court to have denied the privilege in the circumstances, see Id., at 196, 63 S.Ct., at 553, 
in which case a failure to answer would have been a proper basis for adverse inferences and a proper subject for 
prosecutorial comment. But because the privilege had been granted, even if erroneously, "the requirements of fair trial" 
made it error for the trial court to permit comment upon the defendant's silence. Ibid. 
"An accused having the assurance of the court that his claim of privilege would be granted might well be entrapped if his 
assertion of the privilege could then be used against him. His real choice might then be quite different from his apparent 
one .... Elementary fairness requires that an accused should not be misled on that score." Id., at 197, 63 S.Ct., at 553. 
Johnson was decided under this Court's supervisory powers over the federal courts. But the necessity for elementary 
fairness is not unique to the federal criminal system. Cf. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-440, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 1265-1267, 
3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959). 
10 The dissenting opinion relies on the fact that petitioners in this case, when cross-examined about their silence, did not 
offer reliance on Miranda warnings as a justification. But the error we perceive lies in the cross-examination on this 
question, thereby implying an inconsistency that the jury might construe as evidence of guilt. After an arrested person is 
formally advised by an officer of the law that he has a right to remain silent, the unfairness occurs when the prosecution, 
in the presence of the jury, is allowed to undertake impeachment on the basis of what may be the exercise of that right. 
11 It goes almost without saying that the fact of post-arrest silence could be used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant 
who testifies to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have told the police the same version upon arrest. In 
that situation the fact of earlier silence would not be used to impeach the exculpatory story, but rather to challenge the 
defendant's testimony as to his behavior following arrest. Cf. United States v. Fairchild, 505 F .2d 1378, 1383 (CA5 1975}. 
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1 As the Court acknowledges, the "fact of post-arrest sileryce could be used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant 
who testifies to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have told the police the same version upon arrest." Ante, 
at 2245 and n. 11 . 
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3 
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At Wood's trial, the arresting officer described the warning he gave petitioners: 
"I told Mr. Wood and Mr. Doyle of the Miranda warning rights they had the right to remain silent, anything they said could 
and would be used against them in a court of law, and they had the right to an attorney and didn't have to say anything 
without an attorney being present and if they couldn't afford one, the court would appoint them one at the proper time." 
Trial transcript in Ohio v. Wood, No. 10657, Common Pleas Court, Tuscarawas County, Ohio (hereafter Wood Tr.), 126. 
At the Doyle trial, he testified that he "gave them their rights" and gave them a " 'Miranda Warning.' " Trial transcript 
in Ohio v. Doyle, No. 10656, Common Pleas Court, Tuscarawas County, Ohio (hereafter Doyle Tr.), 269. Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, requires the following warning: 
"(The suspect) must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can 
be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an 
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." Id., at 4 79, 86 S. Ct., at ·1530. 
3A J. Wigmore, Evidences 1042 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). 
Petitioner Doyle gave the following testimony on direct and cross-examination at his trial: 
"Q. {By defense counsel.) And you were placed under arrest at that time? 
"A. (By Doyle.) Yes. I asked what for and he said, 'For the sale of marijuana.' I told him, I didn't know what he was 
talking about. 
"Q. (By the prosecutor.) As a matter of fact, if I recall your testimony correctly, you said instead of protesting your 
innocence, as you do today, you said in response to a question of Mr. Beamer, 'I don't know what you are talking about.' 
"A. (By Doyle.) I believe what I said, 'What's this all about?' If I remember, that's the only thing I said. 
"Q. You testified on direct. 
"A. If I did, then I didn't understand. 
" ... I was questioning, you know, what it was about. That's what I didn't know. I knew that I was trying to buy, which was 
wrong, but I didn't know what was going on. I didn't know that Bill Bonnell was trying to frame me, or what-have-you. 
"Q. All right, But you didn't protest your innocence at that time? 
"A. Not until I knew what was going on." Doyle Tr. 479, 506-507. 
At Wood's trial, Doyle gave a somewhat different explanation of his silence at the time of arrest: 
"Q. (By the prosecutor.) Why didn't (Wood) tell (the police officers) about Mr. Bonnell? 
"A. (By Doyle.) Because we didn't know what was going on and wanted to find out. 
"Q. So he hid the money under the mat? 
"A. The police officers said they stopped us for a red light. I wanted to get my hands on Bill Bonnell. 
"Q. It wasn't because you were guilty, was it? 
"A. Because I wanted to get my hands on Bill Bonnell because I suspected he was trying ... 
"Q. Why didn't you tell the police that Bill Bonnell just set you up? 
"A. Because I would rather have my own hands on him. 
"Q. When Mr. Beamer arrived? 
"A .•.. (W)hen Mr. Beamer got there I said to Mr. Beamer what the hell is all this about and he said you are under arrest 
for the suspicion of selling marijuana and I said you got to be crazy. I was pretty upset. Q 
"Q. So on the night of April 29 you felt that you were being framed like you are being framed today? 
"A. I was so confused that night, the night of the arrest. 
"Q. How about Mr. Wood? 
"A. Mr. Wood didn't know what was going on. 
"Q .... Are you as mad and upset today as you were that night? 
"A. I can't answer that question. Q 
"Q. Did you feel the same way about what happened to you? 
"A. That night I felt like I couldn't believe what was happening. 
"Q. You didn't like being framed? 
"A. That is right. I didn't like some one putting me in a spot like that. 
"Q. Didn't it occur to you to try to protect yourself? 
"A. Yes, at this time I felt like I wasn't talking to nobody but John James who was the attorney at that time. G 
"Q. But you felt ... 
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"A. The man walked up and didn't ask me anything. 
"Q. You didn't talk to a soul about how rotten it was because you were framed? 
"A. I will answer the question, sir, the best I can. I didn't know what to say. I was stunned about what was going on and 
I was asked questions and I answered the questions as simply as I could because I didn't have nobody there to help 
me answer the questions. 
"Q. Wouldn't that have been a marvelous time to protest your innocence? 
"A. I don't know if it would or not. 
"Q. Do you remember having a conversation with Kenneth Beamer? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. What was said? 
"A. Kenneth Beamer said I want to know where you stash where your hide out is, where you are keeping the dope and I 
said I don't know what you are talking about. I believe the question was asked in front of you. 
"Q. Where did this conversation take place? 
"A. Took place during the search. 
"Q. So any way you didn't tell anyone how angry you were that night? 
"A. I was very angry. 
"Q. But you didn't tell anyone? 
"A. That is right. If I started I don't know where I would have stopped. I was upset." Wood Tr. 424-430. 
Petitioner Wood testified on cross-examination at his trial as follows: 
"Q. (By the prosecutor.) Jefferson Doyle said he was confused, angry and upset (at the time of the arrest). Were you 
confused, angry and upset? 
"A. (By Wood.) Upset and confused. 
"Q. Why were you upset? 
"A. Because I didn't know what was going on most of the time. 
"Q. Why would you be upset? Because you found $1300 in your back seat? 
"A. Mainly because the person that was in the car Jeff (Doyle} was upset confused and angry and ... 
"Q. What has that to do with you? 
"A. I am in the car. That is what it has to do with me. 
"Q. You are innocent? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Of anything? 
"A. I don't know about anything. 
"Q. This particular incident, you were placed under arrest, weren't you? 
"A. Yes, innocent of this incident. 
"Q. Innocent of the entire transaction? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Or even any knowledge of the entire transaction? 
"A. Up to a point, sir. 
"Q. Mr. Wood, if that is all you had to do with this and you are innocent, when Mr. Beamer arrived on the scene why 
didn't you tell him? 
"A. Mr. Cunningham, in the last eight months to a year there has been so many implications, etc. in the paper and law 
enfo.rcement that are setting people up and busting them for narcotics and stuff." Wood Tr. 467-469. 
See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206-207, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 1203-1204, 12 L.Ed.2d 246; 8J. Wigmore, Evidence 
s 2270, pp. 416-417 (McNaughton rev. 1961); cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961,967, 22 
L.Ed.2d 176. Cross-examination and comment upon a witness' prior silence does not raise any inference prejudicial to 
the defendant, and, indeed, does not even raise any inference that the defendant remained silent. 
"In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege 
when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute 
or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation. Cf. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 
(1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964}; Comment, 31 U.Chi.L.Rev. 556 (1964); 
Developments in the Law Confessions, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 935, 1041-1044 (1966). See also Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 
532,562, 18 S.Ct. 183, 194, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897)." 384 U.S., at 468 n. 37, 86 S.Ct., at 1625. 
7 See n. 4 1 supra. 
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As the Court recently recognized in a most carefully considered opinion, an adversary system can maintain neither the 
reality nor the appearance of efficacy without the assurance that its judgments rest upon a complete illumination of a case 
rather than upon "a partial or speculative presentation of the facts." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709, 94 S.Ct. 
3090, 3108, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039. The necessity of insuring a complete presentation of all relevant evidence has led to the 
rule that a criminal defendant who voluntarily foregoes his privilege not to testify, and presents exculpatory or mitigating 
evidence, thereby subjects himself to relevant cross-examination without the right to reclaim Fifth Amendment protection 
on a selective basis. Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304,315, 20 S.Ct. 944,948, 44 L.Ed. 1078. 
"If he takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like 
that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. '{H)e 
has no right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without layi~g himself open to a cross-examination 
upon those facts.'" Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-155, 78 S.Ct. 622, 626, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (citation omitted). 
One need not impute perjury to an entire class to acknowledge that a testifying defendant has more to gain and less 
to lose than an ordinary witness from fabrications upon the witness stand. Cf. Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 
304-311, 15 S.Ct. 610, 611-613, 39 L.Ed. 709; Taylorv. United States, 390 F.2d 278, 284-285 (CAS 1968) (Blackmun, J.). 
As the Court notes today: "Unless prosecutors are allowed wide leeway in the scope of impeachment cross-examination 
some defendants would be able to frustrate the truth-seeking function of a trial by presenting tailored defenses insulated @ 
from effective challenge." Ante, at 2244 n. 7. In recognition of this fact, this Court has allowed evidence to be used for 
impeachment purposes that would be inadmissible as evidence of guilt. In Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 
S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503, evidence of narcotics unlawfully seized in connection with an aborted earlier case against a 
defendant was held admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching the defendant's testimony that he never had been 
associated with narcotics, although such evidence clearly was inadmissible for any purpose in the prosecution's case 
in chief. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1, the Court held admissible for the purpose Q 
of impeaching a defendant's testimony certain partially inconsistent post-arrest statements which, although voluntary, 
were unavailable for the prosecution's case because they had been given by the defendant without benefit of Miranda 
warnings. And last Term, in a decision closely analogous to Harris, the Court held admissible for impeachment purposes 
post-arrest statements of a defendant made after he had received Miranda warnings and exercised his right to request 
a lawyer, but before he had been furnished with counsel as Miranda requires in such circumstances. Oregon v. Hass, 
420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570. G 
In each of these cases involving impeachment cross-examination, the need to insure the integrity of the trial by the 
"traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process," Harris v. New York supra, 401 U.S., at 225, 91 S.Ct., at 645, 
was deemed to outweigh the policies underlying the relevant exclusionary rules. 
Petitioner Doyle was cross-examined as follows at his trial: 
"Q. (By the prosecutor.) All right. Do you remember the Preliminary Hearing in this case? 
"A. (By Doyle.) Yes Sir. I remember it. 
"Q. And that was prior to your indictment for this offense, was it not? 
"A. Yes sir. I believe, Yes Sir, it was before I was indicted. 
"Q. Arraignment. Is that what you mean? 
"A. Yes. The next day after the arrest. 
"Q. Yes, when evidence was presented and you had the opportunity to hear the testimony of the witnesses against you. 
Remember that? 
"A. Yes Sir. 
"Q. Mr. Bonnell testified; Captain Griffin testified; Deputy-Chief Deputy White testified? 
"A. Yes Sir. 
"Q. Kenneth Beamer testified? 
"A. Yes Sir. 
"Q. You were there, weren't you? 
"A. Yes Sir. 
"Q. And your lawyer was there, Mr. James? 
"A. Yes Sir. 
"Q. Tape recording was made of the transcript? 
"A. Yes Sir. 
"Q. Did you protest your innocence at that proceeding? 
"A. I didn't everything that was done with that was done with my attorney. My attorney did it. 
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"Q. All right. The first time that you gave this version of the fact was in the trial of Richard Wood, was it not? 
"A. Yes Sir. It was the first time I was asked. 
"Q, All the time, you being innocent? 
"A. Yes Sir." Doyle Tr. 507-508. 
Petitioner Wood was subjected to similar cross-examination at his trial: 
"Q. (By the prosecutor.) As a matter of fact you never told anyone that you had been set up until today? 
"A. (By Wood.) Yes, I believe I did, sir. 
"Q. I assume you discussed it with your lawyer? 
"A. Yes, I discussed it with my lawyer. 
"Q. And you heard the testimony and witnesses against you? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And were you aware Mr. James was able to obtain a tape transcript of the proceedings? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q, And you no doubt listed to those? 
"A. Parts and portions of them some of it. 
"Q. But you never communicated your innocence? 
"A. I believe I did one time to Mr. Beamer. 
"Q. When might that have been? 
"A. When in the jail house. 
"Q. So you protested your innocence? 
"A. In a little room. I believe he asked us how do you let people get away with people setting up friends like this. He said 
Bill Bonnell is not your friend and I said no, but I figured he was a good enough acquaintance he would do that. 
"Q, Where was that? 
"A. Little room there. 
"Q, Every been there before? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. When? 
"Q. Did you see me there? 
"A. I didn't know who you were at the time. I believe you were in and out of there. 
"Q. You didn't say anything to me, did you? 
"A. No, I didn't know who you were then." Wood Tr. 470-472. 
1 O Under Ohio law, the preliminary hearing determines only whether the defendant should be held for trial. The prosecution 
need establish, at most, that a crime has been committed and that there is "probable and reasonable cause" to hold the 
defendant for trial, and the court need only find "substantial credible evidence" of the charge against the defendant. Ohio 
Rev.Code Ann. ss 2937.12, 2937.13 (Supp.1973). Indeed, if a defendant has been indicted, no hearing need be held. 
State v. Morris, 42 Ohio St.2d 307,326,329 N.E.2d 85, 97 (1975). Defense counsel thus will have no incentive to divulge 
the defendant's case at the preliminary hearing if the prosecution has presented substantial evidence of guilt. Since that 
was the case here, no significant impeaching inference may be drawn from petitioners' silence at that proceeding. 
Petitioners' failure to refer to the "frame" at any time between arrest and trial is somewhat more probative; for if the 
"frame" story were true, one would have expected counsel to try to persuade the prosecution to dismiss the charges 
in advance of trial. 
11 Raffel was the last decision of this Court to address the constitutionality of admitting evidence of a defendant's prior 
silence to impeach his testimony upon direct examination. Raffel had been charged with conspiracy to violate the National 
Prohibition Act. An agent testified at his first trial that he had admitted ownership of a drinking place: Raffel did not take 
the stand. The trial ended in a hung jury, and upon retrial, the agent testified as before. Raffel elected to testify and 
denied making the statement, but he was cross-examined on his failure to testify in the first trial. This Court held that 
the evidence was admissible because Raffel had completely waived the privilege against self-incrimination by deciding 
to testify. 271 U.S., at 499, 46 S.Ct., at 568. 
Subsequent cases, decided in the exercise of this Court's supervisory powers, have diminished the force of Raffel in 
the federal courts. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99; Stewart v. United States, 366 
U.S. 1, 81 S.Ct. 941, 6 L.Ed.2d 84; Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931. All three 
of these cases held that the defendant's prior silence or prior claim of the privilege was inadmissible for purposes of 
impeachment; all three distinguished Raffel on the ground that the Court there assumed that the defendant's prior silence 
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was significantly inconsistent with his testimony on direct examination. Hale, supra, 422 U.S., at 175-176, 95 S.Ct., at 
2136-2137; Stewart, supra, 366 U.S., at 5-7, 81 S.Ct., at 943-944; Grunewald, supra, 353 U.S., at 418-424, 77 S.Ct., at 
981-984. Two of the three cases relied upon the need to protect the defendant's exercise of the privilege against self-
incrimination from unwarranted inferences of guilt, a rationale that is not easily reconciled with the reasoning in Raffel 
that the decision to testify constitutes a complete waiver of the protection afforded by the privilege. Compare Hale, supra, 
422 U.S., t 180, 95 S.Ct., at 2138 and n. 7, and Grunewald, supra, 353 U.S., at 423-424, 77 S.Ct., at 983-984, with Raffel, 
271 U.S., at 499, 46 S.Ct., at 568. 
12 At Doyle's trial, the prosecutor made the following arguments to the jury: 
"Diffuse what the true facts are; obscure the facts and prosecute the prosecution. 
"A typical and classic defense, but keep in mind, when you are considering the testimony of the law enforcement officers 
involved, that not until, Ladies and Gentlemen, not until the trial of this case and prior to this case, the trial of Richard 
Wood's case, that anybody connected with the prosecution in this case had any idea what stories would be told by 
Jefferson Doyle and Richard Wood. Not the foggiest idea. Both of them told you on the witness stand that neither one 
of them said a word to the law enforcement officials on the scene 
"{continuing) on the scene at the point of their arrest, at the Preliminary Hearing before Indictment in this case. Not a 
word that they were innocent; that this was their position; that somehow, they had been 'set-up.' 
"So, when you evaluate the testimony of the Law Enforcement Officials, consider 
"{continuing) what they had to deal with on the night in question and the months subsequent to that. 
"Then they decide that they have been 'had' somehow. They have been framed. 
"Now, remember, this fits with the facts as observed by the law enforcement officers except the basic, crucial facts. 
Somehow, they have been framed. So, if you believe this, Ladies and Gentlemen, they take off, chase Bill Bonnell around 
to give his money back to him or ask him what he did to them, yet they don't bother to tell the Law Enforcement Officers. 
"It is unbelievable. I think, when you go to the Jury Room, Ladies and Gentlemen, you are going to decide what really 
happened. 
"We have the Fifth Amendment. I agree with it. It is fundamental to our sense and system of fairness, but if you are 
innocent 
"(continuing) if you are innocent, Ladies and Gentlemen, if you have been framed, if you have been set-on, etc. etc. etc., 
as we heard in Court these last days, you don't say, when the law enforcement officer says, 'You are under arrest,' you 
don't say, 'I don't know what you are talking about.' You tell the truth. You tell them what happened and you go from 
there. You don't say, 'I don't know what you are talking about.' and demand to see your lawyer and refuse to permit a 
search of your vehicle, forcing the law enforcement agents to get a search warrant. 
"If you're innocent, you just don't do it." Doyle Tr. 515-516, 519, 526. 
At Wood's trial, he made similar arguments: 
"The defense in this case was very careful to make no statements at all until they had the benefit of hearing all the 
evidence against them and had time to ascertain what they would admit and what they would deny and how they could 
fit their version of the story with the state's case. During none of this time did we ever hear any business about a set 
up or frame or anything else. All right. 
"Yes, it is the law of our land, and rightfully so, ladies and gentlemen, that nobody must be compelled to incriminate 
themselves. It is the 5th Amendment. No one can be forced to give testimony against themselves where criminal action 
charges are pending. It is a very fundamental right and I am glad we have it. 
"The idea was nobody can convict himself out of his own mouth and it grew out of the days when they used to whip 
and beat and extract statements from the defendants and get them to convict themselves out of their own mouth, and 
I am glad we have that right. 
"But ladies and gentlemen, there is one statement I am going to make. If you are innocent, if you are innocent, if you have 
been framed, if you have been set up as claimed in this case, when do you tell it? When do you tell the policemen that? 
"Think about it. After months after various proceedings and for the first time? I am not going to say any more about that 
but I want you to think about it." Closing Argument of the Prosecutor 12-14, supplementing Wood Tr. 
13 Petitioner Doyle also argues that he was erroneously cross-examined at his trial on his failure to consent to a search 
of the car he was driving ~t the time of the arrest. Petitioner Wood appears to raise the similar claim that testimony of 
other witnesses that he failed to consent to a search of the car was erroneously admitted at his trial. The parties have 
not argued these issues separately from the questions whether prior silence in various circumstances may be admitted 
to impeach a defendant or a defense witness. It is apparent, however, that these questions implicate Fourth Amendment 
issues that merit independent examination. Accordingly, like the Court, I do not address them. 
WESTLft.W @ 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 12 
Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980) 
100 S.Ct. 2180, 65 L.Ed.2d 222 
100 S.Ct. 2180 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Charles ANDERSON 
v. 
Glenn CHARLES. 
No. 79-1377. 
I 
Decided June 16, 1980. 
I 
Rehearing Denied Aug. 11, 1980. 
I 
See 448 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 27. 
A petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied by the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan, and petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Sixth Circuit, 610 F.2d 417. reversed, and certiorari was 
granted. The Supreme Court held that: (1) Doyle bars 
the use against a criminal defendant of silence maintained 
after receipt of governmental assurances, but it does not 
apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior 
inconsistent statements; such questioning makes no unfair 
use of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks 
after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to 
remain silent; as to the subject matter of the statements, 
def end ant has not remained silent at all, and (2) each 
of two inconsistent descriptions of events may be said 
to involve "silence" insofar as it omits facts included in 
the other version, but Doyle does not require any such 
formalistic understanding of "silence." 
Reversed. 
Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Marshall 
joined, dissented and would affirm for the reasons stated 
in the Court of Appeals' opinion. 
Opinion 
*404 **2180 PER CURIAM. 
Respondent Glenn Charles was arrested in Grand Rapids, 
Mich., while driving a stolen car. The car belonged to 
Theodore Ziefle, who had been strangled to death in his 
Ann Arbor home less than a week earlier. The respondent 
was charged with first-degree murder. At his trial in the 
Circuit Court of Washtenaw County, Mich., the State 
presented circumstantial evidence linking the respondent 
with the crime. The respondent was found with Ziefle's car 
and some of his other personal property. The respondent 
also owned clothing like that worn by the man last 
seen with the victim, and he boasted to witnesses that 
he had killed a man and stolen *405 his car. Police 
Detective Robert LeVanseler testified that he interviewed 
the respondent shortly after his arrest. After giving the 
respondent Miranda warnings, LeVanseler asked him 
about the stolen automobile. According to LeVanseler, 
the respondent said that he stole the car in Ann Arbor 
from the vicinity of Washtenaw and Hill Streets, about 
two miles from the local bus station. 
The respondent testified in his own behalf. On direct 
examination, he stated that he took Ziefle's unattended 
automobile from the parking lot of Kelly's Tire Co. in 
Ann Arbor. On cross-examination, the following colloquy 
occurred: 
"Q. Now, this Kelly's Tire Company, that's right next to 
the bus station, isn1t it? 
**2181 ''A. That's correct. 
"Q. And, the bus station and Kelly's Tire are right next to 
the Washtenaw County Jail are they not? 
"A. They are. 
"Q. And, when you're standing in the Washtenaw County 
Jail looking out the window you can look right out and 
see the bus station and Kelly's Tire, can you not? 
"A. That's correct. 
"Q. So, you've had plenty of opportunity from-well, first 
you spent some time in the Washtenaw County Jail, 
haven't you? 
"A. Quite a bit. 
"Q. And, you have had plenty of opportunity to look out 
that window and see the bus station and Kelly's Tire? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. And, you've seen cars being parked there, isn't that 
right? 
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.. A. That's correct. 
"Q. Is this where you got the idea to come up with the story 
that you took a car from that location? 
*406 "A. No. the reason I came up with that is because 
it's the truth. 
"Q. It's the truth? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. Don't you think it's rather odd that if it were the truth 
that you didn't come forward and tell anybody at the time 
you were arrested, where you got that car? 
"A. No, I don't. 
"Q. You don't think that's odd? 
"A. I wasn't charged with auto theft, I was charged with 
murder. 
"Q. Didn't you think at the time you were arrested that 
possibly the car would have something to do with the 
charge of murder? 
"A. When I tried to talk to my attorney they wouldn't let 
me see him and after that he just said to keep quiet. 
"Q. This is a rather recent fabrication of yours isn't [sic] 
it not? 
"A. No it isn't. 
"Q. Well, you told Detective LeVanseler back when you 
were first arrested, you stole the car back on Washtenaw 
and Hill Street? 
"A. Never spoke with Detective LeVanseler. 
"Q. Never did? 
"A. Right, except when Detective Hall and Price were 
there and then it was on tape." Trial Transcript 302-304. 
The jury convicted the respondent of first-degree murder. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, People v . 
Charles, 58 Mich.App. 371,227 N.W.2d 348 (1975), and 
the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, 397 
Mich. 815 (1976). The respondent then sought a writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan. The District Court withheld 
the writ, but a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit *407 reversed. The Court of Appeals 
held that "the prosecutor's questions about [respondent's] 
post-arrest failure to tell officers the same story he told 
the jury violated due process" under the rule of Doyle v. 
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). 
610 F.2d 417,422 (6 Cir. 1979). 1 The prison warden now 
petitions for a writ of certiorari. We grant the petition, 
grant the respondent leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 
and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
In Doyle, we held that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits impeachment on the 
basis of a defendant's **2182 silence following Miranda 
warnings. The case involved two defendants who made 
no postarrest statements about their involvement in the 
crime. 2 Each testified at trial that he had been framed. On 
cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the defendants 
why they had not told the frameup story to the police 
upon arrest. We concluded that such impeachment was 
fundamentally unfair because Miranda warnings inform 
~ person of his right to remain silent and *408 assure 
him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be used 
against him. 426 U.S., at 618-619, 96 S.Ct., at 2245; see 
.Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239-240, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 
2129-2130, 65 L.Ed.2d 86. 
[1) Doyle bars the use against a criminal defendant 
of silence maintained after receipt of governmental 
assurances. But Doyle does not apply to cross-
examination that merely inquires into prior inconsistent 
statements. Such questioning makes no unfair use of 
silence because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after 
receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to 
remain silent. As to the subject matter of his statements, 
the defendant has not remained silent at all. See United 
States v. Agee, 597 F.2d 350, 354-356 (CA3) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944, 99 S.Ct. 2889, 61 L.Ed.2d 315 
(1979); United S~tates v. Mireles, 570 F.2d 1287, 1291-1293 
(CAS 1978); United States ,,. Goldman, 563 F.2d 501, 
503-504 (CAl 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067, 98 S.Ct. 
1245, 55 L.Ed.2d 768 (1978). 
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In this case, the Court of Appeals recognized that the 
respondent could be questioned about prior statements 
inconsistent with his trial testimony. The court therefore 
approved the "lat.ter portion of the above quoted cross-
examination .... " 610 F.2d. at 421. But the Court of 
Appeals found. that "the earlier portion of the exchange" 
concerned the "separate issu[et of the respondent's 
"failure to tell arresting officers· the same story he told 
the jury." Ibid In the court's view, these questions were 
unconstitutional inquiries about postarrest silence. Thus, 
the Court of Appeals divided the cross-examination into 
two parts. It then applied Doyle to bar questions that 
concerned the respondent's failure to tell the police the 
story he recounted at trial. 
We do not believe that the cross-examination in this case 
can be bifurcated so neatly. The quoted colloquy, taken as 
a whole, does "not refe[r] to the [respondent's] exercise of 
his right to remain silent; rather [it asks] the [respondent] 
why, if [his trial testimony] were true, he didn't tell the 
officer that he stole the decedent's car from the tire store 
parking lot instead of telling him that he took it from 
the *409 street." 58 Mich.App., at 381, 227 N.W.2d, at 
354. Any ambiguity in the prosecutor's initial questioning 
was quickly resolved by explicit reference to Detective 
Footnotes 
LeVanseler's testimony, which the jury had heard only a 
few hours before. The questions were not designed to draw 
meaning from silence, but to elicit an explanation for a 
prior inconsistent statement. 
(2] We conclude that Doyle does not apply to the facts of 
this case. Each of two inconsistent descriptions of events 
may be said to involve "silence" insofar as it omits facts 
included in the other version. But Doyle does not require 
any such formalistic understanding of "silence," and we 
find no reason to adopt such a view in this case. 
**2183 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice 
MARSHALL joins, dissents and would affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the reasons stated 
in its opinion. 
All Citations 
447 U.S. 404, 100 S.Ct. 2180, 65 L.Ed.2d 222 
1 Neither the Court of Appeals nor the state courts addressed the question whether Doyle should be applied retroactively. 
2 
Although the petitioner now claims that Doyle should be limited to prospective application, see Stovall v. Denno, 388 
U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), there is no indication that this claim was raised in the courts below. 
Moreover, the respondent asserts that Doyle's prohibition against use of postarrest silence was the law of the Sixth Circuit 
and of the State of Michigan long before his arrest. In view of our disposition of the merits of this controversy, we express 
no view on the retroactivity question. 
One defendant said nothing at all. The other asked arresting officers, "What's this all about?" 426 U.S., at 615, n. 5, 96 
S.Ct., at 2243. When told the reason for his arrest, he exclaimed "you got to be crazy," or "I don't know what you are 
talking about." Id .• at 622-623, n. 4, 96 S.Ct., at 2246-2247 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Both the Court and the dissent 
in Doyle analyzed the due process question as if both defendants had remained silent. The iss·ue was said to involve 
cross-examination of a person who "does remain silent" after police inform him that he is legally entitled to do so. Id., 
at 620, 96 S.Ct., at 2245 (STEVENS, J., dissenting): see id., at 616-619, 96 S.Ct., at 2244-2245; id .• at 621 1 622, 626, 
96 S.Ct., at 2246, 2247, 2248 (STEVENS, J., dissenting}. In any event, neither the inquiry nor the exclamation quoted 
above contradicted the defendant's later trial testimony. 
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Addendum C 

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AmendmentV 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
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THE COURT: You may be seated. 
I'm sorry, I need to have you be sworn in. 
you'd just raise your right hand. Okay. 
If 
JAMES C. MCCALLIE 
having been first duly sworn, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WILSON: 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Will you state your name please? 
James c. Mccallie. 
THE COURT: Can I get you to approach the mike? 
THE WITNESS: James C. McCallie. 
(BY MR. WILSON) And the people know you as Chris? 
Yes. 
Chris, I want you to - are you employed? 
Well, not at the moment. 
Were you empioyed as a truck driver? 
Yes. 
And for how long? 
Off and on the last 10 years. 
Q I'd like for you to refer back in your memory to 
the events of March the 30 th and 3pt of 2013. Were you 
driving a truck on March 30 th ? 
A Yes. 
MR. WILSON: May I approach the witness, Your 
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Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q (BY MR. WILSON) I'm going to show you what's been 
marked as Defendant's Exhibit No. 14. It says driver's daily 
log and some receipts. Now I'd like for you to look at 
those. 
Q 
A 
MR. VO-DUC: State would stipulate to publish. 
MR. WILSON: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(BY MR. WILSON) What is the daily log? 
That's my driver's log book. I have a DOT laws I 
have to follow to show my every movement in a truck whether 
stopping for fuel or food or sleeping. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
And does that so depict that -
That is for the 30 th and 31 st • 
And what were you doing on the 30 th ? 
On the 30 th I was driving from Wolcott, Iowa and I 
had stopped in Sydney, Nebraska. 
Q 
A 
Q 
Were you driving alone? 
No, I had a team driver. 
And what does that mean? 
A That means we drive in teams. I drive for 11 hours 
and he drives for 11 hours and when I'm training a driver I 
don't get much sleep when we're pulling doubles and triples 
when I'm training someone that hasn't driven, doubles and 
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triples. 
Q Is this - the person that you had on was he an 
experienced driver? 
He was an inexperienced driver. 
So on the 30 th who was actually driving? 
A 
Q 
A I started at l:1s· in the morning and I drove until 
12:15 that afternoon. 
Q And then what? 
A I moved up into the sleeper and kept the curtains 
open to watch the new driver to try to train him. If you 
hear the rumble strips or anything you can't sleep and with 
another driver, my life is in his hands while I'm driving 
(sic). So I have a hard time sleeping with another driver. 
Lake. 
Q 
A 
And so he drove from when to when? 
From Sydney, Nebraska all the way back into Salt 
Q And what time does it show that you arrived in Salt 
Lake? 
A I was still in the sleeper at the time so we 
arrived in Salt Lake between 8:30 and 9:00. 
Q Okay. And you had some, there's some receipts that 
are attached there. What are those receipts? 
A Just my normal receipts I save on the road for CPA, 
for tax purposes. 
Q Okay. All of them? 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
All of them. 
Would you look at all of them? 
Except for my bank receipt. 
And what is that? 
A That's where I stop at the bank and pulled out $200 
so I could pay rent that night to Tim and Jody Krogh. 
Q 
A 
Q 
What is the time on the ATM receipt? 
On the Chase receipt it's 10:00 p.m. on the 30 th • 
So I guess - I forgot to staple one of these on 
here. I'm going to staple this again. So you got in around 
9:00 on the 30 th ; is that right? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
And then you had to do some things there and then 
you went to - what did you do after you came in? 
A Well, at 9:00 when we arrived I helped my team 
driver, we had to disconnect a set of doubles and put them to 
the doors to be unloaded. So it took us about an hour after 
we got back in to do the post trip and unload both - well, 
put the trailers through the doors to be unloaded.· 
Q And then where did you go? 
A I got the rest - we went back to Penske, dropped 
the truck off 'cause we were in a rental truck and I got all 
of my stuff out of the truck for being on the road for seven 
to ten days I had my TV, my bedding and my clothes and my 
DVDs. So I had to unload that truck and put all my stuff in 
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my pickup truck to drive home. 
Where did you go then? Q 
A On the way home I stopped at 7-Eleven and picked up 
any 18-pack of beer and I stopped at Chase Bank to pick up 
the.$200. 
Q Okay, I notice that there's not a receipt for the 
beer, why is there not a receipt for the beer? 
A Sometimes I do and sometimes I don't. I was trying 
to get home and I do it all through my card. 
you 
Q 
A 
Q 
pick 
A 
Q 
A 
I mean, could you deduct the beer from your taxes? 
Well, my CPA isn't that good. 
So after you pick up the beer, how much beer did 
up? 
An 18-pack. 
All right. And you then went to the bank. 
Went to the bank and picked up $200. I was going to 
pay rent the next morning and I was going golfing the next 
morning. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
life. 
Q 
A 
Okay. And who were you going to go golfing with? 
A girl named Tammy. 
Okay. Were you going golfing with-Mr. Pearce? 
No, I've never seen Mr. Pearce golf before in my 
So then where do you go? 
I head home and the bank is probably not even five 
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minutes from my house where I lived at Tim and Jody's. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Now, you were renting what at Tim and Jody's? 
I was renting a room at Tim and Jody's. 
Okay. And about how often were you in this room? 
Depending on the run I had a long run and a short 
run. So some days I would be home maybe eight days out of 
the month and then on my long runs I would be home for maybe 
a day and a half, 34 hours. 
Q But you were paying rent on this single room at Tim 
and Jody's? 
Yes. A 
Q 
A 
For those limited amount of time that you were -
The longest I was maybe there eight to ten days out 
of the month. 
Q Okay. So what happened when you got home? Who was 
up, what was happening? 
A Well, when I pulled in I noticed Mr. Pearce's car 
was there and -
Q Did you know him? 
A I'd met him a few times at that particular 
residence. I hadn't known him all that well. 
Q Were you all friends? 
A Kind of. We were becoming friends. Like I said, 
I'm not there that often and I'd met him a few times at Tim 
and Jody's house where I was residing. 
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Q All right. Then what happened? 
A I walked to the door, I actually got my parking 
space which I was surprised because every time some stays 
there they park in my parking space. I've got a nice truck 
and I don't want things to happen to it and.when I walked to 
the door John was there and had been drinking and, you know, 
explained to me that he didn't park in my parking space and 
was happy about it. Works for me. 
Q So did you see Tim and Jody? 
A No, their door was closed and they were asleep. 
Q Okay. So what happened then? 
A When I walked through the door I still had my truck 
bag with me and the 18-pack of beer that I set down next to 
the refrigerator. There's a picture of the refrigerator in 
one of those - and took my log book out with my clipboard and 
set it on the table and John was, Have a drink with me. I 
was like let me put my stuff down, I'll have a drink with you 
here in a second. 
Q Okay. 
A So I take my truck bag and go into my room, drop my 
truck bag off and, you know, sitting there kind of relaxing, 
I finally made it home. And John walks right in my room, 
Hey, you going to have a drink with me? I was like, yeah, 
I'll be out there in a minute, I've got to do my paperwork 
and finish my logs off and I'll be out there in a second. So 
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I went out there put my 18-pack in the refrigerator on the 
bottom shelf, grabbed a beer and sat down at the table with 
him and was looking through my notes to make sure my log book 
was correct. 
Q 
A 
Okay. 
And we're talking back and forth and he was asking 
me about my gun 'cause he'd known I had a gun and I talked 
about it before. He's asked probably three or four times in 
front of Tim and Jody to see it and I didn't know him well 
enough so I always told him it was in the pawn shop, I don't 
have it here. 
Q Okay, then what? 
A We talked about guns. He had a 308 and a .30-06 
and I talked about AR-lSs and mini 14s and M-16s, all 
military weapons and we're talking about that for half hour, 
45 minutes, maybe longer, and at this time I probably had two 
beers in me. 
Q Okay, then what happened? 
A I got up to go - I told him, I'm going to go 
golfing - he was asking if he could see the gun. It's like, 
yeah, I have the weapon here, I will show it to you. I went 
into my room. I hadn't closed the door all the way, it wasn't 
latched but it was shut -
Q 
A 
Can you lock your room? 
No, Tim and Jody would not allow me to put a lock 
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on my door. 
Q Okay, go ahead. 
A So I go to the dresser to pull the gun out and I 
set it on the bed and in walks John, Hey, you corning back out 
here? It's like ye~h, I'll be out in a second. 
Q 
A 
Okay. 
So I unloaded the weapon 'cause I keep a loaded 
weapon in the house with me and I'm starting to unload it and 
in he walks again, like the third time he walked in my room 
without knocking or anything. It's like, Look, I told you, 
I'll be out there in a minute. So he goes back out there, I 
unload the weapon and I have the cylinder open and I'm 
holding it by the open cylinder and I take the gun back out 
and show it to him and he's like this is a nice gun, it's 
silver, and we continue talking about guns. 
Q All right. 
A I said, you've seen it enough and I go to put it 
away. I put the weapon - I'm starting to load the weapon and 
in walks John again. Now, at this point in time I'm getting 
the feeling that he's trying to find out where I'm putting 
the weapon so he can steal it. That was my impression. 
Q Right. 
A Finally got him out of the room, he comes in - he 
came in my room five or six different times that night. 
a· Okay. So what did you do with the gun? 
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A 
pillow. 
Q 
pillow? 
A 
I ended up reloading the gun and I put it under my 
I put the case up on -
Why did you do that? Why did you put it under your 
Because I didn't have enough time to put it away, 
he kept coming into my room and I didn't want him to know 
where I was putting my weapon. 
Okay, all right. Then what did you do? Q 
A I came back out and we sat and talked a little bit 
more, started playing a little bit of guitar and he's asking 
me, do a shot with me, do a shot with me. I drink hard 
alcohol once a year on my birthday. I don't drink hard 
alcohol and everybody that knows me, knows this. 
So what do you drink? 
I drink beer. I'm a beer drinker. 
So did you take a shot of whiskey? 
Q 
A 
Q 
A Well, he was adamant about me doing a shot with him 
so I took the bottle and put it to my lips as if I was taking 
a shot. I set the bottle back down. Ummm, that's great and 
continued drinking my beer. 
Q 
A 
Okay. At what point does Tim or Jody come in? 
Well, we're still talking about weapons back and 
forth and Tim had come out and he has a.cyst and I remember 
this directly because he sat down in a chair across from me 
and he was kind of ginger when he sat down and I said, Your 
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cyst is acting up on you again. 
Oh yeah, it's like, You guys are being a little bit 
loud out here and I'm pointing at John going, Yeah, I know. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
It was John - had John continued to drink? 
Oh yes. 
And what was he drinking? 
He was drinking R&R Whiskey. 
Okay, all right. So what happened after that? 
A Said, Sure, you know, not a problem, we'll keep it 
down. I was like I'm going to go take a shower. So I went 
to the kitchen, I grabbed two beers out of the refrigerator, 
went to my room and you know, got my night clothes on, a 
black pair of shorts that have an elastic waistband. I took 
two beers in the shower with me and I guess it's a 
construction worker, it's like sitting in a Jacuzzi with a 
cold beer, you know, I'm just sitting there relaxing with a 
beer in the shower with me. The other beer got warm so I 
didn't open it. Got done with my shower and took the empty 
can and the full can back into my room because I save 
aluminum cans. 
Q I'm going to show you what has been marked as 
Exhibit No. 9 and ask if you recognize that. 
A Yes, it's a picture of my bedroom. 
Q Okay, and it's been introduced. And it looks like 
there's some beer cans on the dresser and on - is that a 
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refrigerator? 
A No, that's my night stand. 
Q Okay. And on the night stand; is that right? 
Yes. A 
Q And how many of those beers did you consume and how 
many were unopened? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
shower. 
A 
There is two full unopened ones on the night stand. 
Two unopened ones? 
Yes. 
And then it looks like there's, is it four on the -
I believe so, four, yes. 
And is that what you consumed? 
Yes, I think so. 
All right, go ahead. What - you went to take a 
I took my shower and I came back out into room, 
hung my towel up and I was on my bed putting on my shorts, my 
black shorts. In comes John again through a closed door. 
uAre you going to come back out here?" 
"Yeah, I'll be out there in a minute." 
Q Okay. 
A "Are you going to do another shot with me?" 
"Sure, I'll be out there in a minute." So I go 
back out there and we're, you know, talking back and forth, 
I'm sitting on one side of the table playing guitar. Tim 
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comes out and we're being a little bit loud. Okay, I'll turn 
my guitar down and John is normally loud because Tim is about 
half deaf anyway and Tim is loud himself. Well, we continued 
talking and about this time Jody comes out. She said, You 
woke me up. It's like really, out of the 13 months that I've 
lived here you've woken me up several times pounding on my 
door and I've asked her, when the light is off and the door 
is closed, do not wake me up to eat dinner and she is adamant 
about me eating for some reason. 
Q So when she says something like that -
A I said, Look, I finally woke you up. 
Well, she started to, excuse my - getting a little 
pissy with me and started, you know, yelling and screaming at 
me. I'm going, Hey, that's too bad, that's how the cookie 
crumbles, I finally woke you up, good. Well, then she 
started f-n' me up one side and down the other. She can cuss 
like a drunken sailor on leave, believe it or not, and she 
was -
Q 
A 
So how did you respond? 
My exact words? It's like, Look, you fat fucking 
cunt, I'm out of here next week anyway, I'm done doing this 
with you. I'm done doing this, I'm out of here next week 
anyway. I planned on moving out. 
Q 
A 
And so you were upset? 
Oh yeah. 
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to -
Q 
A 
Then what happened? 
Finished my beer off and it's like I'm going to go 
Q Did John say anything to you? 
A Yeah, he was like you need to apologize to her and 
it was like I don't think so, chief. You don't live here. 
What happens in this house you have no idea what goes on 
around here because you don't live here. 
Q 
Well, you're going to apologize to my aunt. 
And it's like I don't think so. 
All right, then what happened? 
A Ummm, I went to my room. Tim and Jody both had 
said something, I got up and I grabbed another beer out the 
refrigerator and went to my room and I was going to go to 
bed. I closed my door and that's when John came in for the 
last time. 
Q All right. I'm going to show you what's been 
marked as Defendant's Exhibit No. 10. I'd like for you to 
look at that and tell me what that is. 
A That's a picture of my bedroom where I had pulled 
my bed down and was getting ready to go to bed. Camouflage 
is my truck bag and I was sitting on the edge of the bed as 
John walked in, again I'm like, Oh, here we go again. 
Q 
A 
So what happened then? 
At this point he stands over the top of me and he 
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has one of his feet on top of my feet and he's got both of 
his fists up like this, pointing down at me going you're 
going to apologize to my aunt. 
Q 
A 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
And I'm like no, I'm not going to. And he was 
adamant about it and he's standing over the top of me and I 
can't move the bed back because of this filing cabinet to get 
some space between us. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
So he's right on top of you? 
He's right on top of me. 
And then what happened? 
I can't move, and he's, you know, he's got both his 
fists clenched and he's pointing at me like this. Well, I 
reached behind me and grabbed my gun from out of the pillow. 
Q Why did you do that? 
A I could not get - I couldn't get enough space 
between him and I. He had me in an elevated position to 
where I could not move out of the way. I couldn't call for 
Tim because Tim can't hear me. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Did you feel threatened? 
Oh yes, I felt very much threatened. 
So you reached back and you got the gun. 
I reached back and grabbed my weapon. When I 
pulled the weapon around I had my finger against the frame of 
the gun. 
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Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
You're using your left hand. 
Yes, I'm left-handed. 
Okay. 
Is there - can I see the picture -0f the weapon? 
Yes. That's State's Exhibit No. 3. 
A When I've got this in my left hand, my finger is 
along the frame of the gun this way on the pistol grip. I've 
been through enough gun training with Special Forces that are 
different -
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Are you a gun enthusiast? 
Yes I am, very much so. 
Had you fired that gun on -
Several occasions. 
All right, go ahead. 
I've got my finger across the frame of the weapon 
this way, I've been trained not to put my finger on the 
trigger when it comes to people who, in private securities 
and regular securities, not to ever put your finger unless 
you have a target acquired. Well, when I come up with it, 
I'm going, you need to get out of my room. That's when he 
grabbed the gun and he pinned my finger against the frame of 
the gun. Well, when I pulled back on it, he fell over the 
top of me and he had his finger in the trigger guard and in 
essence, when he fell over the top of me, he pushed the 
trigger and fired the weapon himself. I'm going, Oh my God. 
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Let's see how bad you're hit. 
You're going to shoot me again. 
It's like, I didn't shoot you to begin with, you 
shot yourself. 
Q Let me ask you something. Did you ever threaten to 
kill him? 
A 
Q 
No, I didn't. I just wanted him out of my room. 
Did you ever, did you walk in the room, turn around 
with this gun and point it in his face and say I'm going to 
kill you? 
A No. 
Q So you're on the bed, he's on top of you, you're 
struggling over the gun, then what happens? 
A Well, we're struggling over the gun when - when I 
finally got my fingers around the grip and had my thumb on 
the back of the hammer to make sure he didn't pull the 
trigger again because he was yanking on the gun. So I made 
sure that he couldn't push on the trigger again. 
Q Meaning what kind of - is this a single or double 
action -
A 
modified. 
Q 
A 
Q 
This is a double action weapon that has been 
What do you mean modified? 
It has a spring kit in it. 
What does that mean? 
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A A spring kit is where you can make a hair trigger, 
I don't know if you've ever heard the term ~efore, but you 
know quick draw McGraw, they've got a hair trigger, you just 
barely touch it and the hammer will fall. Well, you can do 
the same thing with a double action. You can loosen up the 
hammer spring to make it an easier pull for a double action 
or single action. 
Q 
A 
And where is the spring? 
The springs are inside the handle. 
Q So the gun goes off, you're asking him are you hit 
and what happens then? 
A Oh I knew he'd been hit. I go let's see how bad 
you've been hit. 
No, no, you're going to shoot me again. 
It's like I didn't shoot you to begin with. 
Well, this time he'd got ahold or the barrel of the 
weapon now. I've got my thumb on the back of the hammer and 
around the pistol grip, not in the trigger guard and I'm 
trying to get him off of me so I can see how bad he's hit. 
Q So with your thumb on the back of the hammer, what 
does that do? 
A That's to keep him from pushing on the trigger and 
having the hammer pull back again. 
Q So in order to be fired on a double action it, when 
in push, pull on the trigger the ·hammer goes back and then 
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goes forward -
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Okay. Then what happened? 
A We're fighting over the gun and I'm not going to 
relinquish it to him to have him turn around and use it on 
me. 
Q Uh-huh (affirmative). 
A And I'm trying to keep it from firing on himself 
again and he's got the, his right hand on the barrel. He's 
got both of his knees on my arm and I'm not letting go and 
he's not letting go. Tim had come in and said I've already 
called the police, they're on their way. 
Q Okay, let's stop just a second. So if you would 
mark where you were sitting with an 'x', if you would, where 
you were sitting and where he was standing before he came 
down on top of you; an 'x' where you were sitting. 
A 
Q 
A 
This is where I was sitting right here. 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
And, well, this is where he was standing. That box 
wasn't there previous. This is me -
Q So in essence he was standing right in front of 
you. 
A He was standing on my foot. 
Q Okay. Would you circle the 'x' where you say he 
was? 
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A 
Q 
And he was actually standing on my right foot. 
If I could display this to the jury, and we'll wait 
just a sec So they can look at it. 
I want to show you another exhibit, No. 11 and it 
looks to be the same type of depiction but in there, in that 
photo there is an 'x' at the top, is there not? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. Would you again mark with an 'x' where 
you were and a 'x' with a circle where he was? 
A In between - well, it's going to be hard to see the 
'x', but in between the dresser and the bed was where he was 
standing over the top of me. Oh, make a circle, this one. 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
It's a little difficult. 
Right. So when you have a moment you can look at 
that. So, you're struggling over the gun and it has already 
fired? G 
A Yes. 
Q Then what happened? 
A That's when Tim had come in and said he had called 
the police. 
Q All right, then what happened? 
A Well, me and John or John and I continued to 
struggle over the gun, I told him I wasn't going to give it 
to him so he could turn around and use it on me and neither 
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one of us were going to give it up. Well, Tim had come back 
in and said the police are here. John stated, I'll go out 
there and tell them it was an accident like it was to begin 
with. 
Q Okay. 
A I relinquished the weapon to h~m and he walked out. 
When I noticed when he walked out he had a little bit of a 
blood stain on his back where the bullet had gone through and 
I've seen bullet shot wounds before, gun shot wounds before 
and it was just an in and out. 
Q Okay. So after he goes out what do you do? 
A I'm in awe. I can't believe this just happened. 
So I get up and I start to walk down the hallway and·I get 
right to Tim and Jody's bedroom and Jody is yelling at Tim, 
starts yelling Tim's name out and I told Jody to quit yelling 
and when I get to the door to the patio, that's when Tim says 
Hey, the police are here. I said-I will be right back, I'm 
going to go put my clothes on because all I had on was my 
black shorts and I put on my slippers and my grey, what I'm 
wearing in that picture right there that you have. That's 
what I put on to go outside. 
Q I'm showing you what's been marked as State's 
Exhibit No. 6. Are those the clothes that you put on? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
And what are they again? 
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A My·grey, both of them, my grey sweatshirt, grey 
sweat pants and my· slippers. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
And you looked a little bedraggled there. 
Just a little bit. 
So what happened after you put these clothes on? 
I walked out the door and when I got on the patio 
there was police right there, said put your hands above your 
head and keep walking forward. I abided by their commands 
and I had my hands behind my head and walked forward. Now, 
as soon as I went through the gate to the outside they kept 
saying, keep telling me walk forward, no problem. When I got 
right to the gun one of the officers told me to stop right 
where I'm at and another officer told me to keep walking 
forward. Well, I've got 8 or 10 people pointing weapons at 
me so I stop right where I was at. 
Q 
A 
Then what happened to you? 
To me? Urnmm, I was hit very hard from the back 
right in the middle of my back and taken down to the ground 
and someone had ahold of my hair and had a knee in the back 
of my head grinding my face into the pavement and another 
officer with his knee in the middle of my back and he has 
knocked the wind out of me and I tried to catch myself with 
both my hands. · I've got both my hands pinned underneath me 
and he's yanking on my arm and grinding his knee in my back 
and telling me to stop resisting. I can't pull my hands out 
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because he's sitting on top of me. 
Q Now this photograph, it shows - what does it show? 
A It shows, ummm, some pretty good cuts on my 
forehead and on my cheek. That's not a mole. That's what 
the police have done to me grinding my face into the 
pavement. 
Q So those are injuries caused by them taking you 
down to the ground? 
A Right and I -
Q On the pavement? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Now, was there any other injuries to you? 
A Oh, both my knees were scrapped up rather bad, 
pretty much looks like my face. 
Q All right, what were you thinking at this time? 
A This was an accident and this, this roughness 
wasn't necessary at all. I was compliant to every rule they 
had except for one told me to keep walking and one told me to 
stop while they're pointing weapons at me. So I was a little 
~ I wasn't going to move anywhere. 
Q Then what happened? 
A When they finally got my hands behind me, they 
clamped the handcuffs down around my ·wrist where the bone is 
where they cut the circulation off to both of my hands and 
this wasn't the chain handcuffs, this was the solid bar so 
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you can't move around in them at all. 
Q 
A 
And did you, did you ask that they be loosened? 
Well, they picked me up by my arms, got me on my 
feet and rushed me over to the squad car to transport me and 
I asked them, can you please loosen the cuffs up and they 
were no, and they frisked me and everything else and I asked 
them again, literally I was begging them to loosen the cuffs 
up on me and they kept saying no. So needless to say I 
wasn't happy about it. 
Q 
A 
So then you were taken down to the police station? 
I was taken down to the police station and put in 
the elevator. 
Q 
A 
Q 
. A 
Q 
Was this photo taken down at the police station? 
Yes, it was. Now this -
You don't appear to be very happy. 
No . 
All right. When you were down at the police 
station were you belligerent? 
A Yes, to a point. 
Q . And uncooperative? 
A Yes. When I came out of the elevator there was 
three of them standing in the elevator and had me in the 
corner and they're going step out of the elevator and I said 
I will as soon as you loosen these cuffs up on me. That's 
when they grabbed both of my fingers and proceeded to try to 
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break my wrist because I wasn't compliant to them any more 
and they had not loosened the cuffs up. I can't feel my 
hands any more. I still have - the backs of my hands are 
still numb from when they had me cuffed. 
Q All right. So after this, after you were arrested 
you went to jail, right? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
And did you make some phone calls from there? 
Yes, I did. 
And who did you call? 
I called Tim first. 
And when you make a phone call from this jail is 
there a recording that says whatever you say is being 
recorded? 
A It's actually written on the wall. 
Q All right. 
A It says all phone calls could be monitored and 
recorded at any time. 
Q So you called - who did you call? 
A I called Tim Krogh. 
And why did you call him? Q 
A Number one to find out exactly what happened on his 
end. 
Q 
A 
How did you do that? 
I just asked him, you tell me what happened I don't 
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remember anything that happened, you tell me what happened, I 
want to hear your side of the story. 
Q Uh-huh (affirmative). And did you have ~ome phone 
calls - so you called him to find out what was happening. 
Why did you want to know what he had to say? 
A Well, when they were trying to read my rights and 
do the interrogation or investigation for however they 
(inaudible) - oh, what do you call it, interview, they were 
asking me what happened and it's like I'm not telling you 
anything and they read my rights and said I'm - no, I don't 
understand my rights, I'm not telling you anything. 
Q And then did you - so you called Tim and you asking 
what happened? 
A Yeah, I was asking him what happened and he's going 
why? I was like, Well the detective told me that I shot you 
and that didn't happen. I knew exactly what happened but I 
wanted to hear his side of. the story, you know, to find out 
what's going on on his end. 
Q So what did you - did you know what you'd been 
charged with? 
A No, as far as I know this was an accident because 
John had shot himself. 
Q All right. Did you have more than one phone call 
with Tim? 
A I made a couple of phone calls with Tim. ·r was 
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trying to get my, get him to call my boss at Alta Express, 
get my mom's number because I didn't have that. Her cell 
phone doesn't accept collect calls and the only one that had 
a land line was Tim, so that's my only form of communication 
to the outside world. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Okay. Did you get that? 
Yes. 
All right, did you call your mother? 
Yes. 
And did you have a conversation with her? 
Yes. 
Q And what did you want from her or what did you say 
to her? 
A I told her to come down and, you know, come down 
and bail me out, there's been an accident. 
Q Uh-huh (affirmative). All right. And did you say 
something to her about get John to be cooperative or 
something to that effect? 
A This is later on. The phone calls I made to her 
were probably three weeks later because the jail wouldn't 
give me my ID. They wanted to take another picture because of 
my wounds that I had. So I went three weeks without any 
commissary or phone cards or I couldn't make any more calls 
to Tim, they were refusing calls. And I went to jail to get 
pictures of my wrist and, you know, my injuries and they 
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refused to do it. 
Q So after three weeks did you call your mother 
again? 
A -I finally got commissary and got a phone card and 
was able to contact her. 
Q 
A 
And what was - why did you call her at this time? 
Well, she'd come into visit -and come to find out 
that I had charges of attempted murder and I was like, Wait a 
minute, this was an accident and when I first got the court 
papers, that's what I found out John Pearce's last name. I 
didn't even know his last name until I received court papers. 
Q All right. Had you been told that your mother had 
talked to John? 
A No. 
Q 
A 
talked to 
Did she tell you that she had talked to John? 
After - yeah, the first phone call said she had 
John when they went to get all my stuff out of the 
house. 
Q Uh-huh (affirmative). 
A They had packed all my stuff up. They did the 
investigation. They were cleared to·back in and they packed 
all my stuff up and put it in storage and Tim and Jody were 
there and she had talked to John and he said that it was an 
accident. 
THE COURT: Excuse me, counsel? 
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MR. WILSON: Okay. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) . 
MR. WILSON: It's not intended for the truthfulness 
of it as to why he did what he did. I'm - I'd just as soon 
the Court not object for the State. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
(End of sidebar) 
Q {BY MR. WILSON) So had you received information 
that he had said this was an accident? 
Yes. A 
Q And then later on are you, you're told that you're 
charged with attempted murder? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
And do you then have another phone, another 
conversation with your mother where you say to her, something 
about that you're going to have to change game plans because-
A There's another phone call in there for Christy 
which is Tim Krogh's daughter. She's my best friend. And 
she told me that John just wanted to be compensated -
Q 
A 
Okay. 
John just wanted to compensated for the days off 
that he missed from work. 
Q So, when you found out that the charges were not 
going to be dropped because this was an accident, did you 
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make some kind of statement to your mother that the game 
plan, I have to change the game plan? 
A Yeah, because he said he wasn't going to press 
charges to begin w~th and -
THE COURT: Sir, please don't speak to what· 
somebody else may have told you. So unless you had - just 
speak to what you said. Okay. 
THE WITNESS: What I said? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
Q (BY MR. WILSON) So after you found that out did 
you make that statement to your mother? 
A Yes. 
Q 
A 
And that's why you're here today? 
Yes. 
MR. WILSON: Answer any questions the prosecutor 
may have. '-' 
MR. VO-DUC: Thank you. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. VO-DUC: 
Q Good morning, Mr. Mccallie. I'd like to just 
followup a little bit. You end up with Tim and Jody Krogh at 
their house because at one point you ran out of propane, 
heating propane where you were living? 
A No. 
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Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Very good. You - but they took you in? 
Yes. 
You were paying rent? 
Yes . 
. Keeping a room? 
Yes. 
Q Because probably since you're so much on the road 
it's not worth it to have a fully furnished house? 
Correct. A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
With stuff that you'd never get to use. 
Correct. 
How old are you, Mr. Mccallie? 
Forty-six. 
Forty-six. And you - so you stayed with them you 
said for 13 months? 
A Yes, at this particular time. I had stayed with 
them previous, before. 
Q Okay. We'll stick to this particular time. 
A Sure. 
Q And Jody, did I hear you correctly, she cooked for 
you? She wanted you to eat? 
A 
·Q 
A 
Q 
On occasions yes, she cooked all the time. 
Cooked all the time. 
Yes. 
And she was adamant, I believe your testimony was 
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about you eating? 
A 
Q 
A 
Constantly. 
That makes her a cunt. 
Not at this particular juncture, no. She wants to 
cook, she wants to cook for everybody. 
Q But when you get annoyed at her waking you up, and 
you said there was a discussion (inaudible) did you call her 
a cunt and basically because she bugs you all the time about 
eating? 
A 
Q 
A 
Well, there's circumstances that lead up to that. 
And Tim Krogh did tell you guys to move out, right? 
Yes, I had already planned on moving out the 
following week anyway. 
Q 
John? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
But he told you that he wanted you out, you and 
Yes. 
The next day? 
Yes. 
And you'd just come back from a haul, from a trip? 
Yes. 
Q And when you come back you don't go right back· out 
usually, you have a regular route? 
A Well, DOT regulates that I have 70 hours to ·work 
with and I have a 34-hour re-start and on long runs and short 
runs I have 34 hours off or I have two days off. 
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Q So this was a long run? 
A This was a short· run. 
Q That you were coming back from? 
A Yes. 
Q With a trainee? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And a trainee can't drive unless you're 
there next to him, right? That's the regulation? 
A Well, with doubles. He was inexperienced. He had 
carried doubles before but didn't have enough experience so I 
was monitoring how he drove with the doubles. 
Q But you were training on a doubles on that day, 
right? 
A No, he'd already had his doubles endorsement. He 
just hadn't had enough time pulling doubles. 
Q · Okay. Now we've used the word belligerent to 
describe you, sir, and I'd like to round off a little of that 
testimony, specifically as it relates to your appearance at 
the police station, you saw Detective Arnn yesterday -
room? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
of them? 
Yes. 
He testified and you remember they put you in a 
Yes. 
All right. And at one point there's more than one 
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A 
Q 
A 
Oh yes. 
Detective Arnn is there? 
Yes. 
Q And you say, While we're in here, big guys, you 
think you can all handle me? 
A Yes. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
That's what you told them, right? 
Oh, yes. 
And they offered you a drink? 
Yes . 
Right? 
Yes. 
And then they offered you a Coke? 
Yes. A 
Q 
A 
Q 
And your answer was, yes, I'll have a rum and Coke. 
Sure. I was being belligerent. 
Right. And I want the jury to understand exactly 
what that means. So thank you for your answers. And they 
came back and we'll ~o get you a Coke and then you said not a 
problem, how about a six pack and a cigarette? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
And then you asked them, ustill don't understand 
why I'm here. What happened?" 
A 
Q 
Exactly. 
They said you're under arrest and you said for 
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what? Yes? 
A Yes. 
Q They tried to help you wi~h that and then you say 
again, "I drive a truck 5000 miles a week, why am I here?" 
A Exactly. 
Q And then tried to explain and again you said, "For 
what? Why am I here?" And then they explained your rights. 
A Yes. 
Q And then at one point Detective Arnn says what part 
of your rights do you not understand and your answer was "The 
part where you're fucking jerking me off. What the fuck am I 
doing here to begin with? You people woke me up." 
A Yes. 
Q Detective Arnn tries to explain - this could be a 
real short thing. And you said, "No, I want to know what the 
fuck I am doing here in the first place, in the place I live 
in." 
A Yes. 
Q And then he explained to you someone got shot and 
your answer was, uwhose got a gunshot wound?" 
Yes. A 
Q And they try to explain that to you and after that 
you said u'Cause I want to know what the fuck is going on." 
This was the second time you said this, "You woke me up. I 
want to know what's going on." Right? 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Tube. 
A 
Yes. 
They tried to take your photo -
Yes. 
- and you said something about Facebook or You 
They o~ght to get my picture off of that. 
Q And you made several calls from the jail where they 
put you after your arrest? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Calls to Tim, several calls to your mom, over first 
call to the Tim was the day, April 1st , right? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
And then you made several calls to your mom, April 
12 th , 13 th , 18 th • Yes? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Pearce was 
she not? 
A 
Yes. 
And one of those calls was to Chrissy? 
Yes. 
And she told you that John was unwilling, ·John 
unwilling to say that this was an accident, did 
Yes. 
Q To which your answer was, "I told John we'd take 
care of him. Talk to him again. This will be well worth his 
while.'' 
A 
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Q 
A 
This is what you told Chrissy to tell John. 
What about the previous call when I talked to 
Chrissy where she said -
Sir, sir -
- John wants to be compensated. 
Q 
A 
Q - I appreciate that. You'll have a chance to offer 
your own evidence and feel free to offer that. I just want 
to followup on what you told us. In the same conversation 
you ended up telling Chrissy can you be pushy with John -
A Yes. 
Q - about saying this was an accident? And about 
three weeks after your stay here you called your mom actually 
later in the year, you talked to your mom later that month, 
sorry, and you knew these calls were being recorded, right? 
A Yes. 
Q And as a matter of fact you knew that these calls 
were going to be played out today in this trial, right? 
A More than likely, yes. 
Q 
A 
Q 
Well, your attorney shared them with you, told you? 
Yes. 
What's coming. You know knew that I would play 
these recordings. 
·A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
You've known for some time. 
But you didn't play the whole phone call. 
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Q That~s fine, sir, you have the opportunity to do so 
if you want to. 
Now, sir, are you the holder of a commercial 
driver's. license a CDL? 
A Yes. 
Q 
A 
Q 
And that is governed by federal law? 
DOT. 
DOT, Department of Transportation. And you 
understand, sir, we can agree that if you were to be 
convicted today that would jeopardize your livelihood as a 
truck driver? 
A Yes. 
MR. VO-DUC: That's all I have. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WILSON: 
Q Mr. Mccallie, have you received information that 
John wanted compensation? 
A Yes. 
Q 
A 
Is that why you replied that he will be rewarded? 
Yes. 
MR. WILSON: Thank you. 
MR. VO-DUC: Nothing further, thank you. 
THE COURT: Do members of the jury have any 
questions for this witness? Yes? Okay. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
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(Inaudible conversation) 
MR. WILSON: It's been covered. I think it has. 
MR. VO-DUC: (Inaudible). 
MR. WILSON: I don't mind. 
(End of sidebar) 
THE COURT: Ummm, the jury member would like to 
know if you were ever told what your charges were? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
MR. WILSON: I gather that's by the police? 
JURY MEMBER: Yes. 
THE WITNESS: No, they didn't. 
MR. WILSON: May we approach, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
MR. WILSON: Can we have a short recess 
(inaudible) . 
Ill 
THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
MR. WILSON: Can we have a short recess? 
(Inaudible conversation) 
MR. WILSON: Oh, iri regard to that (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(End of sidebar) 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. VO-DUC: Thank-you. 
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FURTHER RE-CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. VO-DUC: 
Q You spoke to Sargent Arnn who testified yesterday, 
perhaps we could refresh your recollection. In fact you were 
told, I told you by Sargent Arn0 who was here, told you you 
were under arrest for attempted homicide and your answer was, 
uAttempted homicide? To who?" Do you remember that? 
A Yes. 
Q And then he explained further, uThat's why I'm 
reading your rights." And then you said uwhose got a gunshot 
wound?" That's what you said? 
A Yes. 
MR. VO-DUC: Thank you. Okay. 
MR. WILSON: May we have a recess? 
THE·COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we need a brief 
recess. So five minutes? Ten minutes? 
MR. WILSON: Five minutes. 
THE COURT: Okay, five minutes. All right. You 
are admonished don't discuss the case, don't make up your 
mind. 
Please rise for the jury. 
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom) 
THE COURT: You may step down now. It doesn't 
appear that it's that difficult to walk, is it? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
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THE COURT: I don't understand the big deal about 
(inaudible). 
(Inaudible conversation) 
THE WITNESS: I can't run (inaudible). 
THE COURT:_ The walking back and forth, it doesn't 
seem like it's that big of a -
(Whereupon a recess was taken) 
DEFENDANT MCCALLIE: If you want, if I were to get 
back up on the stand, you don't have to take the jury out, I 
can walk stiff legged in front of them. It doesn't bother me. 
THE COURT: I think we're going to be okay. 
DEFENDANT MCCALLIE: Okay. 
THE COURT: I'm not really quite.sure why, you know-
DEFENDANT MCCALLIE: Well, it's so they don't see my 
restraints. 
THE COURT: It's not a big deal to walk (inaudible) 
it's not a big deal -
MR. WILSON: It clicks, Your Honor. It clicks and 
then locks up. 
THE COURT: If you try to walk too fast. 
MR. WILSON: I find this unnecessary to start off 
with. 
THE COURT: That's not an issue. That's an issue 
with (inaudible). 
MR. WILSON: We know the bailiff is here and~ 
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THE COURT: It's not an issue for debate. The 
issue is to whether it's necessary to have the jury go in and 
out every time and your client, your own client just said 
that he can walk it if he needed to get back -
MR. WILSON: If he makes a mistake then -
THE COURT: I told him that it.was not necessary -
DEFENDANT MCCALLIE: I'll take the advice of my 
attorney. ~ 
THE COURT: Okay. Are we ready to proceed? 
MR. WILSON: Yes Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's go ahead and call 
(inaudible) . 
(Inaudible conversation) 
MR. WILSON: Closings after lunch? 
THE COURT: I'm sorry? 
MR. WILSON: Closings after lunch? 
THE COURT: No, I'm - well, I guess it all 
on how long your witnesses are. 
depends 
MR. WILSON: I'd like to have about 10 or 15 
minutes to make some notes. 
THE COURT: I wanted to get them started with lunch 
before the rush. So that was my .... 
MR. WILSON: Best laid plans. 
(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom) 
THE COURT: Ready for the jury? Come on in. 
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get back at 10 after, okay? 
MR. WILSON: Okay, thank you. 
(Whereupon a noon recess was taken) 
THE COURT: All right. We're back on the record in 
the matter of state of Utah vs. James Mccallie, Case No. 
131903319 and Mr. Mccallie is present with counsel and 
counsel for the State is also present. 
And State, are you prepared to proceed with your 
opening - closing statement? 
MR. VO-DUC: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Closing argument, I guess. Thank you. I 
correct myself. 
MR. VO-DUC: Ummm, I'd like to take some time to 
assist you using the instructions you'll get because we have 
two counts here on the table. I told you yesterday that I 
would prove these beyond a reasonable doubt through the 
evidence, testimony of the officers but we've charged two 
crimes that at first blush may seem so similar as to be 
inseparable but they are separate. 
And let's start with the aggravated assault count. 
You have these instructions. We have Instruction 26. I'm 
not going to read them word-for-word; however, I do have to 
show a few things beyond a reasonable doubt that this man - I 
don't think there's any doubt that this man had the gun, that 
he committed an assault and used a dangerous weapon. 
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1 Now here when we're talking about assault there's 
2 often-a· misconception that leads people_astray. Under Utah 
3 ·1aw I don't need to actually inflict injury to commit an 
4 assault. You can see in Sub(b) - and you can do that later 
5 on, but if you want to re~er to it right now, 26, nThreaten 
6 to do" - this is 3{b) - nthreaten to do bodily injury to John 
7 Pearce followed by a .show of immediate force or violence." 
8 So what this basically says is if you threaten 
9 someone and then you show them right there and then that you 
10 can carry out that threat, it's an assault. Example, I'm 
11 going to bash your head in and I take out a bat and I slam it 
12 on the table~ There's an assault. Has the bat connected 
13 with you? No. Have you been hurt? No. But an assault has 
14 been committed because I have threatened you with bodily 
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injury which is at the most basic level pain, followed by an 
immediate show of force which is the bat slammed on the 
table. ~ 
Now we have an assault. What makes it aggravated 
is the use -of a dangerous weapon and now a dangerous weapon, 
again that's defined in your jury instructions but you have a 
revolver with a 6-inch barrel. That's·the dangerous weapon. 
So when we're talking about. aggravated assault, we won't need 
for a person to shoot the gun to actually commit aggravated 
assault. And you heard the testimony of John Pearce, what 
happened is this, something along the lines of I'm going to 
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kill yori, the gun is raised, the aggravated assault is 
completed. Why? We have a threat to kill you accompanied by 
a show of immediate force and there are very few shows of 
immediate force more persuasive than putting a gun to the 
face of someone within six inches of their nose. So that is 
why th~ defendant is guilty of the aggravated assault count. 
We have the evidence as to all those elements. 
So the first point that I'd like you to keep in 
mind is all the instructions but understand that Utah law 
does not require for an aggravated assault that the person 
carry out on that threat, just that it's made, followed by a 
show of force and we have that in this case. 
The second thing is the other charge, felony 
discharge of a firearm. This is when we have a kind of 
kissing cousins but not twins. We did not charge Mr. 
Mccallie twice, different crimes for the same thing. These 
are not the same things. The aggravated assault and felony 
discharge are different crimes and what separates those two 
crimes? The shot went off. The shot went off. It didn't 
have to·off, it went off because that man, Mr. Mccallie put 
the gun in single action - you've heard-his testimony, 
Special Forces, this is a man well acquainted with guns. He 
cocked the hammer. Remember, this has a spring kit that 
makes the pull even lighter and then he stuck it in the face 
of John Pearce, aggravated assault, he had his finger on the 
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trigger, Mr. Mccallie did, and when John Pearce tried to 
defend himself, the defendant pulled the trigger. 
And I stress by happenstance, really pure luck that 
the shot went here and not here because you saw the 
demonstration, boom, boom. The shot, if Mr. Pearce had not 
deflected it using both hands, it would be gone in his face. 
This was not an accident. There's plenty of evidence that 
it's not an accident, evidence from that man right here, his 
own statements after the events happened. But I digress. 
Let's not defuse the two counts. You can commit 
both, the threat and he committed the second act when he 
pulled the trigger in an effort to intimidate. 
If we turn to Instruction No. 23, (1) the 
defendant, James Mccallie - there's no question of this; 
knowing or having reasonable belief that a person may be in 
danger. Well, there's only two people and one of them is 
within five feet of him and that's John Pearce. With the 
intent to intimidate or harass. What is more intimidating 
than a 6-inch barrel, stainless steel revolver, (inaudible) 
.38 in your face. But, we also need to have the discharge of 
the firearm which we did, pulling the trigger causing bodily 
injury~ W~ have bodily injury. Again, it's defined in your 
instructions and we don't have to show that the injury was 
any more than what we have here, ·a burn and a through and 
thiough. Now some efforts have been made to minimize this, 
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it's just a through and through. You know what, it is just a 
through and through but it's also bodily injury. So here we 
have the two crimes~ 
Now, I've offered evidence and the defendant has 
chosen ·to try to convince you that he acted in self defense. 
I '·d like to address that now and again you' 11 get these 
7 · instructions but there's a basic principle of self-defense. 
8 Let's not get lost in the wording. Trust the wording. This 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
is my interpretation of the law that you received. But it's 
basically this, in self-defense, if I yell at you the law 
will protect you for yelling back. If you punch me, the law 
will protect me from punching you back. If you get out a gun 
and threaten me or shoot in my direction, the law will 
protect me if I get my own gun and shoot you back. So 
there's this principle of correspondence. The threat and the 
response have to be equivalent.· All I 'rn saying is this, if I 
insult your mother, the law will not protect·you for pulling 
a gun and teaching me a lesson by shooting me in the stomach. 
It's that simple. 
In this case I need to add one thing, just because 
Mr. Mccallie claims it was self-defense doesn't mean you have 
to take him at this word. His testimony.is to be weighed 
like the testimony of everybody else that you've seen in the 
last 12 hours _in court, okay? But, the reason there's no 
self-defense is this, Instruction 19 you must determine from 
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all the evidence whether or not the resisting party - that 
would be Mr. Mccallie under his theory - believed the amount 
of resistence used was necessary to protect himself or 
another. In this case it was himself. You must also 
d~termine wh~ther the resisting party's actions were 
reasonable. So you have necessary and reasonable, right? 
And when we have this correspondence, somebody (inaudible) 
with a gun it's necessary to respond with your own weapon, 
right, because you (inaudible) but here we have necessary and 
reasonable. We don't have that here. Who put out - and I'm 
going to assume that you're (inaudible) believe the 
defendant's own account. Let's take his account. Who pulled 
the gun from the pillow, from under the pillow? Chris 
Mccallie. He brought the gun to what had been a word fight. 
Is thai reasonable? Of course, no one expects you to lie 
here arid get beaten to death, you know, if that's what 
happening. That's not what was happening. But this man 
would like you to believe that he was exercising his right of 
self-defense reasonably, that the threat that John Pearce 
claims caused, made it necessary for him; Mr. Mccallie, to 
use the revolver. But from his own words, at least - that's 
if you don't believe Mr. Pearce - from the defendant's own 
words, he's the one who pulled the gun. No one ever said 
John·Pearce had a gun. And was a gun necessary? Is the 
defendant reasonable in believing - and again you have a 
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definition for reasonable, looking at all the circumstances, 
was it reasonable for him to think that he, a Special Forces 
operative, truck driver, his own words, would need, in a word 
fight to bring a 6-inch .357 revolver (ina~dible)? No. It's 
not. 
So these are the elements that we've had to prove 
and I believe we've proven them. We've overcome the claim 
that this was a self-defense because Mr. McCallie's actions 
were not reasonable and they were not necessary. He 
completed one crime when he raised that gun in John Pearce's 
face and said I'm going to kill you, committed an assault. 
In that split second between that threat and the discharge of 
a gun, we moved over into discharge of a·firearm and bodily 
injury. That is what happened and a guilty verdict is what 
must result from this. Thank you. 
MR. WILSON: If it please the Court, George 
MR. VO-DUC: Thank you, Mr. Wilson. 
MR. WILSON: - and above all may it please you 
ladies and gentlemen of the jury. 
Quote, nAll I know is I was about to die and I 
said, not today." Quote, ur know for sure he was going to 
kill me and probably kill Jody and Tim." These·are quot~s 
from Mr. Pearce. Is he for real? Aren't these the actions 
of a cartoon action figure? Heroic, grandiose assertions by 
him? Is it believable? It is reasonable? Is it logical?· 
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And then we go to he tells this story that defies all 
logic, all reason and all believability. And that story is 
he's invited into Chris's bedroom and immediately - there's 
been no ~rguing for hours, there's not been -any bad words 
said, there is no indication that Chris was going to do 
anything in those three hours. All that Mr. Pearce had said 
before is you should apologize and yet he would have you to 
believe that he was lured into Chris's bedroom and 
immediately Chris turns, right when he gets into the bedroom, 
back towards the hallway, produces this .357 - and you saw 
it, ladies and gentlemen, this is not a weapon that is easily 
hidden. It appears from nowhere. He doesn't get it out of 
hi~ bed, he doesn't get it out of his night stand, he doesn't 
bend over, he doesn't see it coming out of his waist. It 
magically appears. There is no reason that it appeared. And 
supposedly Chris pulls the gun up, cocks it at the same time 
which is a double action which he didn't have to cock it, it 
already had a hair trigger on-it. All he had to do was shoot 
the thing and he fired that gun on numerous occasions and 
knew exactly how it worked. But he supposedly cocked the 
gun, pointed it at Mr. Pearce and said ur should kill youn or 
something to that effect. 
And then another grandiose statement, you would 
think that-this, being a surprise to-you, a shock to you if 
you come up and a person puts a gun in your face, that you 
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may go like tpi~, hesitate for a moment. But not Mr. Pearce. 
He's right on that gun imm~diately, pushes it down, the gun 
is fir~d, it goes through a portion - and then I'm going to 
discuss it later, the gunshot goes through in the opposite 
direction, behind where the gun is supposedly pointed and 
enters a wall up in the ceiling almost. It defies all logic, 
all belief and all reason. 
And that's what jurors are asked to do, to use your 
common sense to evaluate evidence critically, to determine if 
it's believable, if it's reasonable. You know, like you 
would make decisions in your everyday life about things that 
are important. And you make a decision based upon that. 
Now, in every criminal case, ladies and gentlemen, 
there's a presumption of innocense. Chris is presumed to be 
innocent. Now there is a tendency to give deference to 
someone whose been shot and want to believe that they are 
telling the truth. However, that's not what the ·1aw says. 
The law says that you're to presume him innocent and you're 
to look critically at what Mr. Pearce has to say to determine 
whether the case has been proven, whether that presumption 
goes away and the case has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Now it's the same thing, if you remember during 
voir dire, one of the prospective jurors said, Well, he's 
charged, I would think that maybe something happened. You're 
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called upon a higher duty than that. 
here with you. 
That's why she's· not in 
And Sargent Arnn, yo~ know, he wasn't impartial. I 
usually don't like to cast dispersions at officers but in 
this case I think it's worthy of it. I asked him the simple 
question of a hypothetical, if that hole in the ceiling is a 
bullet hole, if, isn't the defendant's, I mean Mr. Pearce's 
statement of what occurred completely inconsistent with where 
that hole was? Obviously, it is because the pointing of the 
weapon was a direct different direction than where that hole 
was and he refused to answer it. "I'm not used to answering 
hypothetical questions." He was prepared and he wouldn't 
answer ·it. But you're called upon, as I said, a higher road, 
the presumption of innocense and that unless the proof· 
convinces beyond a reasonable doubt then you should vote for 
acquittal. 
Now in this case there are a multitude of problems 
in the State's case and the very most important problem is 
Mr. Pearce and what he had to say because this case is based 
upon Mr. Pearce, not Sargent Arnn, not Tim and Jody Krogh, 
because they weren't in there and they weren't there for the 
few hours before that as to what occurred. So only Mr. 
Pearce and Chris know what happened-in that room. So you 
have to believe Mr. Pearce beyond a reasonable doubt. We 
don't have to convince you, Chris doesn't have to convince 
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you that he is not guilty. They have to prove that he is 
guilty based upon Mr. Pearce's t~stimony beyond a reasonabl~ 
doubt. 
Now what about, what other thing~ about Mr. 
Pearce's testimony shows that he is unbelievable? One of the 
main things is the .31. Now the officer tried to convince 
you based upon what he saw, his judgment that Mr. Pearce was 
not under the influence, he was not intoxicated, he was not 
drunk in the five or ten minutes that he spoke with him in 
the hospital. Sargent Arnn did not perform any tests on him, 
and that's the purpose of his blood. It doesn't lie. It has 
no judgment. It speaks for itself that a .31, four times 
almost the .08 presumptive limit for someone being under the 
influence of alcohol. Dr. Rothfeder testified, yes, there 
are some variables but a .31 is astronomically high and that 
.31 is true, it doesn't tell lies, it has no judgment, it is 
what it is. It's a scientific test that shows how much 
alcohol is in the blood, way beyond the limit. 
Not only do we have Dr. Rothfeder's testimony but 
we have the treating physician's testimony who has no axe to 
bear, who has no influence at all but who has intimate 
contact with Mr. Pearce·while in the hospital and his notes 
show that he was way intoxicated. 
So we have someone who is very intoxicated and then 
we look at Chris, according to Sargent Arnn that he was 
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better, that Mr. Pearce was better than Chris was when he 
talked to Chris. Well, Chris wasn't cooperative with him, 
all right? He was belligerent, smart, and uncooperative and 
probably· very unlikeable. That's (inaudible). And what's 
important is that, you know, he didn't do a field sobriety 
test, certain things that have been shown to be accurate in 
determining whether someone's under the influence, walk and 
turn, the finger to the nose, recitation of the alphabet, 
certain things that would indicate whether someone is under 
the influence. 
What else is important is that no breathalyser was 
given to.him that will scientifically show whether he was 
under the influence, what kind of breath did he have, whether 
he was under the influence and most importantly, no blood was 
drawn from him that will dictate to you exactly what his 
level was under scientific terms. So we have the judgment of 
Sargent Arnn who had already had the distinct unpleasant 
opportunity to talk to Chris when he was belligerent, 
uncooperative, ·smart, and just not very pleasing. 
And another important factor to take into 
consideration is the officers didn't take these - you know, 
my client, Chris is drinking beer. He acts like he takes a 
drink of whiskey but he doesn't. He acts like he is drinking 
beer and we have those five or six cans in the bedroom - and 
they have access to the entire house. They do not take any 
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of those cans into evidence. They do not check to see how 
many had had been drank, how many were still closed. They 
don't take any evidence of the R&R whiskey that Mr. Pearce 
·was drinking or any indication of how much he had been 
drinking. But we know that he was drinking and he's 
testified or he's given statements that he had been drinking 
from that afternoon all night and.we know that because when 
he was admitted into the hospital at (inaudible) in the 
morning he still had a .31. No amount of drinking on a 
regular basis every night will keep someone from being drunk 
if they have a .31, four times almost the limit. So he's 
intoxicated. 
So why is that important? Does he not know what 
happened to him? Yes. And why is that? What - alcohol is a 
depressant. It slows down the mental faculties of a person. 
It ·causes memory problems. It causes judgment problems. It 
reduces motor skills. It is a disabling drug, especially when 
you have .31. 
Then we have Mr. Pierce's testimony that he, that 
he testified that Chris was there that afternoon and all 
evening, was playing cards with them. And what did Tim and 
Jody testify to? No, he wasn't there all afternoon and 
evening. Chris didn't get there, from Jody and Tim's 
testimony, until after they had gone to bed around 9:00 or 
10:00 p.m, not what Mr. Pearce says - and you're called upon 
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to believe him, beyond ·a reasonable doubt. And he testified 
that this argument with Jody and my client using vulgar 
language to her happened before they went to bed, I'm talking 
about Tim and Jody. Both of them testified that it happened 
after, long after they'd gone to bed. They were awakened by 
them, both of them went outside and then there was this 
conversation between Jody and Chris. She used vulgarities, 
he used vulgarities and John said you should apologize. Both 
of them contradict what Mr. Pearce has to say and both - and 
his testimony contradicts what my client has introduced into 
evidence in regard to a receipt from an ATM that he got money 
out of the bank at around 9:59 or 10:00 p.m. that night and 
then he went ·home. So another contradiction. Another reason 
not to believe him. 
Then he says that when he goes into the bedroom - I 
just want to back up one thing, I don't understand ~hyi if 
you believe Mr. Pearce, that Chris waited to go into the 
bedroom to pull that gun. Huh? Did he pull it anywhere in 
the house? I mean, what was so importarit about the bedroom? 
I mean, he doesn't know where the gun came from. Obviously 
he didn't see him get it from any place in the bedroom or on 
his person. It just magically appeared. It could have 
happened in any place of the house. But supposedly they go 
in the bedroom and he immediately turns with this gun put to 
his face and cocks it and says I'm going to kill you or 
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something to that effect. 
And when Mr. Pearce is interviewed, a couple of 
days later, that thank goodness his own tape and the 
statement is transcribed, does he say on three occasions when 
he is specifically asked did he say anything and the officer 
tells him what he had said before, did Chris say anything 
about I'm going to kill you, did he say anything? And on 
three occasions during the same interview he says I don't 
know, maybe he did, my memory is not 100 percent, I'm not 
quite sure. And yet today he is absolutely sure because he 
has convinced himself of what occurred, not from his memory, 
not from what happened, but to continue that persona of the 
great protector, the heroic figure, not today, I'm· protecting 
myself -and he would probably kill Jody and Tim as well. 
They go into the bedroom, and if you look at the 
picture of the bed it;s obvious that Chris had pulled the 
sheets back and the blanket in preparation for going to bed 
unless he's so devious that he pointed that out as well. So, 
they go in the bedroom. 
All right. This is the front door or his door; 
it's a very small room, all right. Chris goes into the 
bedroom, not very far, and he turns and Mr. Pearce is right 
there in front of him, all right, facing out towards the 
hallway, right? The bullet hole is found way back up here in 
the wall. According to Mr. Pearce when he points a gun -
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also Mr. Pearce says, Oh, yeah, it was his right hand and 
Chris is left handed. He pulls the gun down and it goes off. 
~o not only is the gun directed away from where that bullet 
hole was but was down, not up but down. 
Now the officer thought that that was a bullet 
hole, that's why he investigated. He didn't find a bullet, 
but that's not unusual because as he testified it could have 
gone anywhere. He looked for it but he didn't look real hard 
'cause it could have dropped down behind a wall, it could 
have gone in a number of directions and there was no 
indication, no other hole in that room and neither did he 
look for any other hole after he supposedly only found out 
afterwards that the bullet was not longer in Mr. Pearce. I 
don't know why he was looking for a bullet hdle in the first 
place if he didn't, if he thought that the bullet was still 
in Mr. Pearce. Obviously he thought it wasn't and that's why 
he was looking for a bullet hole. 
So he's looking for this bullet hole and he finds 
one but he cannot find the bullet. And that bullet hole, 
it's location is consistent with Chris's statement to you. 
And you look at the photographs as to where Mr. Pearce was 
and where Chris was on that day and he's laying over the top 
of him, the gun goes off, it's going up like this and it's 
directly behind where· that hole was. 
You know, the prosecutor talked a little bit about 
106 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
--------·--·----···· ·--------- ----·-···---------- ------····· .. ·········---···--·-
the instructions and I just want to say a few words. In 
regard to discharge of a firearm, if you believe Mr. Pearce 
beyond a reasonable doubt then Chris is guilty, he pulled 
this trigger, he discharged that firearm. If you believe, if 
you don't believe him beyond a reasonable doubt then he's not 
guilty. You don't have to believe Chris beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you have to believe Mr. Pearce beyond a reasonable 
doubt and Chris's statement is very consistent with what the 
facts show, that Mr. Pearce in that struggle over the gun 
discharged the firearm. 
Now, is he guilty of assault in threatening Mr. 
Pearce with this handgun? Obviously a dangerous weapon. No 
doubt·about that. But ask yourself and put yourself in 
Chris's po~iiion. He's sitting on the bed, Mr. Pearce for 
the umpteenth time comes into that room without asking 
permission, without knocking on the door, just comes busting 
through that door and he comes over there and hets standing 
over· the top of Chris whose sitting on the bed. Chris is in 
a very vulnerable position because when Mr. Pearce goes in 
there he's obviously got in his mind this guy is going to 
apologize or ·r' 11 know better, and he stands over top of him, 
he's got his first clenched, he's standing on his feet which 
keeps him from moving and he says to Chris, You're going to· 
apologize. 
· Now what kind of thoughts would be going through 
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Chris's mind, what mind of reasonable thoughts would be going 
through your mind? I'm going to be attacked. Isn't that 
justification for getting that gun out and putting it to him 
and saying get out of my room? He didn't intend actually to 
use it unless he was attacked by Mr. Pearce and you would 
think any reasonable person would have backed off and gone 
out of the room but Mr. Pearce is not a reasonable person. 
He is a drunk person, irrational, using very bad judgment and 
he's going to make sure that Chris apologizes, threatening in 
a menacing way, physical injury to Chris. So under those he 
has the right of self protection to the assault, he didn't 
fire the gun in regard.to discharge of a firearm. 
So what about the defense's case? You can consider 
it but it's still not, we don't have to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt. They have to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt and you heard from Carol Ibarra and Marjorie Maughan, 
they talked to Mr. Pearce - Ms. Ibarra twice, once on the 
phone and once in person and what is said to them is this was 
an accident, an accident because it was an accident. And Mr. 
Pearce, he cannot go back and re-construct his statements, 
he's stuck with them. It was an accident. He talks to them 
on the phone and his mom who can hear him over the phone say 
it was an accident. This is John. It could have been 
another John. Really? You know, Carol was talking to 
somebody and she says to them, Can I ta'lk to John? He gets 
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on the phone. Yes, it's John Pearce, they know who he is 
now. They heard his voice and he says it was an accident, 
not some John Doe. Why, he wouldn't even know what ·they were 
talking about. But John Pearce, he's talking so loud that 
Ms. Maughan hears it and• Carol goes over the next week to get 
the rest of his stuff and John is there and he says again, 
it's an accident, I don't wish to prosecute, I'm not going to 
press charges. ·But here he is pressing charges. 
And then we have the testimony of Chris. He is on 
the road for an extended period of time, he keeps the log of 
where he's been, what he's doing and that's into evidence. 
He keeps the receipts, that's into evidence. He comes home 
late on the 30 th , he gets the money out of the bank and 
there's a receipt for that. He gets home around 10:00 or 
shortly thereafter and who is up? Just Mr. Pearce. As Tim 
and Jody also corroborate, they had gone to bed. So he is 
out there and said drinking a beer or two, he's trying to get 
his log together and everything and Mr. Pearce is talking 
about guns and they talk about guns and Mr. Pearce obviously 
knows that Chris has a gun and he's hounding him to show him 
this gun. And he walks into his room on several occasions 
without knocking or permission and he's just a~ he's just 
not very nice or very thoughtful which is in keeping with 
someone whose intoxicated. 
And finally Chris says I'll show you the gun. 
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Well, he tri~s·to get the .gun out without showing Mr. Pearce 
where the gun is, all right. He takes the bullets out and 
finally shows him about the fourth, fifth occasion and then 
they go back out. Chris is playing the guitar. He's not 
playing poker. He's playing guitar as Tim corroborated. 
He's out there. They're getting too loud and Jody comes out 
and then there's this vulgar conversation and John is 
incensed about that and Chris said, I'm not going to 
apologize which incenses Mr. Pearce even more. 
They go back to bed. There may have been one other 
occasion when they were loud and Tim comes out and says you 
all, both of you are going to be out of here tomorrow and 
then Chris says that he goes to his room to go to bed and Mr. 
Pearce comes through that door without permission. It's like 
being in your castle, although it is a very small little 
room. You have a right to some privacy, the right· to your 
own space, for the right not to be attacked or threatened by 
someone else. He hasn't put the gun back because he doesn't 
want Mr. Pearce to find out where it is. He's sitting on the 
bed getting ready to go to sleep and Mr. Pearce comes in and 
I've already told you what he did. And he acts reasonably 
under the circumstances to get that guy, this drunk out of· 
his room. But he didn't bargain for a drunk who will grab 
the gun. They fight over the gun, the gun goes off and Chris 
is saying, Let me see, let me see if you're .hurt. He's still 
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struggling over it because he's drunk. 
And finally, the police are there and he's, Chris 
is convinced by Mr. Pearce that it is going to go down as an 
accident and he gives the gun up and Mr. Pearce goes out with 
the .gun, and shortly thereafter Chris goes out. In the· 
meantime he has put on some clothes because he's only iri his 
black shorts and that's what he puts on and he goes out and. 
he is slammed down to the ground and you can see the injuries 
on him. This is not his photograph. It is the police 
photograph. This is no birthmark, that is a rub mark on the 
concrete. His knees are scraped as a result of going to the 
ground. All of this for an accident. It's not right but the 
police don't know that, you know, they think somebody had 
been ~hot and somebody did the shooting. So they slam him 
down to the ground and put the cuffs on him and they're so 
tight that they have taken his feeling out of hands and he 
asks them to lighten them up and nothing is done and no one 
has come in here to testify otherwise. He's taken down and 
then the officers are trying to be real nice to him down 
here, want something to drink? It's all being recorded then. 
But he is mad; an innocent man has been slammed down, 
arrested for an accident and therefore he is belligerent, he 
is uncooperative, he gets smart with the officers and that 
causes them to be not very pleasant when he ·comes to testify. 
Yes, he makes some phone calls from the jail and 
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it's quite believable as to what he knew they were going to 
be recorded and he made them anyway .. He wanted to know from 
Tim what was going on, so he played dumb. What happened 
here, I don't remember, to get all the facts out because what 
has been an accident has turned into an attempted murder. 
You know, he gets word that Mr. Pearce wants 
compensation and he's willing to do that and then he finds 
out that that's not going to happen. So he had to go to 
another game plan and the game plan is self protection. I 
mean, what would a person do in those circumstances? Isn't 
that believable? Isn't it reasonable and logical? And then -
and now we're here today. 
You saw his demeanor. I thought he was straight 
forward. He didn't, you know, beat around the bush. He 
didn't try to convince you of things that were not true. He 
didn't try to give explanations for everything under the sun, 
he answered the questions, answered them directly and ~' 
sincerely. 
You know, this is my last time. Mr. - George gets 
to get back up here and give another closing in essence 
because it's their burden and I hope that you take with you a 
few words of what I said. You know, 'it's not me, it's the 
evidence. I'm just bringing some things to your attention. 
You make the decision. I think it's beyond a reasonable 
doubt that this was an accident but we don't have to prove 
112 
~I 
~I 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
that to you and I think they've gone far, far less than 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Chris is guilty. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Vo-Due. 
MR. VO-DUC: Your Honor, thank you. Mr. Wilson. 
I'd like first (inaudible) not here because John 
Pearce wants us to be here. He did not put up with pressing 
charges. This is not (inaudible} but we are here because I 
charged him and if that meant -
MR. WILSON: Pardon? 
MR. VO-DUC: We charged him, my office charged. 
MR. WILSON: Okay. 
MR. VO-DUC: It had nothing to do with his wishes. 
Mr. Wilson will echo this, the State decided based on the 
investigation of the police what charges will be filed and we 
file charges that the victim wants us to file in certain 
cases you file cases that (inaudible), let's be clear about 
that. So let's not get the impression that this is a 
vendetta and that Mr. Pearce is.just out to get the defendant 
because it's convenient for the defendant's theory. 
Sargent Arnn - and please, your recollection 
prevails here but Sargent Arnn testified that that hole in 
the ceiling that the defense would like you to believe was 
caused by a bullet, he said no, (inaudible) I investigated 
it, I used a Saws All. We cut a section and, you know, I 
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looked at it. I have experience•in bullet strikes, hard 
surfaces and he- said as plain as day, that this was not 
caused by a bullet wheri I got up there but th~ def~ridaht was 
not very happy with that and kept pushing and he pushed 
Sargent Arnn into (inaudible) let's be quite frank, I told 
you this was riot a bullet, whi do you want me to surmise when 
I told you in my observations, in my experience with guns, 
this was not a bullet strike. 
So what you're being lead down to here is a bunch 
of distractions, but check your recollections of what Sargent 
Arnn - he was not (inaudible). We have to go blow by blow as 
to why he thought this was a bullet hole and he confirmed 
that in his significant experience, as a shooter, as a police 
officer, as a detective, this was not a bullet hole, and, in 
fact, this· was not the only hole in the w·all. I believe that 
was also testified to. There were other imperfections in the 
wall, in the room (inaudible). 
Now, of course, also Sargent Arnn is not impartial. 
Is anyone really, truly impartial? There's also an attempt 
to hypnotize you with this magic number 31 and this is the 
case here. We have·the evidence but the defendant's own 
evidence really makes the case, it's not about Mr. Pearce. 
And let's start with Dr. Rothfeder, very helpful.· We can 
agree that basically what he said·is it depends, .31 doesn't 
tell you anything, it depends on the individual. I will not 
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make, what he said, a conclusion, unless I know more. 
What did the nurses observe about the person? So 
Dr. Rothfeder, the defendant's own witness told you it 
depends .. 31 is not the end of the story because of the 
individual's build, genetic makeup, how long they'd been 
drinking, how long had they been a drinker? They build up 
tolerance and it also depends on what I as a doctor get from 
people who are seeing the person. So don't get hypnotized 
into .31, case closed, four time the legal limit for DUI. 
DUI, okay which is not what we're talking about here. 
Yes, 
at .31, drunk. 
(Inaudible) . 
evidence. 
I'll sell you the goods, that's man was drunk 
Did he get it wrong about a few things? 
That's not my belief. I'll show you with the 
Also again check my recollection, Detective Arnn 
said that he spoke to Mr. Pearce at the hospital and - within 
an hour of the event happening and then twice that night. To 
him Mr~ Pearce told him that Chris Mccallie had threatened 
him. Within one hour of the event happening Mr. Pearce had 
reported Sargent Arnn, yes, Chris Mccallie, before he shot 
said I'm going to kill you or something to that effect. 
There were two quotes and I had Sargent Arnn (inaudible) the 
quotes that he noted in his report. 
So please, your understanding, your recollection 
rules here. Fine. Let's get down to this case. This case is 
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not (inaudible). The defendant would like you to believe 
that without this man, this case is nothing. Wrong. It's 
thinking about the considerable amount of ~vidence and tw6· 
words came to mind, it's going to sound like a science 
lecture; one is vacuum. I say this vacuum because in this 
world nothing that happens has absolutely no effect on what 
surrounds it. Nothing goes through this world, not a 
particle, not a person, not an animal, not a rock acts on 
this world without affecting everything around it. That kind 
of evidence is what make this case. 
John Pearce, he was shot. No doubt. A gun was used. 
No doubt. That man's gun was used. No doubt. But let's look 
at the circumstances. First let's look at Mr. McCallie's 
actions before, during, and after these ·events. Let's see 
the effect 6f everyone's actions on the other people? What 
do you know about Mr. Mccallie that day? Angry man. He 
wasn't angry just when he was· apprehended by the police. We 
know he was angry when he uttered that word, cunt. Yeah, 
that word, it resonates so harshly right now. That was his 
anger right there before we know we're dealing with an angry 
man. Dealing with an angry man whose about to be evicted. 
Who is - where does the anger come from and how does 
that anger affect other people? Well, we know Mr. Pearce got 
shot. We know that anger also drives the subsequent actions 
of the defendant. He insulted Jody. He insulted the officer. 
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Right now the defendant would like you to believe that he got 
indignant, how dare you arrest me. No, the anger didn't come 
from the arrest, the anger came and the arrest resulted from 
the anger, from the acts that the anger prompted. He 
insulted the officers. This man was not indignant, by his 
own admission, and that's why I say that this case is not 
about this man, John Pearce. This case is made by the 
defendant's own actions and his words. (Inaudible), big 
guys. You think you can all handle me? Special Forces guy, 
knows his guns. By his own statement, I hadn't been 
drinking. Of course, here in the jail calls he said he's 
been drinking -
MR. WILSON: I object, Your Honor. 
MR. VO-DUC: = two beers, two beers and two shots. 
MR. ·WILSON: Okay. 
MR. VO-DUC: By his own ·statements that he agreed 
to on the phone calls. Belligerent, combative, yeah, Why 
don't you bring me a rum and coke. Heh, how about a 6-pack 
and a cigarette? Again, his own admissions. 
And then when he's told you're under arrest he says 
for what, for what, for what but this is within hours of this 
happening. Today he would like you to believe that he 
remembers crystal clear (inaudible) what happened. Look, 
nothing happens in a vacuum. This was an angry man who was 
angry before, he was angry during, he was angry after. We 
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can see his actions. This doesn't come through Mr. Pearce. 
Jody told you about the insults that he hurled at 
her~ Tim told you that he had evicted him. Offic~r Arnn and 
the defendant admitted to all this course of conduct. He was 
defiant from the very start, he was angry. You heard, No, 
I'm not going to apologize. 
So, nothing happens in a vacuum and it's the 
interactions of all these things that make the case. You 
don't have to just believe him, you also have other evidence. 
This case does not hang on this man. 
Now Mr. Wilson was perfectly right, common sense, I 
want you to use common sense. (Inaudible) 18 years to ·serve 
on a jury, 18 times 8, 144 years on this planet. We don't 
want people that we can just plug facts in. We could have a 
machine for that. You're here because you have significant 
experience in this world. You have significant experience on 
how the actions of certain people explain subsequent actions 
of other people in their home. We're asking you to draw on 
that. Look at all the evidence. But really, look at the 
evidence that this man has agreed to when I crossed him. He 
was angry, he had reason to be angry. He was mad at the 
woman who wanted to feed him, cannot - what was that -
understand normal thinking. So we see his words, the words 
that he admitted to having uttered really reflect his own 
state of mind before the shot and those words absolutely 
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undermine everything he would like you to believe today. 
Which leads me my second science word, but it's 
(inaudible). This vacuum, this lack of vacuum how, of the 
facts that I've offered react together, show an evolution, a 
progression of what? Of the defendant's fabrication. Recall 
when I crossed and I played the messages, this man's own 
words to his mom, to Tim Krogh, to his friend Chrissy. 
Listen to the words, they were all in chronological order and 
we see an evolution. ur need John to say this was an 
ac~ident." Well, first he says to Tim, I shot you? I shot 
John, I thought I shot you. I don't remember anything, first 
call to Tim, on the first (inaudible}. There's the evolution. 
A couple of weeks later to his mom, the second 
call, I need John to state that this was an accident. Day 
after, again to his mom, ur already have a game plan. John 
will be a team player. John will say this was an accident. 
However, in a phone call to Chrissy, Chrissy says and the 
defendant admitted this, John is unwilling to say this was an 
accident, to which it was then revised ur told him I'd take 
care of him, talk to him again, it'll be well worth his 
while." ucan you Chrissy get a little pushy with him?" And 
then the last one, uI'm going in a different direction with 
the story, I'm going a different direction with the story 
now, it's self-defense now since John doesn't want to play 
ball." That's the evolution of the story. The story that 
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he's had months to think about, to offer you. He's admitted 
he knew about these phone calls. We disclosed them. He's 
made the calls fit the story. It doesn't fit. We see the 
progression. 
Again, vacuum works with the evolution of this 
story. At first it's got to be an accident. No, no, this 
man won't go along with that, so we change. All of a sudden 
it's self-defense because he's not playing ball, John Pearce 
is not saying this is an accident, he refuses to. Again, we 
have this common sense appreciation of what's happened here. 
Now, this man may be w~ong. I'm not going to tell 
you that I think he's wrong on everything, right? There are 
contradictions. This man may be wrong,· that man is not 
telling the truth. The evolution of his story from the very 
beginning when they questioned him, what does he say? Why am 
I here? Why are you jerking me off? Nothing happened. You 
woke me up. You woke m~ up. He didn't say it was an 
accident. He doesn't say this was self-defense. Two hours -
MR. WILSON: Objection -
THE COURT: Counsel -
MR. WILSON: Can we approach? 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
THE COURT: Please don't interrupt during closing 
argument. This is· (inaudible}. 
MR. WILSON: I have to make my objection when it 
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occurs. I can't wait until the end of (inaudible). He's now 
commenting on my client's 
MR. VO-DUC: No, not even close. 
MR. WILSON: (Inaudible) he says, he didn't say it 
was self-defense. H didn't say it was an accident, you know, 
and now he's coming in here saying (inaudible). That is a 
comment on my client's right to remain silent and I move for 
a mistrial. 
THE COURT: And the motion is denied. 
(End of sidebar) 
MR. VO-DUC: (Inaudible) contrast. Again, common 
sense. Today he's had time to think about it, tried to get 
John Pearce to lie, say this was an accident. It didn't 
work. Now he wants you to believe this was self-defense. 
Why? Nothing happens in a vacuum. Why is Mr. Mccallie so 
intent on having you believe this was self-defense or that 
this was an accident? 
It's interesting, Mr. McCallie's mother was on the 
stand, we don't need an expert to know how a mother feels 
about their son. It was an interesting - her answer was 
interesting. She said she spoke to the def - to Mr. Pearce 
on the phone and her quote was this, uJohn Pearce told me, 
why would Chris shoot me, he's my best friend." Came out of 
that woman's mouth. Well, what do we know? Beyond a 
reasonable doubt from his mouth and from his, they're not 
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friends at.all. They were acquaintances at best, 
acquaintances at best. Well, what do we see? We see a 
loving mother who is telling you what Mr. Mccallie wants you 
to say - to hear. He's tried with him and it didn't work. 
Clear as (inaudible), he's my best friend. We know they're 
not best friends and (inaudible) not best friends. 
So nothing operates in a vacuum. Look at the 
facts. Don't hang this on John Pearce. Yeah, he's 
inconsistent. I (inaudible). But he took a bullet in the 
gut and everything else that follows, not just from these 
actions but from the evidence from Sargent Arnn, but mostly 
from this man's own words and course of action afterwards, 
he's co~ering it up. He wants you to believe a story that 
just doesn't hold up, a story that he tried to build over the 
last few months and his own words hang him. He's trying to 
pull the wool over your·eyes. He·is guilty of both counts, 
for threatening John Pearce and for shooting him and that's 
the verdict he deserves. 
THE COURT: I need to make one thing clear. The 
charges here as I identified earlier and as ·will be shown in 
the verdict form that needs to be filled out are discharge of 
a firearm with injury and aggravated assault. Those are the 
charges. There's, .you know, reference been made to attempted 
homicide, that -is not, those.are not the charges and I just 
wanted to ·make sure that that's understood. Okay? 
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{Whereupon the ~ailiff was sworn) 
THE COURT: This is the - let's see - where's the 
.(inaudible)? These are the additional•instructions although 
you have exact copies bf that but for purposes of the record 
I need to provide you the official ·record; verdict 'form that 
will need to be filled out and the exhibits that have been 
received into evidence and now the matter is turned over to 
you for your good judgment and for you to return a verdict. 
And I thank you in advance for the attention that you've paid 
so far and the work you're going to be doing next. 
Please rise for the jury. 
{Whereupon the jury left the courtroom) 
THE COURT: Please be seated. Ummm, for the 
record, Mr. Wilson made a mistrial motion. I don't believe 
that - I disagree that the comments by the prosecutor was a 
comment on the defendant's right to remain silent or not to 
incriminate himself but even.for purposes of this analysis, 
assuming that what essentially was, would have been construed 
as a slip of the tongue, the tests that I need to apply is 
whet~er it probably influenced the jury to the prejudice of 
the defendant. I am not persuaded that the comment, if it 
could be construed -as the defense has construed it, was a, is 
something that would be a - would have influenced the jury to 
the prejudice of the defendant, that it probably influence 
which is the test is that it probably influenced the jury to 
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the detriment .of the defendant. So that is the reason for my 
denial of the motion. 
MR. WILSON: Okay, for the record-I want to put on 
that the defendant was advised and invoked his right to 
remain silent when he was interviewed by the police even 
though he was belligerent and smart with the·police. So no 
statement was obtained from him in regard to the event. So 
the prosecutor, when he said that after he was arrested there 
was nothing, he didn't make any statements that it was an 
accident, that he was acting in self protection would lead 
the jury to believe that he has made that up between his 
arrest and today does prejudice my client and is obvious its 
intent, when given to the jury and the jury could not avoid 
l:;1 
the same conclusion. ~-
THE COURT: Response? 
MR. VO-DUC: Your Honor, the Court knows that 
accusation of recent fabrication, it's in the rules and that 
is exactly what the State was inferring, not that if - the 
argument was·not if he's so innocent why didn't he say that 
then? The argument is this, today he says this, that's 
inconsistent with what he said before which was nothing 
happened and none of their questioning. Before his rights 
were invoked, discussed because when they were invoked, you 
know, at the interview and so is it to show that this was a 
fabrication? Absolutely, not to smear the defendant and - as 
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Mr. Wilson suggested and I think that the method is perfectly 
appropriate for closing argument to highlight the 
inconsistency. 
MR. WILSON: But there is no inconsistency_ and I 
·would agree with the prosecutor in that nothing was said at 
the time that he was·arrested and to indicate that this is a 
recent fabrication, indicates that he didn't say anything 
about self protection or a accident when he was arrested and 
therefore what he's saying on the stand is a recent 
fabrication and it goes directly back to the fact that he 
remained silent when he was arrested. 
THE COURT: All right. I think the record has been 
amply made. 
you want 
I'll give 
MR. VO-DUC: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. WILSON: Thank you. 
MR. VO-DUC: · Can I give the Court {inaudible) .- Do 
my number? 
THE COURT: Yes, and Mr. Wilson -
MR. WILSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Will you be remaining or -
MR. WILSON: ·r' 11 ·be going back to the office and 
my phone number. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. WILSON: I'll turn it on. 
THE COURT: Yeah, that would be helpful. 
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